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Kazakhstan’s agricultural sector plays an important role in the country's 
economy. Not only does it function as an economic output producer, it also 
serves as a social buffer in times of transition to a market economy. The 
restructuring process had a strong impact on the economic performance of 
agricultural enterprises. As the state no longer functions as a back-up financier 
in times of economic downturn, farmers have to find their own sustainable 
instruments to manage business risks, which are significant in Kazakhstan due to 
the acute continental climate and the resulting revenue fluctuations.  
This thesis is an integral part of the research project "Crop Insurance in 
Kazakhstan – Options for Building a Sound, Institution Promoting Agricultural 
Production".  
It aims at shedding light on the question, how farm income can be efficiently 
stabilized under transition conditions. Furthermore, it will be attempted to 
answer following sub-questions by employing a utility-efficient risk programming 
model to three typical study farms in North, East, and South Kazakhstan:  
•  What are the most efficient income stabilization mechanisms for different 
farm types in Kazakhstan?  
•  How do climatic conditions and yield variability influence the efficiency 
of income stabilization instruments?  
•  How do assumptions about the decision-maker behaviour influence the 
choice and efficiency of selected farm income stabilisation instruments, e.g. 
to which extent risk aversion affects the choice of risk management 
instruments in a less developed country with extremely high coefficients 
of yield variation and often little diversified production systems?  
Although insurance solutions to agricultural risk suffer from being prone to 
asymmetric information problems, their possible impact on risk reduction will 
be investigated. Therefore, insurance products, which are able to limit the extent 
of moral hazard problems will be described and analysed.  
Additionally to the programming model, a farm survey as well as a stakeholder 
survey among political decision-makers, representatives of insurance companies Summary 
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and public administration and researchers have been carried out. The rationale 
for these empirical studies, particularly the farm survey, was to obtain information 
about production risks Kazakhstani farmers face, their attitude towards risk, and 
the risk management instruments they apply.  
Furthermore, answers will be provided to the question how the actual law on 
crop insurance in Kazakhstan can profit from findings generated in the course 
of this research.  
Considering the utility-efficiency of different risk management instruments, we 
can conclude that the separate regional analysis was a reasonable procedure, 
because no general recommendations can be derived from the efficiency results. 
Therefore, conclusions regarding the utility-efficiency of the considered 
insurance instruments will be drawn regionally.  
A large number of insurance products stabilises income efficiently as can be 
derived from the utility rankings. However, weather index insurance seems to 
be more appropriate in Northern Kazakhstani grain production. Area-yield 
insurance might be a reasonable alternative to weather insurance, since it provides 
a number of advantages in fighting moral hazard compared to farm yield insurance. 
Efficiency results as well as the analysis of variation coefficients show its 
applicability for East and South Kazakhstan conditions. However, the advantages 
providing better access to symmetric information should be evaluated against the 
potentially lower risk reduction. When introducing area-yield insurance, smaller 
areas (rayons) as the basis for the calculation of the underlying yield index are 
supposed to provide higher risk reductions than larger areas (oblasts).  
A central conclusion can be derived for all considered study farms simultaneously. 
The choice of the production technology is the decisive factor in risk management. 
The result can be connected to the evaluation of risk management responses of the 
farm survey. According to the interviewed farmers, the maintenance of capital 
reserves and production with low costs are two of the most important objectives 
in risk management. As results from the normative decision model show, these 
strategies are not ‘first best solutions’ for all considered farms. When crop 
production is insured, more intensive production technologies (with higher costs) 
might be more appropriate than low input technologies.  
For further research, we can conclude that decision-making conditions and 
criteria vary across geographic regions and by farm type; thus, subsequent risk 
models should be adapted to the unique conditions of the research domain because 
standardized modelling formulations can produce spurious results. Obviously, a 
natural extension of this work is the investigation of other crops and regions. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments 
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Future research should test the long-term economic potential of alternative crops 
under changing natural conditions and prices. Furthermore, different combinations 
of insurance with hedging products can be tested.  
The hypothesis that crop insurance often supports only large-scale farmers cannot 
be rejected when investigating the data on crop insurance market development. 
One of the reasons for introducing mandatory crop insurance in Kazakhstan was 
to provide all farmers with access to insurance, disregarding their risk exposure or 
the size of their enterprises. However, insurance companies have less incentives 
to insure small, risk-prone farms. The future task of the government will be to 
find appropriate enforcement mechanisms to motivate insurance companies to 
provide insurance to small farms or to transform the mandatory system into a 
voluntary one.  
A further government task involves breaking up the path dependence of crop 
insurance. The bad image of the entire insurance industry could be primarily 
overcome by setting right the legal framework, the incentives, and enforcement 
mechanisms. The objective would be to create an insurance system, in which 
insurance companies can generate profits with their clients experiencing justice 
and income stabilisation that provides a sound base for the development of economic 
activities.  
To strengthen the link between on-farm risk management and risk-sharing strategies, 
the government could promote research in agronomic methods to mitigate the 
effects of difficult growing conditions. Differences in agro-climatic environments 
such as soil type and fertility, moisture availability, distribution of weeds, and 
susceptibility to erosion should be better taken into consideration when 




Kasachstans landwirtschaftlicher Sektor spielt eine wichtige Rolle in der 
Wirtschaft des Landes. Die Rolle der Landwirtschaft liegt nicht ausschließlich in 
der Produktion ökonomischen Outputs, sondern dient vielmehr als ein sozialer 
Puffer in der Transformationsphase. Der Restrukturierungsprozess hat einen großen 
Einfluss auf die ökonomische Leistung landwirtschaftlicher Unternehmen. Der 
Staat fungiert nicht länger als ein natürlicher Rückversicherer in wirtschaftlichen 
Krisenzeiten, so dass die Landwirte eigene, nachhaltige Instrumente finden 
müssen, um ihre Geschäftsrisiken abzusichern. Diese Risiken sind erheblich in 
Kasachstan. 
Diese Arbeit ist ein integraler Bestandteil des Forschungsprojektes 
"Ernteversicherung in Kasachstan: Optionen zum Aufbau einer nachhaltigen 
Institution in der Landwirtschaft". Dieser Beitrag möchte die Frage beleuchten, 
wie landwirtschaftliche Einkommen unter Transformationsbedingungen effizient 
stabilisiert werden können. Mit Hilfe der Anwendung eines Programmierungs- 
models auf drei typische Betriebe in Nord-, Ost- und Südkasachstan wird versucht, 
die folgenden drei Fragen zu beantworten: 
•  Welches sind die effizientesten einkommensstabilisierenden Instrumente 
für verschiedene Betriebstypen in Kasachstan? 
•  Wie beeinflussen klimatische Bedingungen und Ertragsschwankungen die 
Effizienz der Instrumente? 
•  Wie beeinflussen Annahmen über Entscheidungsträgerverhalten die Wahl 
und Effizienz ausgewählter Instrumente zur Einkommensstabilisierung? 
Obgleich Versicherungslösungen zur Minderung landwirtschaftlicher Risiken 
anfällig für Probleme asymmetrischer Information sind, wird ihr möglicher 
Beitrag zur Risikoreduktion untersucht. Vor diesem Hintergrund werden 
Versicherungsprodukte beschrieben und analysiert, welche in der Lage sind das 
Ausmaß von Moral Hazard zu begrenzen. 
Über das Programmierungsmodel hinaus, wurden eine Betriebsbefragung sowie eine 
Befragung unter politischen Entscheidungsträgern, Repräsentanten von Versiche- 
rungsfirmen und öffentlicher Verwaltung sowie Wissenschaftlern durchgeführt. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments 
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Die Zielstellung dieser empirischen Studien, insbesondere der Betriebsbefragung, 
ist die Beantwortung der folgenden Fragen: Welchen Produktionsrisiken stehen 
kasachstanische Betriebsleiter gegenüber? Welche Risikoeinstellung besitzen sie? 
Und welche Risikomanagementinstrumente wenden sie an? 
Des Weiteren, werden Antworten gegeben auf die Frage, wie das aktuelle 
Gesetz zur Ernteversicherung in Kasachstan von den Ergebnissen dieser Arbeit 
profitieren könnte. 
Hinsichtlich der Nutzeneffizienz verschiedener Risikomanagementinstrumente 
können wir schlussfolgern, dass die separate regionale Analyse eine vernünftige 
Vorgehensweise darstellt, weil nur schwer generelle Schlussfolgerungen aus den 
Ergebnissen gezogen werden können.  
Eine größere Anzahl verschiedener Versicherungsprodukte stabilisiert Einkommen 
auf effiziente Art und Weise, wie aus erarbeiteten Ranglisten geschlossen werden 
kann. Allerdings erscheinen wetterbasierte Indexversicherungen besser geeignet für 
die Absicherung von Risiken in der nordkasachstanischen Getreideproduktion. 
Versicherungen von Rayon-, Oblast- oder nationalen Erträgen stellen eine sinn- 
volle Alternative zu wetterbasierten Versicherungen dar, da auch sie einige Vorteile 
hinsichtlich der Bekämpfung von Moral Hazard aufweisen. Allerdings sollten 
die Vorteile in bezug auf einen besseren Zugang zu symmetrischer Information 
abgewägt werden gegen die möglicherweise geringere Risikoreduktion. Für den 
Fall einer Einführung einer sogenannten Area-Yield-Versicherung bieten 
Underlyings, die sich auf kleinere Flächenausschnitte (Rayonebene) beziehen, 
höhere Risikoreduktionen als solche, die größere Flächen (Oblastebene) zugrunde 
legen. 
Eine zentrale Schlussfolgerung kann für alle Untersuchungsbetriebe gezogen 
werden. Die Wahl der Produktionstechnologie ist der entscheidende Faktor im 
Risikomanagement. Dieses Ergebnis steht in engem Zusammenhang zu den 
Ergebnissen der Betriebsbefragung. Den befragten Betriebsleitern zufolge, gehören 
die Akkumulation von Kapitalreserven sowie die Produktion zu möglichst 
geringen Kosten zu den wichtigsten betrieblichen Zielen. Allerdings zeigen die 
Modellergebnisse auch, dass diese Strategien nicht die First-Best-Lösungen für 
alle untersuchten Betriebe ergeben. Wenn die Erträge versichert werden, kann 
eine Anwendung intensiverer Technologien (mit höheren Kosten verbunden) 
sinnvoll sein. 
Für die weitere Forschung können wie schlussfolgern, dass die Bedingungen unter 
denen Entscheidungen, beispielsweise hinsichtlich eines Versicherungsabschlusses, 
getroffen werden, stark zwischen einzelnen Regionen und Betriebstypen variieren. Zusammenfassung 
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Demzufolge sollten zukünftige Risikomodelle an die besonderen Bedingungen des 
Forschungsobjektes angepasst werden, weil standardisierte Modellformulierungen 
zu falschen Ergebnissen führen können. Eine natürliche Erweiterung dieser 
Arbeit stellt die Untersuchung anderer Regionen und Kulturen dar. Zukünftige 
Forschung sollte das langfristige Potential alternativer Früchte unter veränderten 
natürlichen Bedingungen und Preisen erkunden. Darüber hinaus können 
verschiedene Kombinationen von Versicherungs- und Hedginginstrumenten 
getestet werden 
Betrachtet man den Versicherungsmarkt in Kasachstan, kann die Hypothese, 
dass Ertragsversicherungen oft größere Betriebe unterstützen, nicht verworfen 
werden. Einer der Gründe für die Einführung einer Pflichtversicherung ist   
die Schaffung eines gleichberechtigten Versicherungszugangs aller Betriebe, 
ungeachtet ihres Produktionsrisikos oder der Betriebsgröße. Nichtsdestotrotz 
haben Versicherungsunternehmen zur Zeit weniger Anreize, kleine, risikobehaftete 
Betriebe zu versichern. Zu den Zukunftsaufgaben der Regierung gehören deshalb, 
einen angemessenen Mechanismus zu finden, der die Versicherung von kleineren 
Betrieben im Rahmen eines Pflichtversicherungsprogramms gewährleistet bzw. 
die Umwandlung zu einem freiwilligen Versicherungssystem voranzutreiben. 
Eine weitere Regierungsaufgabe beinhaltet das Aufbrechen der negativen 
Pfadabhängigkeit von Ernteversicherungen in Kasachstan. Das schlechte Bild 
der gesamten Versicherungswirtschaft könnte primär verbessert werden durch die 
Setzung eines zuverlässigen Rechtsrahmens sowie der Schaffung von zusätzlichen 
Anreiz- und Durchsetzungsmechanismen. Das Ziel sollte der Aufbau eines 
Versicherungssystems sein, das Versicherungsunternehmen Gewinnerwirtschaftung 
ermöglicht sowie ihren Klienten den Zugang zu fairer Einkommensstabilisierung 
eröffnet, welche die Basis für eine Entwicklung wirtschaftlicher Aktivitäten 
herstellt. 
Zur Stärkung der Verbindung zwischen produktionstechnischen und finanziellen 
Risikomanagementinstrumenten sollte die Regierung die Erforschung geeigneter 
pflanzenbaulicher Verfahren zur Minderung der Effekte schwieriger Anbau- 
bedingungen fördern. Unterschiede in klimatischen Bedingungen, wie Bodenart 
und -fruchtbarkeit, Wasserverfügbarkeit, Verbreitung von Unkräutern und die 
Erosionsanfälligkeit, sollten mehr als bisher bei der Erarbeitung neuer 
Technologieempfehlungen berücksichtigt werden. 
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1.1  The role of agricultural income stabilisation in the transition  
process 
In past decades, economists have been changing their understanding of the 
relative contribution of agriculture and industry to economic growth. There has 
been a shift – away from an earlier "industrial fundamentalism" to an emphasis 
on the significance of agricultural development and productivity for the overall 
development process. 
Marx was highly impressed by the efficiency of large-scale farming in England 
and regarded the elimination of peasant farming as an essential step in agricultural 
development. His theory had strong impact on the structural developments in 
many former socialist countries, especially in the countries of the former Soviet 
Union. Large-scale cooperatives and state farms were created which were oriented 
towards output maximization. 
Increasing agricultural output by means of expansion of areas cultivated or grazed 
has played a dominant role throughout history. The most dramatic example in the 
Western history was the opening up of new continents as sources of food and 
agricultural raw materials for the Metropolitan areas in Western Europe. In the 
Eastern hemisphere, the largest project of crop area expansion was the Virgin 
Lands Campaign which took place between 1954 and 1964 and cultivated about 
30 million hectares of steppe in Western Siberia and Kazakhstan. This policy 
which was designed under Chrustchov extended grain production to marginal 
areas with extremely low and fluctuating precipitation. Since then, crop production 
has played an important role in the gross domestic product of Kazakhstan and 
serves as the most important base of living for about 43 per cent of the population 
that live in rural areas. However, agricultural business is risky and incomes from 
crop production are particularly prone to strong income fluctuations. Income 
stabilization in the agricultural sector plays an important role for overall economic 
sustainability and might justify income stabilising governmental policies. 
Stabilisation of agricultural incomes might significantly reduce incentives for 
rural-urban and international migration and human capital degradation. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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The justification for agricultural income stabilisation finds a good repetition in the 
multifunctional character of agricultural production. This means that agriculture 
produces jointly primary and secondary products. Primary products are food and 
fibre. Secondary products can be summarised as shaping the landscape, providing 
environmental benefits, such as land conservation, the sustainable management of 
natural resources, the preservation of biodiversity and last but not least a contribution 
to socio-economic development. Finally, agricultural income stabilisation might 
contribute to the narrowing of the rural-urban income gap and the fight against 
rural poverty, which are predominant problems in many transition countries
1.  
Worldwide, crop insurance is seen as an important instrument of farmers’ income 
stabilization. For politicians the introduction and promotion of crop insurance 
promises voters’ support and success in elections. An indicator of the political 
topicality in post-soviet countries are frequent headlines in recent press releases 
(INTERFAX AGRICULTURE AND FOOD REPORT, 2003, 2004a, 2004c, 2005b, 2005c, 
2006a). However, there might be more efficient income support mechanisms in 
place that would fulfil the same objective and better support smaller farmers. This 
contribution focuses on risk analysis on the farm-level and discusses the welfare 
implications of risk management instruments as a side aspect. 
From a normative point of view, policy objectives should be based on societal 
needs
2. The need for income stabilization in Kazakhstan’s agriculture is 
particularly reflected by the extreme crop output fluctuations caused by adverse 
weather conditions. The analysis of affordable and efficient risk management 
instruments in a transition country seems scientifically and practically rewarding. 
From a scientific point of view, unique data has to be collected and analysed to 
reflect the situation of decision-makers appropriately. Methods will have to be 
developed to account for structural breaks and uncertainty caused by transition. 
                                           
1  For a recent review of rural poverty in transition countries, see MACOURS and SWINNEN (2006). 
2 G ÓMEZ-LIMÓN and ATANCE (2004) discuss the importance of agricultural policy objectives 
from a society point of view by analysing the relative weights that people assign to the 
various potential objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the European 
Union (EU). Two of the identified societal objectives are directly related to rural income 
stabilisation, i.e. "to maintain villages and improve the quality of rural life" and "to provide 
an adequate income for farmers". Under the assumption of coupled direct payments as defined 
in Agenda 2000, both objectives were ranked important to very important compared to other 
objectives in a survey among 321 residents of the region "Castilly y León" in Spain. This 
indicates the relative political importance of income stabilisation measures in rural areas. 
There is no such evidence how comparable policy objectives would be evaluated in 
Kazakhstan. However, the fact that the support of rural areas is a major objective of 
Kazakhstan’s agricultural policy might show their societal importance, e.g. expressed in a 
programme on development of rural area, which was implemented in the years 2003-2005. Introduction 
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From a practical point of view, innovative risk management instruments can be 
tested on a pilot-basis and results and recommendations disseminated to political 
decision-makers, farmer organisations and insurance companies. 
1.2  Motivation and focus of the study 
As an area of research, the topic of risk management and crop insurance has 
seen a dramatic increase in popularity during the past decade. A search of the 
Ingenta Connect database indicates that during 2001-2005 the number of crop 
insurance related articles published in refereed journals was double that of the 
previous five-year period. COBLE and KNIGHT (2002) believe that a number of 
forces have attracted researchers to this seemingly narrow research topic. Primary 
among these is the fact that issues arising in crop insurance are at the interface 
of sub-disciplines within the agricultural economics profession. Crop insurance 
has attracted the interest of researchers interested in models of risk and risk 
behaviour. The topic fits also within the broader framework of farm management 
decision-making. Furthermore, it has appeal to those scientists who are interested 
in information economics and deal with adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Crop insurance is in most parts of the world a government-subsidised programme 
and thereby touches the research areas of welfare and constitutional economists. 
The analysis of crop insurance and risk management in a transition country, 
where political and economic structures are in dynamic change processes might be 
rewarding from a scientific and practical point of view. MISHRA and GOODWIN 
(2006) put forward two reasons, why the discussion on crop insurance has gained 
momentum in recent years. First, the liberalisation of agricultural markets may 
be associated with greater price instability. Second, under agreements with the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), crop insurance qualifies under certain conditions 
as ‘green box’ policies. 
This contribution aims at shedding light on the question, how farm income can 
be efficiently stabilized under transition conditions. Furthermore, it will be 
attempted to answer following sub-questions: 
a)  What are the most efficient income stabilization mechanisms for different 
farm types in Kazakhstan? 
b) How do climatic conditions and yield variability influence the efficiency of 
income stabilization instruments? 
c) How do assumptions about decision-makers on the farm-level behaviour 
influence the choice and efficiency of selected farm income stabilisation 
instruments, e.g. to which extent risk aversion affects the choice of risk 
management instruments in a less developed country with extremely high Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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coefficients of yield variation and often little diversified production 
systems? 
Although insurance solutions to agricultural risk suffer from being prone to 
asymmetric information problems, their possible impact on risk reduction will 
be investigated. Therefore, insurance products, which are able to limit the extent 
of moral hazard problems will be described and analysed. Furthermore, answers 
will be provided to the question how the actual law on crop insurance in 
Kazakhstan can profit from findings generated in the course of this research. 
1.3 Chapter  organization 
The thesis is organised in five chapters. Chapter 2 provides a theoretical discussion 
of risk sources and effects in agricultural production as well as possible risk 
management instruments. The chapter furthermore discusses obstacles to effective 
insurance market development. Finally, it motivates risk programming as the 
conceptual framework for analysing behaviour under risk and uncertainty. 
After the theoretical background for risk analysis in agriculture has been explained, 
chapter 3 describes the development of the agricultural sector in Kazakhstan 
during transition with special emphasis on the role of risk management in crop 
production. This chapter provides a detailed description of the three research regions 
Akmola, East Kazakhstan, and South Kazakhstan, which have been selected for an 
in-depth analysis. It consolidates the discussion of risk management instruments 
started in the preceding chapter by investigating on-farm and financial measures 
to manage risk efficiently under the described conditions. A special focus in this 
chapter is the critical discussion of the actual crop insurance system in Kazakhstan 
and the role of public support for crop insurance. 
Chapter 4 presents the empirical analysis of risk management instruments. First, 
the results of different surveys on the development of an adequate risk management 
framework are discussed. Interviews were conducted with farmers, scientists and 
representatives of insurance businesses, government institutions and agricultural 
lobby groups. The aforementioned results provide the background for the modelling 
of on-farm and financial risk management instruments from a whole-farm point 
of view. The applied utility-efficient programming model investigates the impacts 
of different risk management instruments on utility and income of the considered 
case farms. Sensitivity analysis is carried out and results are supplemented by 
findings of stochastic dominance and mean-variance analyses of insurance products. 
Finally, chapter 5 summarises the thesis. It places the obtained results within the 
context of policy design. Implications for current theory are pointed out as well 
as possible directions of future research.  
 
2  Analytical framework of risk and risk management  
analysis in agricultural production 
This chapter presents the most important risk sources and effects in agriculture. 
The following description of risk management strategies focuses on the 
management of production risk. Chapter  2.3 discusses obstacles to effective 
insurance market development. Finally, the main methodological approaches to 
decision-making under uncertainty will be described.  
2.1  Risk sources and effects in agriculture 
Agriculture is typically a risky business. Farmers as well as policy-makers have for 
long tried to cope with those risks. The most important risks can be categorized 
in the following way (BAQUET  et al., 1997; BOEHLJE and TREDE, 1977; 
FLEISHER, 1990; HARDAKER et al., 2004; ODENING, 2005): 
–  Production or yield risk. The particular characteristic that distinguishes 
agriculture from many other types of business is the high degree of 
production risk. This can be due to technological change, machinery failure, 
resignation of workers, weather effects, and other factors. Production 
technology plays a key role in influencing the extent of uncertain 
consequences. Production and yield risk in agriculture depends significantly 
on the farm type. Whereas yield risk in the livestock sector is less influenced 
by meteorological factors, crop farmers’ dependence on weather is greater, 
but varying across specialisations. For example, crop yield variability in 
irrigated cotton farming in South Kazakhstan is relatively unimportant 
compared to grain farmers in northern Kazakhstan regions. Equivalent 
results are presented by BLANK et al. (1997) for Californian farmers. 
–  Price or market risk results from changes in prices of outputs or of inputs 
after a production decision has been taken. The price changes result from 
different sources, such as variable interest on working funds, supply and 
demand variations on domestic and world markets, shift in agricultural 
policy, change of consumer behaviour, and deficient quality. In a survey 
conducted in Kazakhstan (HEIDELBACH et al., 2004), price risk seems to 
play a predominant role in farmers’ decision-making. Comparable studies Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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for the U.S. by PATRICK et al. (1985) and PERRY (1997) confirm the high 
importance of price risk, especially for wheat and cotton farmers. For farmers 
in developing and transition countries without access to futures and options 
markets, trustworthy information on prices as well as price forecast is 
important to make decisions on crop portfolio and storing or selling. 
Farmers in the developed world who are well-integrated into the market can 
progressively rely on price information provided by futures markets. 
–  Institutional risk reflects changes in policies and regulations negatively 
affecting the financial result of a farmer. For example, regulations
3 restricting 
the use of pesticides may alter production costs or foreign trade arrangements 
might affect output prices. The risk caused by policy measures might be 
partially reduced by increasing market liberalisation and decreasing subsidy 
levels. 
–  Human or personal risk is common to all business operators and relates to 
death or poor health of a principal or employees. 
–  Asset risk is also common to all businesses and involves theft, fire and other 
loss or damage of equipment, buildings and other agricultural assets. 
–  Financial risk comprises rising cost of capital, exchange rate risk, insufficient 
liquidity and loss of equity.  
–  A growing importance is attributed to contracting risk – A type of risk that 
involves opportunistic behaviour and reliability of contracting partners. 
The different types of risk are interrelated and become relevant in different 
economic situations. The empirical analysis of risk management instruments in 
chapter 4 focuses mainly on the analysis of production risk (as an effect of weather 
and technology changes) and price risk. Some scenarios of the risk programming 
model will highlight the effects of financial (variations in interest rates) and 
contracting risk (moral hazard). 
                                           
3  A recent example of institutional risk in German agriculture are the newly evolved debates 
about limiting the amount of foreign seasonal labourers in agriculture (Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 2005). In Germany foreign farm labourers are mainly used by labour-
intensive vegetable and fruit producers during the harvest season. Political decision makers 
discuss a potential positive effect on the domestic labour market, when the German 
unemployed will replace the foreign seasonal labourers who come since 15 years annually 
mostly from Central and Eastern Europe. German agricultural employers are concerned 
about negative consequences of the "job-creating campaign" of the federal government 
since they know about the often low motivation and physical condition of the unemployed. 
Farmers state that they would have to give up production, if they had to employ 
comparatively the less productive German unemployed (MDR, 2006). Analytical framework 
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2.2  Management of production risk in agriculture 
"Risk management is the systematic application of management policies, 
procedures and practices to the tasks of identifying, analysing, assessing, treating 
and monitoring risk" (HARDAKER et al., 2004). Two types of risk management 
strategies are normally distinguished: (1) on-farm measures and (2) risk-sharing 
with others (MEUWISSEN et al., 1999). 
On farm strategies concern farm management and include production portfolio 
selection, holding sufficient liquidity and diversification. Risk-sharing strategies 
include marketing contracts, production contracts, vertical integration, hedging 
on futures markets, participation in mutual funds and insurance. Other strategies 
include relying on public assistance and increasing the share of non-agricultural 
income. 
2.2.1 On-farm  strategies 
On-farm risk management measures aim at avoiding or limiting the impact of 
different types of risk. The following sections discuss the two most important 
on-farm strategies, which are the selection of less risky technologies and the 
diversification of enterprises.  
2.2.1.1  Selecting less risky technologies 
KIM  and CHAVAS (2003) investigated technological change and risk 
management based on data from Wisconsin research stations. They analysed the 
effects of technology on risk exposure. Their empirical results indicate that 
technological progress contributes to reducing the exposure to risk as well as 
downside risk in corn production. They reported that the technological change has 
contributed to a lowering of the risk premium, which they use as the criterion to 
measure risk exposure 
The technology diffusion debate has elicited a vast amount of economic literature
4, 
with much of it focusing on the explanation of slow diffusion rates of profitable 
technologies. The different identified factors imply different policy strategies for 
the promotion of new technologies. FOLTZ (2003) mentions four hypotheses for 
how and why new agricultural technologies diffuse throughout a region. These 
include resource scarcity, capital constraints, learning costs, and risk aversion. 
                                           
4  For a review of the literature, see FEDER, JUST and ZILBERMAN (1985). Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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Adopting technical innovation depends not only on the entrepreneurial skills and 
willingness of the decision-maker, but also on the availability and the price of 
the new technology. The protection of domestic agricultural sectors by means of 
tariffs, quotas and other trade barriers has in many countries positive external 
effects for domestic agricultural machinery producers, such as high import 
duties for imported machinery. In the case of Kazakhstan, there is a 40 per cent 
import duty on tractors. DYKER (2005) assumes that if Kazakhstan manages to 
negotiate a significant degree of protection for the agricultural sector in the 
course of WTO negotiations, some of the benefits of this protection might be 
passed on to the domestic agricultural machinery sector, to the extent that 
Kazakhstan farms buy equipment from domestic agricultural machinery firms. 
However, restriction of competition weakens technological innovations and might 
be an impediment for the competitiveness of the agricultural sector as such. 
2.2.1.2 Diversification   
The idea of diversification is to reduce the dispersion of the overall return by 
selecting a mixture of activities that have net returns with low or negative correlations. 
The diversification approach indirectly follows the thoughts of PENROSE (1995), 
who developed the resource-based theory of growth and diversification.  
Enterprise diversification is a traditional approach to risk management in 
agriculture (BARRY et al., 1995). In general, farmers will diversify more with 
increasing degree of risk aversion (HARDAKER et al., 2004). However, diversification 
can be costly if it means foregoing the advantages from specialisation through 
better command of superior technologies and closer attention to the special needs 
of one particular market. The merits of diversification are widely recognized. 
However, it was not practiced under the very specialised large-scale agriculture in 
the Soviet Union. Gradually, a stream of the scientific community in the CIS 
countries seems to acknowledge the advantages of enterprise and product 
diversification (SAFRONOV et al., 2005)  
YACOUBI et al. (1998) discuss farmer’s risk management measures in the case of 
drought, which is the most important natural hazard in Kazakhstan. They list 
following points as relevant in drought risk management: 
– Water  conservation 
–  Use of drought-resistant seeds 
– Diversified  farming  systems 
–  Development of off-farm sources of income 
–  Low input strategy 
– (Micro-)financial  services Analytical framework 
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Prospects of agricultural diversification will be discussed for the case of Kazakhstan 
in chapter 3.5.1.2.  
2.2.2 Risk  sharing 
A holistic approach to risk management requires to investigate the effects of 
financial risk management alternatives. Fisher’s separation theorem (FISHER, 1933) 
implies that it is better to diversify through capital markets than through a 
combination of enterprises. Therefore, risk analysis in agriculture should consider 
on-farm risk management instruments AND financial instruments for coping 
with risk. The empirical analysis includes marketing responses to risk (futures), 
credit and insurance as financial risk management responses. These measures 
are described in further detail in the following sections. Special emphasis is 
given to crop insurance products. A more comprehensive discussion of financial 
risk management measures can be found in HARDAKER  et al. (2004) and 
ODENING (2005). 
2.2.2.1 Marketing  responses 
TOMEK and PETERSON (2001) group marketing alternatives to risk management 
into three alternatives: First, spot-market strategies, i.e. diversifying the 
frequency of marketing of annually produced crops. Second, individual forward 
contracts, e.g. between traders of agricultural commodities and producers. Third, 
hedging via standardized futures and options contracts. In finance, a futures 
contract is a standardized contract, traded on a futures exchange, to buy or sell a 
certain underlying instrument
5 at a specified future date at a predefined price. 
Futures are quite similar to forward contracts, but with some important 
differences to be explained: In contrast to a forward contract between a single 
farmer and a single merchant, futures are standardized instruments with usually 
competitively determined prices. That implies that futures are always traded at 
an exchange, whereas forward contracts are traded over the counter. The credit 
risk of futures is lower than that of contracts, because the profit or loss on a 
futures position is exchanged in cash every day, whereas the profit or loss on a 
forward is only realised at the time of settlement. Thus, the forward contract 
credit risk exposure can keep increasing and a farmer might be better off with 
futures compared to a forward contract. The price of a future represents the 
expected value of the underlying discounted at a risk-free interest rate
6. The 
                                           
5  Frequent underlyings are assets, pensions or indexes. 
6  The risk-free interest rate is the assumed interest rate that can be obtained by an investment 
with no risk. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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value of a future F(t) will be found by compounding the present value S(t) at 
time t to maturity T by the rate of risk-free return r:  
) ( ) 1 ( * ) ( ) (
t T r t S t F
− + =  
2.2.2.2 Credit   
Credit is an important instrument of enterprise financial management. The adoption 
of a new technology as well as the ongoing production processes requires 
investments, with payoffs and revenues realized at a later point in time.  
To receive credit, a borrower usually has to fulfil several preconditions 
depending on the credit contract. In formal credit markets, the most important 
precondition is the existence of collateral for the case of loss of the ability to 
repay the loan in another way. Many farmers in transition and developing 
countries suffer from a lack of collateral and therefore do not get access to 
formal credit markets. The second problem that contributes to the failure of 
credit markets is strategic default, i.e. a situation in which the borrower is able but 
not willing to pay back the loan (RAY, 1998). The probability of loan default is 
especially prevalent where the legal enforcement system is weak (RAY, 1998). 
For these reasons, many informal credit markets exist based on different concepts 
that reach from mutual self-help initiatives to informal lenders, such as landlords, 
shopkeepers, and traders. During the past twenty years, the importance of 
smallholder access to credit has been recognised by international organisations, 
national governments and newly evolving credit organisations, such as the 
Grameen Bank in India that provides micro-credits to mostly poor rural people 
(GRAMEEN BANK, 2006).  
There is an opportunity to closely link the establishment of rural credit markets 
and crop insurance. It has been recognised that the development of crop insurance 
could help to improve borrower repayment discipline by diminishing farmers’ 
inability to repay low yields after occurrence of natural hazards. In Morocco, the 
Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole (CNCA) made the purchase of drought 
insurance a mandatory condition for obtaining an agricultural loan in the areas 
covered under the current drought insurance scheme (SKEES et al., 2001). Insurance 
is also compulsory in Mexico for those farmers who borrow from agricultural 
banks. Crop insurance will be extensively discussed in the following section. 
2.2.3 Insurance   
There are various types of insurance contracts available to agricultural 
enterprises, such as hail and fire insurance, death and disability insurance for 
farmers and family members, different types of insurance for machines and Analytical framework 
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buildings as well as crop insurance that in contrast to the other forms of insurance 
mentioned before, is mostly provided under subsidized government schemes.  
The functioning principle of insurance can be formulated as follows (RAY, 1998): 
Usually a farmers’ income at each date consists of three components, i.e. first, 
the average income (A), second, a random shock (ε ) that may have the same 
distribution across farmers, but affects each one independently
7, and third, a 
component (θ ), which incorporates all aggregate income variation that affects all 
farmers in a region at the same time. Aggregate or systemic income variations in 
agriculture can be often drawn back to adverse weather effects or infectious 
diseases that spread over space. The stated relationship can be algebraically 
expressed as: 
θ ε + + = A Y  
With the establishment of a (formal or informal) insurance funds with no 
administrative costs, the idiosyncratic component (ε ) can be diversified away, 
when farmers pay the expected value of ε, E(ε), as the insurance premium. 
Thereby farmers with positive values of ε  support other farmers with negative 
realised values of ε at a specified point in time. At another specified point in 
time contributors and recipients of the fund might change due to a change in 
idiosyncratic factors that influence individual income. The comparison of the 
situation with insurance  θ + = A Y  to the case without insurance reveals that the 
income with insurance carries less risk because the idiosyncratic component is 
removed. 
There are two main preconditions for the establishment of a perfect insurance 
market: First, the insurance provider must be able to pool the risks of a number 
of clients. Second, the insurance provider has access to information about the 
characteristics of the insured and is able to assess the future loss potential of the 
insurance pool in an appropriate way (RAY, 1998).  
The thesis is focused on risk management in crop production. Therefore, the 
following further discussion on insurance will be confined to crop insurance 
solely. 
Crop insurance – An International perspective 
Given the diversity of natural hazards, crops, and political systems worldwide, the 
experience of crop insurance policies is varied. Though the majority of the 
                                           
7  This component is also called idiosyncratic factor and is influenced by e.g. disease infestation 
of plants and animals or an inappropriate production technology.  Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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examples discussed in the literature stems from Northern America
8, a significant 
focus of the agricultural economics profession lies on the stabilisation of agricultural 
incomes in developing countries. Insuring farmers’ production and price risk has 
long attracted governments’ attention. The motivation for insurance and other 
income stabilisation programmes often originates in governmental concern about 
catastrophic risks such as drought, which might have an impact on national food 
security, or the desire to reduce loan defaults to banks (HAZELL et al., 2001). 
However, many different insurance schemes have been tried with modest success. 
In practice, many of the larger crop insurance programmes are state-subsidised by 
50 per cent of insurance premiums. Even at these high levels of subsidy, many 
farmers are still reluctant to purchase insurance. As a result, some crop insurance 
programmes have been made compulsory, e.g. in Japan, Mexico, and Kazakhstan. 
HARDAKER et al. (2004) question the utility-efficiency of compulsory schemes for 
farmers unwillingly forced to join. However, reluctant farmers may not insure 
under a facultative scheme, because of non-transparent information provided by 
the state or the insurance company.  
The diversity of insurance products makes it difficult to draw a clear distinction 
between them. Before starting an analysis of different insurance products, the 
most important ones will be presented and systemized to provide an overview 
(Table 2-1).  
Table 2-1:  Main crop insurance products 




Particular risk insurance  
Actual Production 
History (APH) 
Whole-Farm Income Insurance (NISA) 
Whole-Farm Gross Revenue Insurance 
(FGRI) 
Commodity Gross Revenue Insurance 
(CGRI) 
Income Protection (IP) 
Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) 
Revenue Assurance (RA) 
Parametric Insurance  Area-yield index 
Weather index  
Group Risk Plan (GRP) 
Group Risk Income Protection (GRIP) 





Catastrophic Coverage Level (CAT) 
Source: BOKUSHEVA and HEIDELBACH, 2003. 
                                           
8 See  BERG (2001) for a comprehensive overview about the crop insurance system in the 
USA and European Commission (2001) for an overview of crop insurance in industrialized 
countries. Analytical framework 
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Generally, one can distinguish between all-risk, multiple risk and particular risk 
insurance. Two additional important groups of insurance schemes should be 
considered separately: Parametric and catastrophic insurance
9. At the same time, 
two mechanisms of crop insurance can be distinguished. The first mechanism is 
based on the actual production history (APH) of the farm. APH provides the 
base for premium and indemnity calculations using the insured’s historical yield 
records. Another mechanism of insurance is the so-called parametric or index-
based insurance, which uses weather or area-yield indexes for designing insurance 
contracts. By this technique, insurance payoffs are subject to the occurrence of a 
special event or result, which can be described by an index (SKEES, 1999). In case 
of area-yield insurance, average area yield "triggers" an indemnity payment which 
is equal to the difference, if positive, between the annual area yield and some 
predetermined critical yield (MIRANDA, 1991). Weather index insurance will be 
described in more detail below. 
The next distinction can be drawn between crop insurance products is the 
particular objective they are designed for. Primarily, one can distinguish between 
yield-only (or crop) revenue and income insurance schemes. In contrast to crop 
insurance, revenue and income insurance schemes provide protection against 
both production and price risks. 
Aside from this ordinary distinction, crop insurance products may be modified 
with regard to the following issues: 
–  Participation (compulsory versus voluntary participation); 
–  Contract duration (multi-year versus single year insurance contracts); 
–  Monitoring mechanism and technique (who evaluates losses and how?); 
–  Re-insurance regulations (state as a backup-financier or international  
re-insurance?); 
–  Deductibles (yes or no and if yes, what percentage of insurance sum), and 
–  Prices and costs, which are used to calculate indemnities and premiums. 
Another important distinction to be drawn pertains to the organizational form of 
insurance provision. In this regard, several options exist: Private and state-
subsidized private insurance, insurance by the state and insurance on a mutual 
basis. VALENTINOV  and HEIDELBACH (2006) discuss the advantages and 
disadvantages of alternative institutional mechanisms of agricultural insurance, 
                                           
9  Parametric insurance products are based in indexes such as weather indexes. Catastrophic 
insurance is defined as insurance against catastrophic events such as severe droughts, 
floods, and hurricanes. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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such as the role of civil society and institutions in the organisation of agricultural 
insurance. 
This short overview shows that, although there exists a variety of insurance 
products at the moment, many of them bear a resemblance to each other and are 
based on the same features or functioning principles. However, there may be 
considerable differences in purchase decisions and risk reduction between crop 
insurance products. MISHRA and GOODWIN (2006) investigate revenue insurance
10 
purchase decisions. They motivate their research on revenue insurance by citing 
several studies on comparative advantage of revenue insurance compared to price 
support programmes or pure crop yield insurance. E.g. TURVEY (1992) compared 
public expenditures per monetary unit (dollars in this case) of risk reduction and 
found revenue insurance was the best at promoting self-insurance through 
diversification. Similar results were obtained by GRAY et al. (1994), HARWOOD et al.  
(1994, 1999) and HENNESSEY et al. (1997). STOKES et al. (1997) show that 
insuring for the whole farm’s revenue is more efficient than insuring each crop by 
a different revenue insurance policy. COBLE et al. (2000) demonstrate that revenue 
insurance may be a substitute for alternative risk reduction strategies, such as 
hedging with futures and options. MAHUL and WRIGHT (2003) indicate that revenue 
insurance contracts might be complementary to typical hedging instruments. 
However, all mentioned studies do not include weather index insurance (WII)
 11, 
which is a relatively new insurance instrument. The following section will compare 
weather index insurance to other available insurance products. A special focus lies 
on the applicability of insurance products under transition conditions. 
2.2.3.1  Comparison of crop insurance products with regard to their applicability 
in a transition economy 
In order to support the development of sound crop insurance, alternative insurance 
products should be considered for discussion. The following comparison will shed 
some light on the design of adequate insurance products for a transition country 
like Kazakhstan. 
 
                                           
10 Revenue Insurance programmes, such as RA, IP, and CRS provide coverage to producers 
against lost revenues or incomes caused by low prices, low yields, or a combination of 
both. An indemnity is paid when any combination of yield and price results in revenues 
that lie below a pre-defined guarantee level. 
11  WII is a type of parametric insurance. Parametric insurance uses triggers that describe the 
naturally occurring event such as the intensity and location of a storm, the number of 
millimetres of precipitation, or the height of flood. These parameters are outside the 
control of the parties to the hedge contract.  Analytical framework 
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BOKUSHEVA (2004) compares different crop insurance products regarding their 
applicability in transition countries. She finds that index-based insurance provides 
some important advantages compared to other insurance types, primarily due to 
their capacity to reduce transaction costs on the insurance market. In the case of 
transition countries, area-yield crop insurance could allow to manage to some 
extent the problems of limited data availability. On the other hand, as serious 
differences in farm productivity
12 are prevalent during transition, using area-
yield as a reference value for risk pooling should be considered with caution. Thus, 
WII can be viewed as a preferable insurance product under these circumstances. 
Like other crop insurance products, weather-based insurance cannot solve the 
problem of systemic risk pooling. An important precondition regarding the 
establishment of a WII product is the provision of reliable and affordable weather 
information for insurance market participants. This issue underlines the importance 
of institutional frameworks.  
At the initial stage of insurance market development, a great deal of attention 
must be paid to educating potential customers on insurance matters. In the light 
of bad experiences with insurance during the Soviet era, farmers in transition 
countries might be sceptical about crop insurance. Hence, pilot projects must 
be started to convey farmers the advantages of their participation in the initial 
stages of crop insurance market development. In this regard, a strong engagement 
of government and public agencies is indicated.  
In the view of a less-developed financial market in a transition economy, crop 
insurance can be considered as a possible instrument of a farmer’s income 
stabilization. BOKUSHEVA’s analysis (2004) shows that area-yield insurance (AYI) 
and WII provide more advantages compared to multi-peril crop insurance and 
revenue insurance in a transition context. These advantages include:  
–  Insurers can more accurately assess the actuarial fairness of premiums, and 
thus reduce the adverse selection problems, because only systemic risk is 
to be insured; 
–  Both schemes have relatively low transaction costs; 
–  AYI is better applicable given prevailing data limitations on the farm level; 
–  WII is less bureaucratic, and thus provides less scope for corruption
13; 
                                           
12 Table 3-16 shows productivity differences expressed in the correlation of farm yields of 
main crops for the three rayons investigated in chapter 4.4.3. Chapter 3.1 discusses the 
development of the agricultural sector in Kazakhstan before and after transition. 
13  Precondition is the establishment of a dense net of telemetric weather stations that are not 
possible to manipulate. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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–  WII is better positioned to avoid moral hazard because of objective nature  
of parameters that trigger indemnity payments. 
WII is a promising alternative also in the eyes of the Worldbank. MAHUL (2006) 
sees two other advantages of WII, i.e. 
–  Quick disbursement. WII claims can be settled right after the occurrence 
of an insured event, as weather data is usually available on a daily basis. 
This immediate claim settlement allows farmers to get access to quick 
liquidity. 
–  Availability. WII could be made available to a wide variety of parties 
(including farmers, agricultural lenders, traders, processors, input suppliers, 
agricultural workers) who have an insurable interest, i.e. adverse weather 
events create monetary losses. 
The World Bank plans to support the establishment of a network of weather 
stations in Kazakhstan. Furthermore, it is planned to test WII in some pilot 
regions. 
Nevertheless, some important issues remain unresolved despite introducing these 
advanced insurance schemes (BOKUSHEVA, 2004): 
–  AYI and WII do not solve the problem of risk pooling; 
–  Both products generate a higher basis risk compared to individual insurance 
products; 
–  Neither of them provides protection against price risk; 
–  There exists a danger that risk-averse farmers may change their production 
patterns in a way that increases systemic risk; 
–  AYI can lead to adverse selection since it is based on average yields of a 
region; 
–  WII is attractive for those farmers, who look for insurance against only 
one, most serious risk – other important risks cannot be insured; 
–  Risk-averse farmers could prefer farm-level insurance to area products, 
thus WII might be more attractive for them compared to AYI. 
MAHUL (2006) discusses other challenges related to WII, i.e.: 
–  Imperfect coverage. Careful design of the terms and conditions of the 
weather index insurance policy is critical to ensure that the indemnity 
payment is commensurate with the incurred loss. However, by definition, 
the index is a proxy of the real loss and thus one cannot exclude that the 
indemnity may slightly under-estimate (or over-estimate) the actual loss. 
–  Measurements. WII relies exclusively on the index measurements reported 
by the weather stations. It is thus critical to further develop more secure, Analytical framework 
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tamper-proof stations and instruments and, whenever it is possible, to 
double-check these measurements with nearby stations or satellite data (e.g., 
remote sensing data).  
–  Actuarial modelling. The modelling and rating of WII differ from those 
used for standard lines of insurance business. They mainly rely on recent 
catastrophe risk modelling techniques. In particular, it is critical to identify 
any possible downward trend, such as inter-temporal decreasing rainfall due 
to climate change, because such trend may jeopardize the viability of such 
products. 
–  Securitization. WII is a new type of financial product where the underlying 
asset is a weather index. Financial market institutions are attracted by those 
types of products not correlated with their asset portfolio and thus which 
allow them to increase the performance of their portfolio. While they are 
sometimes reluctant to invest in insurance and reinsurance companies 
because they do not fully understand the risks faced by these companies, the 
products focusing only on specific insured events (rainfall, temperature) are 
more transparent and thus more attractive. This may facilitate the access of 
the reinsurance market to the capital markets through securitization. 
–  Education. WII is a combination of insurance concepts and financial concepts. 
Education campaigns and training should be organized by government 
agencies to explain these concepts to potential providers (insurers) and 
potential customers (farmers, banks, etc.) (s. a. VALENTINOV, 2006). 
Although it is an old idea (HALCROW, 1949) WII received in recent times global 
attention, which can be concluded from the number of worldwide projects related 
to that topic. The World Bank and other institutions have been piloting weather-
based index insurance contracts in Morocco, Mongolia, Peru, Vietnam, Ethiopia, 
Guatemala, India, Mexico, Nicaragua, Romania, and Tunisia (SAWADA, 2006; 
NIETO et al., 2006; SKEES et al., 2001) 
A further indicator of the actuality of the topic is the number of presentations on the 
IAAE conference 2006 dedicated to it. There were two complete sessions dealing 
with the introduction and implementation of weather-index insurance (BREUSTEDT 
and LARSON, 2006; BERG et al., 2006; KARUAIBE et al., 2006; TAKAHIRO and 
KUROSAKI, 2006; MUßHOFF et al., 2006; GOODWIN and MAHUL, 2006; GINE et al., 
2006; SARRIS, 2006) as well as a session on drought as the most important 
hazard affecting agricultural production (PANDEY et al., 2006; HERTZLER et al., 
2006; GAUTAM, 2006;  ANDERSON, 2006). Additionally one poster has been 
presented, which is directly related to this thesis (BOKUSHEVA et al., 2006) 
Whereas most models on optimal hedging/insurance of a single risk investigate 
only one type of risk management instrument, MAHUL (2003) combines individual 
and index-based insurance contracts. Mahul illustrates the role of an index-based Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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contract as a market-enhancing instrument using two representative wheat farms 
located in France. The efficient frontiers show the efficiency gain provided by 
an optimal combination of the two hedging instruments. The author shows that 
this gain decreases as the individual yield variability increases and/or the degree 
of correlation decreases.
14 
2.2.3.2 New  developments 
Another new development is the emerging of traded weather derivatives. Though 
weather derivatives and weather-index insurance have many things in common, 
there are differences between the two: The Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(CME, 2006) defines weather derivatives in contrast to weather insurance as 
follows: "…weather derivatives cover low-risk, high probability events. Weather 
insurance on the other hand, typically covers high risk, low probability event." 
This is true as long as weather insurance covers events like floods and hurricanes. 
In the case of rainfall-based crop insurance the probability of drought occurrence 
might be higher, while the risk involved is lower than in the definition above. 
Furthermore, satellite imagery offers new opportunities for agricultural insurance. 
The new generation of crop index-based insurance products will be based on the 
combination of available historical ground data and high precision remote 
sensing data (MAHUL, 2005). The use of advanced remote-sensing technology 
for monitoring purposes offers the opportunity to obtain independent, reliable 
information about field sizes, date of sowing and yields. The first crop insurance 
programme based on this technology is the pasture-satellite imagery insurance 
programme in Canada. The use of this technology for crop insurance is under 
investigation in some developing countries. According to expert statements, first 
tests were conducted for Kazakhstan (SPIVAK, 2003). DORAISWAMY et al. (2002) 
tested a satellite imagery system for crop yields assessment in the spring wheat 
belt of north Kazakhstan. Results show that the system works in general, but 
would have to be calibrated to the natural conditions in Kazakhstan. Although, 
multiple-peril crop insurance is not yet introduced in Germany, the insurance 
industry has already designed applicable insurance products. These products 
consider the specific risk potential by accounting for regionally specific weather 
risks, crop-specific risks and soil conditions. For the evaluation of the drought 
risk of a regional soil, a database of the Federal Institute for Geosciences and 
                                           
14 The applied risk programming model (s. chapter  4.4.3) also offers the opportunity to 
combine different insurance products at the same time. However, the allowed combination 
is not in the sense of Mahul as a buy-up for the total area. The model rather considers 
different insurance products for different parts of the total crop area. Analytical framework 
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Natural Resources (BGR) is being used (BÖHME, 2006). This approach could be 
exemplary for other countries. 
2.2.3.3  Insurance in the light of WTO negotiations 
Both, income and crop insurance schemes are part of the green box, which is 
defined in Annex 2 of the Uruguay Round Agriculture Agreement
15. In order to 
qualify, green box subsidies must not distort trade, or at most cause minimal 
distortions. They have to be government-funded and must not involve price 
support. In the current negotiations, some countries argue that some of the subsidies 
listed in Annex  2 might not meet the criteria of the annex’s first paragraph – 
because of the large amounts paid, or because of the nature of these subsidies, the 
trade distortion they cause might be more than minimal. Among these subsidies is 
government financial participation in income insurance and income safety-net 
programmes as stated in paragraph 7 of Annex 2. The regulations stated here and in 
paragraph 8 (payments for relief from natural disasters) have to be taken into 
consideration when designing agricultural insurance (WTO Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture). 
2.2.4 Political  considerations 
As mentioned in the introduction, the formulation of policy objectives and 
recommendations should be led by societal needs. From a normative point of view, 
financial risk management products should increase overall welfare. Concretely, 
we might raise the question, how insurance market development influences 
overall economic development. KUGLER and OFOGHI  (2005) discuss in their 
recent paper the relationship between insurance market development and overall 
economic growth. In contrary to WARD and ZURBRUEGG (2000), their results 
show for most insurance types a positive relationship between insurance market 
development and economic growth.
16 
Under the assumption that insurance market development positively contributes to 
welfare, the question arises, how insurance should be designed. For the 
agricultural insurance context, one has to keep in mind that farmers’ incomes are 
more variable than incomes of non-farmers (MISHRA et al., 2002). In the same 
context, INNES (2003) discusses the effects of ex ante crop insurance versus ex post 
disaster relief in a political economy. The applied model depicts how crop insurance 
                                           
15 <http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14-ag_02_e.htm#annII>. 
16 Although KUGLER and OFOGHI (2005) are not considering agricultural insurance, the 
results might apply for it as well. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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can deter relief payments and improve production incentives by countering moral 
hazard problems. Under several assumptions (see INNES, 2003), an optimal ex ante 
farm policy (a) insures farmers against the distress that otherwise prompts ex post 
government disaster relief, (b) offers an output subsidy that counters the 
underproduction incentive created by the government revenue guarantee, and (c) 
limits government programme costs by charging farmers for the programme. 
BABCOCK  and  HART (2005) investigate the effect of premium subsidies on 
farmers’ insurance coverage decisions. Investigating U.S. data, they come to the 
conclusion that subsidizing higher coverage levels induced farmers to buy crop 
insurance at greater than 65  per  cent coverage levels. However, the subsidy 
became necessary to reduce disincentives caused by inappropriate ratemaking 
procedures. The authors estimate that acreage with higher coverage would decrease 
significantly if subsidies were decoupled. The positive effect of the introduction 
of coupled subsidies on the decision to buy additional coverage will make it 
difficult to find arguments to change this policy after ratemaking was adjusted. 
This relationship highlights the importance of the sound establishment of a crop 
insurance system. When having the chance to build up a new system from scratch, 
particular effort should be put in a sound ratemaking procedure. 
As the legislative power, the government and the parliament of a country can choose 
between a compulsory or voluntary insurance system. Compulsory insurance 
solves the misallocation of risks in the economy and the organisation of a system 
to compensate the victims (GOLLIER, 2005). However, Gollier is more sceptical 
than optimistic about compulsory insurance. He states that compulsory insurance 
has been funded by a flat, non-discriminatory, non-incentive compatible insurance 
tariff. The policy holders investment in loss prevention would not be observed by 
the fund because it is difficult to get information on it or because the fund did not 
get a positive incentive to organise an incentive-compatible system. 
A compulsory insurance scheme usually undermines the farmer’s decision-
making autonomy and hence affects activity of individual farmers. In such 
circumstances, farms are forced to employ risk-management instruments, which 
may not provide the best solution to the farm's problems, or must even pay for 
services which they do not need. It violates free decision-making and factor 
allocation. Additionally, a compulsory insurance scheme is usually regulative, 
which prevents insurance companies from setting actuarially fair premiums.
17 
                                           
17 At this point, we might ask, why the Government of Kazakhstan chose to introduce a 
ompulsory crop insurance. One of the reasons is definitely the political will to offer an 
insurance to all farmers in Kazakhstan and not to compensate high-risk farmers in certain 
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2.3  Obstacles to effective insurance market development 
A necessary condition for a demand for risk management instruments is risk-averse 
preferences of potential risk managers. A risk management instrument increases 
the users’ welfare only when their income is less prone to risk with than without 
the respective instrument. This assumption is restrictive, in the sense that farmers 
might change their production depending on the risk management instruments in 
place. For instance, under subsidised insurance, it is conceivable that the part of 
relatively risky crops will be increased, since the insurance compensates the 
additional risk. In such a case, the total risk of the producer stays constant, but 
the expected value of profit increases. Availability of financial risk management 
measures (risk-sharing strategies) influences decisions on diversification and 
technology choice. 
The main precondition for insurance market development is insurability, which 
hinges on whether individually rational insurance policies are available, i.e. 
policies which make both, clients and insurance companies better off than in the 
absence of insurance (CHAMBERS, 1989). More specifically, rational insurance 
policies have to be available for a sufficient number of individuals to realise the 
law of large numbers. In addition, the literature specifies two further aspects that 
have an effect on insurability: Asymmetric information and systemic risk. In 
assessing the insurability of risks in agriculture, MIRANDA and GLAUBER (1997) 
identify both as basic conditions for risk insurability: First, the insurer and the 
insured should have very nearly symmetric information regarding the probability 
distribution of the underlying risk; second, the risks should be nearly independent 
across insured individuals. The following two sections discuss these obstacles to 
insurability. 
2.3.1 Asymmetric  information in insurance markets 
Asymmetric information manifests itself primarily in terms of adverse selection 
and moral hazard. Adverse selection in insurance markets is caused by the 
inability of the insurer to accurately rate the risk of loss of individuals who 
purchase insurance. Thus, under asymmetric information, low risk individuals 
may not be able to obtain an equilibrium insurance contract, resulting in a 
market failure (CHAVAS, 2004). Moral hazard is a result of hidden actions of the 
                                           
regions only. As results from a farm survey show, there is a strong disapproval of 
compulsory crop insurance in Kazakhstan. Although 64.4  per cent of the respondents 
would like to be insured, only 37  per cent of this number believe that crop insurance 
should be compulsory (HEIDELBACH et al., 2004). Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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insured, which increase the risk of loss of the insurer. In the context of the 
principal-agent model, this means that the principal cannot observe the agent’s 
effort level. It implies that the effort level cannot be specified in the contract terms. 
When effort is costly, this gives an incentive for the agent to apply little effort, 
which may be detrimental to the efficiency of resource allocation (CHAVAS, 2004). 
Theoretical and empirical studies (AKERLOF, 1970; ROTHSCHILD  and  STIGLITZ, 
1976; MAKKI and SOMWARU, 2001) have shown that adverse selection reduces 
the consumption of insurance by low-risk individuals or businesses, and results 
in the transfer of income from low-risk to high-risk insured. MIYAZAKI (1977) 
demonstrates that, when it is impossible or highly-expensive to distinguish between 
low- and high-risk insurance applicants, the insurer prices insurance contracts at 
an average premium for all individuals. That results in undercharging high-risk 
customers and overcharging low-risk customers for similar contracts.  
Past experience suggests that most popular crop insurance schemes, particularly 
multi-peril yield insurance and revenue insurance, are prone to adverse selection 
and moral hazard. Both prevent the emergence of commercial, all-risk agricultural 
insurance. Therefore they will be discussed in the following sections. 
2.3.1.1  Accounting for moral hazard 
Moral hazard has several economic implications. According to KOTOWITZ (1987) 
moral hazard enclose "actions of economic agents in maximizing their own 
utility to the detriment of others, in situations where they do not bear the full 
consequences or, equivalently, do not enjoy the full benefits of their actions due to 
uncertainty and incomplete or restricted contracts which prevent the assignment of 
full damages (benefits) to the responsible agents." DOHERTY and MAHUL (2006) 
explain the occurrence of moral hazard in an empirically more applicable way. 
They state that the occurrence of catastrophic events (so-called frequency risk) is 
beyond the control of individuals, while the economic impact (risk severity) is 
not. An agent can reduce the severity of given events by applying risk mitigation 
strategies. By reviewing the literature, this section will explain economic 
impacts of moral hazard and mention some of the countermeasures that can be 
taken to reduce the negative impacts. Several references to the empirical part of 
this contribution will show how impacts and countermeasures were investigated 
for the case of Kazakhstan. 
BORCH  (1990) discusses moral hazard as a possible explanation for insurance 
markets failures. First of all, it might reduce insurability of crops by shifting the 
insurer’s expected utility curve inwards, as depicted in Figure 2-1 (see CHAMBERS, 
1989). For the Pareto-optimal expected utility frontier, the relevant region is the 
portion lying to the northeast of A where both, insurers and farmers are better Analytical framework 
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off than in autarky. For an insurable agricultural market, A lies on or below the 
Pareto-optimal expected-utility frontier. If moral hazard shifts the curve to the 
origin (V2 to V1), the probability that agricultural risk is not insurable rises. 









Source:  Own figure based on CHAMBERS (1989).  
Note:  U=Utility, V=Expected profit of insurers. 
Second, moral hazard leads to less than full insurance with the effect that the 
insured retains some incentive to reduce losses. Thus, moral hazard causes 
deadweight losses that may prevent the development of profitable agricultural 
insurance markets without state subsidies
18.  
As we have learned from the literature cited above, moral hazard has several 
negative economic effects. What can be done to reduce or abandon these effects? 
According to a part of the literature, countermeasures are deductibles and co-
insurance
19. The introduction of deductibles or limited coverage is a traditional 
argument to stimulate self-protection of the insured (HUBERMAN et al., 1983). 
CHAMBERS (1989) disagrees on this point and states that increasing deductibles 
is a bad strategy because high deductibles make the highest revenue states less 
attractive for producers and thus provide a disincentive for self-protection. 
Chambers recommends that agricultural insurance policies should include outcomes 
for which the farmer bears the entire burden of revenue risk. Furthermore, the 
asymmetric information problem should be solved directly, e.g. insurance companies 
                                           
18  An empirical investigation in chapter 0 quantifies the arising deadweight losses from moral 
hazard for investigated farms. 
19  The simplest type of indemnity payment is one in which the insurer pays a fixed proportion 
of the loss. This type of insurance indemnity is often referred to as coinsurance, since the 
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should collect as much a priori information about farmers as possible. If available, 
insurers may also use any contemporaneous information on farming practices.  
Another measure against moral hazard are multiyear contracts, i.e. the contracts 
have a memory and the insurance company is able to sanction the insured for 
high indemnity payments in the past. Multiyear contracts are more widely 
distributed in life insurance. However, the willingness to sign multiyear contracts 
was tested in the farm survey and will be discussed in chapter 4.4.2.2. 
In recent times, HALCROW’s (1949) historic proposal for a crop insurance contract 
where indemnities are based not on a producer’s individual yield, but instead on 
the aggregate yield of a risk pool was intensively discussed in literature. Several 
studies (e.g. MIRANDA, 1991; BOURGEON and CHAMBERS, 2003) stressed the 
advantages of area-yield insurance as compared to farm-yield insurance. Miranda, 
in particular, emphasises its ability to prevent adverse selection problems associated 
with farm-yield insurance. Moreover, area-yield contracts can help eliminate moral 
hazard if the pool is large enough and a single farmer cannot influence the area 
yield and treats it as given. 
There are other empirically relevant studies that investigate measures in insurance 
design that help to control moral hazard. DOHERTY and MAHUL (2006) examine 
how multiple triggers in recently launched insurance securitisations trade off 
between moral hazard and basis risk. Several case studies of objective, informative 
of the action triggers are being investigated. The idea to use multiple triggers to 
address moral hazard stems from HOLMSTRÖM (1979). Moral hazard is controlled 
by linking the payout to an objective trigger. DOHERTY and MAHUL (2006) give 
three examples of triggers that are used in insurance securitisations: First, the 
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) catastrophe derivatives are triggered by an index 
of aggregate insurance industry losses. Second, weather derivatives are triggered 
by physical descriptions of a weather event. Third, over-the-counter instruments 
(OTC), such as catastrophe bonds, have various triggers, though predominantly, 
they are triggered by a market index or a parametric description of the event. 
2.3.1.2 Adverse  selection 
Adverse selection refers to the implications of insurers’ inability to identify the 
risk types of individuals. JUST et al. (1999) analysed U.S. cross-section data at the 
farm level to understand incentives to participate in crop insurance programmes. 
The results suggested that farmers participated mainly to receive the associated 
subsidy or because of adverse selection. The risk-aversion incentive was small. 
GOODWIN (1993) illustrates the effects of adverse selection on the actuarial 
performance of the US crop insurance program, demonstrating that only farmers 
whose risk is above average are likely to purchase insurance. The results of a Analytical framework 
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study conducted by JUST et al. (1999) suggest that participating farmers tend to 
be those with higher-than-expected indemnities, as farmers with lower-than-
expected indemnities are priced out of the program. They conclude that the 
domination of high-risk farmers in the insurance market can lead to market 
failure.  
MIRANDA (1991) argues that area-yield insurance offers numerous advantages over 
individual-yield crop insurance. Because information regarding the distribution 
of the area yield is generally available and more reliable than information 
regarding distribution of individual yields, insurers could more accurately assess 
the actuarial fairness of premiums under an area yield policy, thereby significantly 
reducing adverse selection problems. The use of an insurance product based on an 
index must eliminate the problem of asymmetric information between government 
and insurance companies, as well as between insurance companies and farmers, 
since all involved parties have symmetric information regarding the contract, and 
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection can be reduced significantly. 
However, SKEES and REED (1986) show that the potential for adverse selection 
depends on a farmer’s subjective assessment of the expected yield and the 
variability of the yield. They argue that premium rates based only on the mean 
crop yields of a region can lead to adverse selection, particularly when the variance 
of yield fluctuates considerably between farms. This aspect might be even more 
serious in a transition country, where farm productivity and production technologies 
are rather heterogeneous. In this respect, weather-based index insurance products 
provide some advantages because of the objective nature of the parameters that 
trigger indemnity payments. VARANGIS et al. (2002) argue that the weather can 
be independently verified, and therefore is not subject to the possibility of 
manipulation. Pre-conditioned, reliable assessment of area-yield based insurance 
can have similar benefits to weather-based index insurance. 
2.3.2 Systemic  risk 
A special type of risk that is not explained by a certain source, but rather describes 
a certain risk quality is called systemic risk. Contrary to automobile or fire risks, 
which tend to be independent, systemic risk in agriculture means that crop-yield 
risk exhibits a substantial degree of correlation across space (MIRANDA  and 
GLAUBER, 1997). Insurers often face the possibility of all the insurance contracts 
they write making large losses simultaneously. If individual insurers face credit 
rationing, as it is often the case in developing and transition countries, they may not 
be able to indemnify large losses simultaneously (CHAMBERS, 1989). If agricultural 
markets are non-insurable for this reason, Chambers suggest that they can be 
made insurable by broadening the risk pool to encompass less covariate risk Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
 
26
sources, e.g. by introducing financial market products such as weather derivatives, 
and removing the limits of credit rationing. When markets fail, mutual insurance 
might be another solution.  
Much attention has to be paid to the economic viability of agricultural production 
in individual regions. If long-term farm profitability is not achievable due to 
unfavourable weather and production conditions in a region, risk pooling would 
not be an appropriate mechanism of farm income stabilisation, since it would 
imply an income redistribution from profitable to unprofitable farms and, 
respectively, from more productive to less productive sectors of the economy. 
2.4  Analysis of decision-making under uncertainty – Basic approaches 
The classical approach to decision-making under uncertainty is the Expected Utility 
Model, which is a classical mathematical theory of decision making with associated 
procedures for measuring subjective desires and beliefs. The Expected Utility 
Model has been used as the framework theory in many textbooks on decision-
making, risk analysis, and risk management (e.g. ANAND, 1993; BISWAS, 1997; 
CHAVAS, 2004; EECKHOULDT and GOLLIER, 1995; and HARDAKER et al., 2004). At 
the same time, there exist some paradoxes which induce certain limitations on 
application of expected utility framework for approximating actual behaviour of a 
decision maker. Several contributions have shown alternative ways of modelling 
decision-making under risk and uncertainty, e.g. GOLLIER and MACHINA, 1995. 
Nevertheless, the Expected Utility Model remains the best model at hand for 
prescriptive analysis and will be used as the theoretical framework in this thesis. 
2.4.1  The Expected Utility Model and its axiomatic foundation  
The Expected Utility Model is based on the expected utility hypothesis, which 
states that a decision-maker has risk preferences represented by a utility function 
U(x) and makes decisions to maximise expected utility EU(x). However, some 
assumptions have to be made under which human behaviour would always be 
consistent with expected utility hypothesis. These assumptions include
20: 
                                           
20  Note that the choice between  1 x and  2 x is denoted as follows: 
  2
*
1 x x ≈  denotes indifference between  1 x and  2 x , 
  2
*
1 x x ≥  denotes that  2 x  is not preferred to  1 x , 
  2
*
























–  Ordering and transitivity: 
–  for any random variables  1 x  and  2 x , exactly one of the following must hold 
2 1 1 2 2 1 , , x x or x x x x
∗ ∗ ∗ ≈ f f , and if  3 2 2 1 x x and x x
∗ ∗ ≥ ≥ , then  3 1 x x
∗ ≥ , 
– Independence: 
–  for any random variables  3 2 1 , , x x x , and any  ) 1 0 ( p pα α , then  2 1 x x
∗ ≤  if 
[] [] 3 2 3 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( x x x x α α α α − + ≤ − +
∗  
–  , i.e. the preferences between  1 x  and  2 x  are independent of  3 x . It implies 
that indifference curves are always parallel and probabilities are linear, 
– Continuity: 
–  for any random variables  3 2 1 , , x x x , where  2 3 1 x x x
∗ ∗ p p , there exist numbers 
α  and β ,  1 0 , 1 0 p p p p β α , such that  [ ] 1 2 3 ) 1 ( x x x α α − +
∗ p  and 
[] 1 2 3 ) 1 ( x x x β β − +
∗ f , i.e. a sufficiently small change in probabilities will 
not reverse a strict preference (s.a. CHAVAS, 2004).  
Figure 2-2 presents a graphical interpretation of the expected utility concept: 
When income increases, utility increases less than proportionately for risk-averse 
decision-makers. Hence, utility is an increasing but downward bending function of 
income. Expected utility estimates can be translated into certainty equivalents (CE), 
where CE is the inverse of the utility function and represents the monetary value a 
person would take to avoid a certain risk. Knowing certainty equivalent outcomes 
not only permits the ranking of risky alternatives, but also facilitates estimating risk 
premiums. CE simultaneously accounts for the probabilities of risky prospects and 
the preferences for the consequences (ANDERSON et al., 1977).  
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When considering certainty equivalent as a criterion in a normative decision 
model it is important to prove that the model holds true in an expected utility 
framework. CHAVAS (2004) has shown that the maximisation of certainty 
equivalent is equivalent to the maximisation of expected utility, i.e. max EU(x)≡ 
max [E(x)-R], where R is the risk premium
21. 
2.4.2  Alternatives to the Expected Utility Model 
From a theoretical point of view, one might question expected utility theory 
(RABIN and THALER, 2001; The Economist, 2001). Several pieces of literature 
demonstrated the shortcomings of the expected utility model (ALLAIS, 1953; 
TVERSKY and KAHNEMAN, 1981). The Allais paradox (CHAVAS, 2004) is grounded 
on the empirical evidence that the indifference curves are not always parallel. 
This has been interpreted as evidence that the independence assumption is 
inconsistent with observed risk behaviour. MACHINA  (1982) shows that the 
expected utility model would provide a good approximation to risk preferences 
for small changes in the probability distribution 
PAPON’s (2004) experimental study investigates insurance behaviour in low-
probability high-loss risk situations. The study reveals that insurance behaviour 
may depend on the individual prior experience towards risk. The author favours 
non-additive decision models such as Dual Theory (YAARI, 1987) and Cumulative 
Prospect Theory (TVERSKY and KAHNEMANN, 1992) that seem to have a higher 
descriptive power than Expected Utility Theory when explaining subjects’ 
behaviour. In particular, Papon’s paper provides new explanations of the fact that 
people usually fail to obtain insurance against disaster-type risks such as natural 
disasters, even when premiums are close to actuarially fair levels. According to 
the author’s results, the deficiency of insurance demand for natural disasters 
may be due to the lack of individual prior experience towards such risks; as well 
as the relatively short commitment period of insurance policies (usually one fiscal 
year) compared with the empirical frequency of major natural hazards (centennial 
and even more). 
Despite criticism, leading economists still consider the expected-utility model 
as best suited for prescriptive analysis of risky choices (MACHINA, 1987; 
EDWARDS, 1992). Among agricultural and resource economists this view is 
supported by MEYER (2001), JUST (2003), and HARDAKER and LIEN (2005). 
                                           
21 The risk premium (RP) measures the largest amount of money that a decision-maker is 
willing to pay, to replace a random revenue by its expected value. Analytical framework 
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2.4.3  The importance of accounting for risk aversion 
The discussion above shows different approaches to explain behaviour under 
risk and uncertainty. However this behaviour is explained, not accounting for it 
and assuming risk-neutral behaviour might be misleading. JUST and POPE (2002) 
conclude in a conceptual paper that risk behaviour is most important for long-
term inter-temporal decisions because instabilities cannot be mitigated by 
standard risk management tools. More empirical work has to be done to understand 
how decision-maker preferences weigh consumption versus wealth accumulation, 
and how those preferences affect long-term decisions related to consumption 
versus investment decisions, financial planning, insurance, etc. However, the 
technical, physical, and financial structure of agricultural production and the inter-
temporal dependence of income shocks and marginal utilities is crucial to 
understanding the magnitude and implications of risk-aversion. HARDAKER et al. 
(2004) support the view that risk aversion is often not nearly as important as 
getting the expected income value right, at least in commercial farming in more 
developed country. The authors argue that the focus on risk aversion may have 
been a source of confusion in that attention has been directed to reducing variability 
of returns rather than on finding the most risk-efficient option (erroneously 
minimizing the risk premium rather than maximizing the certainty equivalent). 
Figure 2-3 depicts schematically the cost of ignoring risk aversion (CIRA). In a 
Mean-Variance context, CIRA is defined as 
* * E U CE CE CIRA − = , 
where * U CE is determined assuming a risk averse decision maker and * E CE  is 
certainty equivalent defined under assumption that the decision maker is risk-
neutral. The magnitude of CIRA depends on the risk aversion coefficient, which 
explains the slope of the MV indifferent curves U1 and U2. The gradient of these 
curves declines as risk aversion diminishes. As a result CIRA decreases. No 
general conclusions can be drawn on the impact of risk aversion on operational 
farm management decisions. CIRA has to be measured before drawing conclusions 




















Source: HARDAKER et al., 2004. 
HUDSON et al. (2005) prove in their study on consistency of risk premium (RP) 
measures the difficulty of selecting a single RP measure to employ in applied 
analysis. None of the tested measures exhibited superior explanatory power. 
From a broader perspective their results suggest that the multidimensionality of 
risk inhibits the efficient capturing of risk for applied research. 
Nevertheless, for the assessment of individual risk aversion different methods 
were tested. Besides Likert-scale questions in the farm survey, the ELCE 
(equally likely risky outcomes) method was used. This method, which was first 
described by ANDERSON et al. (1977), enables to elicit a utility function directly 
by comparing two prospects, one of which is risky and the other not. If the 
decision-maker has an aversion to, or a preference for, gambling the method allows 
depicting this bias. HARDAKER et al. (2004) propose this method for its advantage 
to be based on the ethically neutral probabilities of 0.5. However, this method has 
also disadvantages. First, if the decision maker has aversion or a positive attitude 
towards gambling, bias will be introduced. Second, the ELCE method cannot be 
applied to discrete cases, where outcomes cannot be varied continuously. 
The ELCE method is illustrated in Figure 2-4. It shows the results of an 
application of this method to a crop farmer, whose wealth (measured by own 
capital) varied strongly across the last five years, i.e. future wealth accumulation 
cannot be forecasted and is subject to uncertainty. The farmers initial wealth wi 
was 295 Mio KZT, his final wealth wf 706 Mio KZT. The utility values attributed 
to wi and wf are 0 and 1 assuming that the farmer cannot gain any utility from 
wealth levels below the initial one. The slope of the utility function indicates the 
properties of a typical risk-averse decision-maker. 
U1, U2: MV indifference curves 
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Source: Own  figure. 
Note:  CE=Certainty Equivalent, EMV=Expected Monetary Value. 
However, when considering income instead of wealth, the curve looks somewhat 
different (see Figure 2-5). At higher income levels, risk aversion decreases and 
the risk-averse decision-maker becomes a gambler. Behaviour towards risk is not 
always consistent with expected-utility theory as the discussion above shows. 
HUDSON et al. (2003) record this behaviour in experiments. 








Source: Own  figure. 
Note: CE=Certainty  Equivalent. 
In this context, the study aims also at clarifying the question, to which extent 
risk aversion influences the choice of risk management instruments in a less 
developed country with extremely high coefficients of yield variation and often 
little diversified production systems. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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2.4.4  Methods for risk analysis at the enterprise level 
There are different ways of how to implement the expected utility framework in 
a model that analyses risk efficiency of different production activities and risk 
management instruments. In the literature, two main methodological approaches 
can be identified that analyse risk reduction of risk management measures on the 
farm level. 
First, normative programming models provide exact solutions and flexibility to 
represent different scenarios. These models have been numerously applied to 
empirical problems. Well known examples are MOTAD (Minimisation of Total 
Absolute Deviations), Expected Utility, and Mean-Variance models. 
Second, econometric models make few assumptions about the decision makers’ 
objective function and preferences, technology parameters and about ‘representative’ 
conditions that reflect different states of nature. They are strongly data-driven and 
must contain a sufficiently great number of economic units. 
Additionally, a relatively new theoretical model, which allows integrating production 
adaptations under risk – the so-called state-contingent approach – stems from 
CHAMBERS and QUIGGIN (2001). However, empirical applications are limited as 
the authors assume that production technology is dependent on the state of nature, 
which appears at a period and is stochastic between the periods. 
The following discussion of advantages and disadvantages of different approaches 
as well as some empirical applications will concentrate on the first two of the 
methodological approaches. 
2.4.4.1 Mean-variance  analysis 
Most empirical applications determine the agent’s optimal hedging strategy 
following the mean-variance (MV) approach. Mean-variance analysis uses the first 
two moments of a distribution to determine risk-efficient solutions to a problem. It 
is based on the proposition that, if the expected value of alternative A is greater 
than or equal to the expected value of alternative B, and the variance of A is less 
than or equal to the variance of B, with at least one strict inequality, then A is 
preferred to B by a decision-maker who fulfils following conditions. First, the 
decision-maker is risk-averse or risk-neutral. Second, the decision-maker must have 
an outcome distribution that is normal or an utility distribution that is quadratic. 
Since the second condition is very restrictive and seldom holds in practice, the 
mean-variance criterion has to be perceived as an approximation rule. 
One popular application of MV efficiency analysis are portfolio models 
(MARKOWITZ, 1952) on the firm level to support decision-making regarding Analytical framework 
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different investment alternatives or production activities. Table 2-2 describes the 
contributions of BERG (2003), NANSEEKI and MOROOKA (1991) and PETRICK and 
DITGES (2000) as applications of the MV criterion, which support its usefulness 
and practicability. When carrying out portfolio analysis in a MV framework it 
has to be kept in mind that the MV criterion is an approximation of the expected 
utility model. HARDAKER et al. (2004) conclude that where direct maximization 
of expected utility is possible, it is to be preferred to the MV approximation. 
There are alternative methods to MV analysis when analysing portfolio risk and 
hedging decisions. Stochastic efficiency analysis is a well-known approach defined 
as follows.  
A risk programming model seems to be best suited to test the risk efficiency of 
on-farm instruments and risk-sharing strategies simultaneously. Furthermore, 
the effects of changes in technology, credit access, and interest rates can be 
analysed in the framework of a programming model. The following section tests 
the adequateness of different risk programming approaches to fulfil the research 
objectives. 
2.4.4.2 Risk  programming 
Since FREUND (1956) wrote his paper on introducing risk in a programming model 
and developed a quadratic risk programming (QRP) model, many alternative risk 
programming models have been developed. QRP is commonly used to generate 
the mean-variance efficient set of plans. It has the advantage of being simple. 
Unfortunately, the approach requires restrictive assumptions of either a quadratic 
utility function or normally distributed net income. Quadratic utility functions 
assume positive marginal utility within a bounded range (HANOCH and LEVY, 1970) 
and increasing absolute risk aversion (ARROW, 1965). Both characteristics are 
inconsistent with the expected nature of true preferences (PATTEN et al., 1988). 
There have long been available methods for approximating the effects of risk 
aversion in an LP model, including chance-constrained programming (KIRBY, 1970), 
MOTAD (HAZELL, 1971) and Target MOTAD (TAUER, 1983). See BOISVERT 
and MCCARL (1990) and HARDAKER et al. (1991) for useful reviews of these and 
other techniques. These last mentioned models have been developed at a time 
when software to handle non-linear objective functions was less available and 
less reliable. 
However, another group of methods, such as the direct maximization of expected 
utility (LAMBERT and MCCARL, 1985) and Utility Efficient Programming (UEP) 
(PATTEN et al., 1988) is superior to these in that it involves a lower level of 
approximation and is more consistent with the expected utility analysis   
(HARDAKER et al., 1991). For our problem, given some knowledge about the shape Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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of the utility function and risk aversion, UEP seems to be well suited, because 
assumptions about the shape of the utility function and risk attitudes are made.  
UEP is a simple extension of the direct maximization of expected utility 
developed by LAMBERT and MCCARL (1985). In a UEP the activity net revenue 
vectors for different states of nature, sn, represent the uncertainty in activity 
returns. Therefore, there is no need to assume any standard form of distribution. It 
rather permits the incorporation of a number of different probability distributions, 
which can be derived from past observations that are treated as a sample of equally 
likely outcomes or as states with subjectively assessed probabilities. CHAMBERS 
(1989) differentiates between states of nature and result states. States of nature are 
often difficult to determine. This is particularly true in agriculture, when the 
state of nature is a combination of many different risk sources, such as drought, 
wind, rain, hail, pest infestation, etc. As a result agricultural insurance contracts 
are often specified in terms of result states, i.e. yield states, rather than the 
underlying state of nature. The applied determination of states will be discussed 
in chapter 4.5.2. 
The UEP procedure allows the identification of all farm plans that are efficient 
for a set of decision-makers whose risk attitudes can be represented by a 
particular class of utility functions, defined over an interval of degrees of risk 
aversion. The identified farm plans will be first, second, third and n-th degree 
stochastically efficient for those particular decision-makers (PATTEN et al., 1988). 
HARDAKER et al. (2004) report on the difficulties of evaluating correctly the net 
effect of introducing new risk management instruments such as insurance. They 
conclude that such decisions can be best considered in a whole-farm portfolio 
selection model. A utility-efficient programming approach would be especially 
suitable for evaluating the merits of crop insurance in a farm plan since this 
method is implemented via a states of nature matrix that can capture the effects 
of insurance on the distribution of returns. 
2.4.4.3 Stochastic  efficiency  analysis 
In contrast to MV analysis and other moment-based methods, stochastic 
efficiency analysis is based on the direct maximisation of expected utility. There 
are different stochastic efficiency criteria, such as first-, second-, and third-degree 
stochastic dominance. An application of second-degree stochastic dominance (SSD) 
analysis will be presented in the empirical part of the thesis (see chapter 1.1.1) and 
is therefore conceptually described here.  
The SSD criterion can be summarised as follows: A risky alternative A 
described by the cumulative distribution function G(w) is preferred to another risky 
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If the farmer’s utility function is concave in w, SSD is consistent with expected 
utility (MOSCHINI and  HENNESSY, 2001). However, SSD sometimes is not a 
good decision-making tool because high degrees of risk aversion are excluded. 
Empirical applications of the SSD criterion in agricultural economics are income 
comparisons of different policy scenarios (TOLLEY and POPE, 1988) and the 
efficient reduction of crop production risk by insurance (BREUSTEDT, 2004). 
Breustedt combines the MV and the SSD approach and concludes that the model 
results in terms of risk reduction vary significantly among the two. In chapter 1.1.1 
different insurance instruments for Kazakhstani crop production will be tested 
based on Breustedt’s approach. A detailed description of stochastic efficiency 
concepts can be found in LEVY (1992). 
Table 2-2 gives an overview of selected recent empirical applications of different 
risk analysis models on the farm-level. It describes briefly the methodology and 
data used for analysis and presents the main findings of the applications. 
 Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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Table 2-2:  Selected empirical analyses of risk reduction on the farm-level 
Author(s)  Subject  Methodology  Region, data  
& time 
Main results and findings 
BERG (2003)  Modelling the impacts of 
uncertainty and attitudes 
towards risk on production 






farm, 150 ha 
Mean variance approach has proven its usefulness 
because of its deductive strength and the straightforward 
applicability in optimisation models. 
BREUSTEDT 
(2004) 
Efficient risk reduction in 
arable farming by means 




analysis with the 








Previous methods may have overestimated the risk 
reduction of area yield crop insurance for more than one-
half of the farms.  
For every fifth investigated farm, the EU consistent 
minimum relative variance reduction can be overrated by 
more than ten percentage points by means of MV. 
Bootstrapping shows that even many expected variance 
reductions above 50% are not significant and that area 
yield insurance seems to perform significantly better than 
farm yield insurance for many farms. 
LIEN et al.  
(2001) 
Whole-farm planning 
under uncertainty: Impacts 
of subsidy scheme and 
utility function on 






business data for 
7 years  
(1992-1998 
Farmers’ risk attitudes have no significant impact on the 
choice of enterprise mix. 
Subsidy schemes, market conditions and available farm 
labour are more important determinants of optimal plans 




Benefits derived from 
systematic statistical 
analyses of empirical data 
and improved production 
planning approaches 
Systematic time 
series analysis and 
stochastic 
optimisation model,  
4 German cash 
crop farms, 
1998-2004 
The method shows clear advantages in terms of realised 
gross margins compared to farmers’ observed empirical 




Author(s)  Subject  Methodology  Region, data  
& time 




Risk preference and 









Changes in risk preference affect the optimal crop 
combination. 






of portfolio selection for 
rural banking and risk 
management in 
agriculture; 
Impacts of liquidity 




quadratic programming  
(QP) and minimisation of 
total absolute deviations 
(MOTAD) 
QP and MOTAD for 
the analysis of 






Even relatively small amounts of credits could reduce 
whole-farm risk if a middle course is found which 
ensures a sufficient return on capital and thus attracts 
banks’ interest. 
In order to reduce risk in the short-run at given resource 
stocks, a strategy of diversifying the production 
programme can be pursued. 
QP vs. MOTAD: Close to the risk-neutral solution, 
results of both are nearly identical, while substantial 
differences in activity levels exist for less risky farm 
plans. With regard to the computed combinations of 
expected profit and standard deviation, MOTAD 
produced a systematically higher variation than quadratic 
programming.’ 
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2.4.4.4 Sensitivity  analysis 
A methodology for conducting a sensitivity and stability analyses of solution 
behaviour with respect to problem changes is a well-established requirement of 
any scientific discipline. It should be an integral part of any solution methodology 
because the status of a solution cannot be understood without such information 
(FIACCO, 1983). 
Sensitivity analysis is broadly defined as the investigation of the responsiveness 
of conclusions to changes or errors in parameter values and assumptions 
(BAIRD, 1989). Sensitivity analysis can be used to determine whether output 
changes significantly, when one or more inputs are changed (LAW and KELTON, 
1991). FIACCO (1983) emphasises the importance of sensitivity analysis. They 
demand that sensitivity and stability analysis should be an integral part of any 
solution methodology. The status of a solution could not be understood without 
such information. The sensitivity analysis of the later discussed programming 
model will be carried out by varying assumption about risk aversion and input 
factors, such as liquidity and credit availability. 
  
 
3  Development of the agricultural sector during transition 
and the role of risk management in Kazakhstan 
3.1  Economic situation in Kazakhstan 
Taking into account the Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP, 2005), 
Kazakhstan ranks in the group of countries with ‘medium human development’ 
on place 80 out of 177 countries. Since the first HDI recording for Kazakhstan 
shortly before independence in 1990, the index remained relatively stable (between 
0.767 in 1990 and 0.721 in 1995). Since 1995 the index value is steadily increasing 
to 0.761 in 2003. 
In the years between independence in 1991 and the year 1995 the GDP fell by 
almost one third. The reason for this sharp decline was mainly the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union economic system with all the accompanying negative 
circumstances, mainly hyperinflation and the disappearance of important 
markets (ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, 2005). The government could stop 
the downward trend of the economy in the second half of the 1990s by pursuing a 
strict monetary policy, the consequent opening of the economy and the beginning 
of a reform process that allows for limited private ownership. Compared with 
other former Soviet republics in Central Asia, Kazakhstan was a precursor towards 
a market-friendly economic policy and could attract foreign direct investment 
(ALAM  and BANERJI, 2000). However, Kazakhstan is still a relatively closed 
economy compared to Central and Eastern European countries. Crude oil and other 
natural resources are its main export products (BROADMAN, 2005). Economic 
growth driven by the exploitation of natural resources like oil and gas is risky to 
some extent. Rapid increase of oil exports is causing an appreciation of the 
domestic currency and draining financial and human resources out of other 
economic sectors (Dutch disease). 
Characteristically for Kazakhstan is the strong and steady increase of GDP mainly 
caused by the growth of the oil industry. GDP was growing in average by 10.4 per 
cent in the period between 2000 and 2004. However, the rapid GDP growth does 
not say much about the income distribution. MACOURS and SWINNEN (2006) 
investigate rural and urban poverty across transition countries as related to 
differences in land privatization and farm restructuring Rural-urban poverty Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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differences are very high for Kazakhstan. As in Russia, the ratio of rural and 
urban headcount is more than 50 per cent higher in rural than in urban areas
22. In 
Kazakhstan, agricultural growth and rural poverty reduction between 2001 and 
2002 occurred in the oblasts
23 that had a stronger shift to small-scale agriculture. 
A regional example for such a pattern is South Kazakhstan with an agricultural 
structure that resembles structures in Albania, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan. 
According to Macours and Swinnen, this group of countries shows a pattern of 
small-scale agricultural-led growth in rural areas characterized by a shift towards 
labour-intensive crops (horticulture) and livestock production. Little restructuring 
and maintenance of social functions of large-scale enterprises in northern 
Kazakhstan might explain why rural-urban differences are larger for income than 
for non-income poverty. 
3.2  Development of the agricultural sector before and during transition 
Writing about agricultural production in Kazakhstan, it is important to describe 
its historical background in order to understand problems and perspectives of its 
modern agriculture. Living from nomadic herding activities, Kazakh herders 
were brutally collectivised by the Soviet ruling power in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Millions of people lost their lives in the aftermath of a huge famine following 
the collectivisation campaign. 
In 1954, as a response to an increasing dependence on imported grain and 
unstable yields in existing grain producing regions, Khrustchev ordered a vast 
expansion of Soviet cropland by ploughing the virgin lands located beyond the 
lower Volga and north Caucasus and extending into Eastern Siberia. Although a 
number of large-scale regional development programmes were implemented during 
the Soviet era (STADLBAUER, 1996) the Virgin Lands Campaign is historically 
unique. The first scientific information about intensity, dimensions and effects of 
the campaign was made available outside of the former Soviet Union by to the 
authors EULE (1962), BREBURDA (1965), and WEIN (1980, 1983).  
In April 1954, only two months after the decision for the virgin lands campaign 
was taken, ploughing and seeding activities started. About 17  million  ha of 
previously untouched steppe were tilled in the first year  (GEORGIEV, 1955). 
492 sovkhozes were established until 1963, encompassing about 19 mln ha of 
newly developed crop area, with the average sovkhoz covering around 25,000 ha. 
                                           
22 There are strong regional differences. Whereas the 2002 poverty rate in rural areas varies 
from 12 per cent in Akmola, the rate is about 76 per cent in Mangystau. 
23  An oblast is an administrative region comprising several rayons (smaller administrative districts). Development of agriculture and the role of risk management in transition 
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Henceforth, in a nine-year period, new cropland larger than that of Germany was 
created. Although privatised, many of these large farms still exist today and lug 
the problems of marginal productions areas that were created in the 1950s. Most 
of the farms are situated in the north of the Republic of Kazakhstan.  
Figure A-4 shows the share of crop production in total agricultural production 
from the times of the Virgin Lands Campaign until 2004. With the successive 
development of the livestock sector in the 1960s, the share of crop production 
fell to values below 40 per cent. With the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the 
livestock sector suffered from a strong crisis until recent years. Since 1996 gross 
agricultural product consists mainly of crop production (except the drought 
year 1998). The droughts in 1963, 1965, and 1998 can be clearly identified in the 
diagramme. As can be perceived in Table 3-1, transition supported the specialisation 
on certain crops and thereby reduced the crop portfolio diversification possibilities.  
Table 3-1:  Change in cropping structure and crop ranking as affected by  
transition to market economy 




% of total 
sown area  Crop 
Sown area 
('000ha) 
% of total 
sown area 
1 Wheat  14,070  40  Wheat  10,850 64.6 
2 Perennial 
forage 4,568  13 
Perennial 
forage 2,222  13.2 
3 Barley 3,660 10.4  Barley 1,751 10.4 
4 Annual 
grasses 3,498  9.9  Oilseeds  347  2.1 
5 Maize  for 
forage 2,282 6.5 
Annual 
grasses 267  1.6 
6 Millet  781  2.2  Oats  183  1.6 
7 Rye  769  2.2  Millet  115  0.7 
8 
Oats 382  1.1 
Maize for 
forage 72  0.4 
9 Oilseeds 266  0.8  Buckwheat  57  0.3 
10 Buckwheat  218  0.6  Rye  44  0.3 
11 Pulses  159  0.4  Pulses  24  0.1 
Source: AGENCY OF STATISTICS, 2002. 
According to statements of the Ministry of Agriculture, it is planned to further reduce 
the grain area. Nevertheless, regional administration plans to increase grain area 
even in marginal areas like Aktubinskaya Oblast (Krestyanskie Vedomosti, 2006). 
The transformation of the economy had severe implications for the agricultural 
sector. The following table shows some of the characteristics of this period and 
its implications for the agricultural sector. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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Table 3-2:  Characteristics of transition and their implications for the  
agricultural sector  
Feature  Implications for the agricultural sector 
Disintegration of the soviet market Loss of input and output markets 
Hyperinflation  Revenue loss between harvest and sowing, barter trade 
Market liberalisation  Input prises increase faster than output prices 
Privatisation  Removal of assets from co-operative shareholders (e.g. 
by foundation of holdings) 
Redistribution of land ownership 
rights 
Total number of farms increased, farm restructuring 
and ownership changes are beginning to yield 
increases in farm productivity and profitability 
Removal of subsidies  Abrupt decline of enterprises in marginal production 
areas 
Insufficient functioning of formal 
institutions 
Informal institutions may act not according to societal 
needs and overall welfare objectives 
Source:  Own table based on LENK, 2005; CSAKI and KRAY, 2005. 
In the first years after the declaration of independence in 1991, agricultural 
policy was a stepchild of national economic policy. More lucrative fields of the 
economy such as the oil industry were in the centre of reforms. This decision 
might have been reasonable in the short-run from an economic point of view, 
however, it became increasingly problematic in view of the fact, that 43 per cent 
of the population live in rural areas. The share of agriculture in gross domestic 
product decreased in the 1990s from more than 30 per cent (1990) to less than 
10 per cent (since 1998). 
Most agricultural enterprises found themselves in a steady decline that was amplified 
by bad harvests (1994-98) and the financial crisis in 1998. In economically weak 
years, deficits from crop production were compensated partially by livestock sales, 
which contributed to the drastic decline in livestock numbers. Since enterprises 
were short on cash at this time, resources were mostly exchanged for the nearest 
harvest. In the case of harvest loss, assets were used as a means of payment. In 
this way, in fertile areas numerous companies passed into the possession of the 
lenders within short time. In marginal areas, machinery was transported off in 
many cases and crop production ended to a large extent. 
The decline in cultivated grain area since 1991 (Figure  3-1), reflects the 
successive abandoning of marginal sites. After the grain yield doubled in 1999 
compared to the previous year, the reduction of the sowing area came to a 
standstill and even slightly increased since then. Development of agriculture and the role of risk management in transition 
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Source: AGENCY OF STATISTICS, 2004a. 
While total crop areas declined sharply, the agricultural area used by private 
farms is more than 40 times higher than 1991. The number of registered private 
farms rose even faster than the area by 21 per cent annually since 1995 (Table 3-3). 
Table 3-3:  Number of private farms, area of land and average size of farms,  
1991-2004 
    1991 1995 1996 1997 2000 2001 2003 2004 
Number of private farms, thsd.   0.3  22.5  30.8  42.5  68.2  76.4  111  122 
Area of land plots, mln. ha  0.8  7.8  12.7  20  26.8  29.4  31.5  32.8 
Area of land per private farm, ha 238  348  412  452  393  386  283  269 
Source: AGENCY OF STATISTICS, 2005c. 
The production share measured as value of production of different farm types 
changed drastically alike. While corporate farms were the most important market 
player at the beginning of transformation in 1993, private farms and household 
plots produce nowadays a higher value than the large successors of former 
sovkhozes and kolkhozes. 
On the one hand, the distribution of income sources between production sectors 
is rather similar between private and corporate farms. It involves a high share of 
relatively labour-extensive crop production and an income contribution from 
livestock production of 8 and 15 per cent, respectively (Figure 3-2). Household 
plots have specialized on livestock production and more labour-intensive crops, 
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Figure 3-2: Relative share of crop (CP) and livestock production (LP) in 
















Source:  Own figure based on AGENCY OF STATISTICS, 2005c. 
3.2.1 Productivity  trends 
Interviews with experts as well as examination of the current agricultural policy 
priorities convey the impression of inferiority of small private farms to large 
corporate enterprises in many respects. However, the yield statistics for the 
period 1999-2003 draws a different picture. Particularly, in South Kazakhstan, 
small private farms demonstrate their competitiveness through higher productivity 
in wheat production. After a productivity decline during the transition period, 
both crop and livestock productivity seem to stabilise in recent years. For the 
harvesting period 2006, the Ministry of Agriculture forecasts a grain productivity 
increase of about 10 per cent mainly through the intensification of plant protection 
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Source: AGENCY OF STATISTICS, 2004a. 
As Table A-2 demonstrates, there is a huge potential for stabilising yields by 
application of pesticides, because many areas are not treated with pesticides 
(only 41  per  cent of the grain area was sprayed). However, parallel to the 
positive overall economic development, input use has been increasing in recent 
years. The amount of fertilisers used by agricultural enterprises tripled in the 
period 1999-2003 (Figure 3-4). In the same period, the area used for crop 
production by agricultural enterprises decreased by one million ha. 











Source: AGENCY OF STATISTICS, 2004a. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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Still, the productivity of the agricultural sector is relatively low in comparison to 
other sectors. This is reflected in the differences between agricultural wages and 
wages in other sectors of the economy. As following table shows, the monthly 
salary in agriculture and forestry is only about one third of the average salary. 
Table 3-4:  Monthly salary in different sectors (as of April 2005) 
Sector KZT  Euro 
Agriculture and forestry  11,535  70.34 
Industry 38,520  234.88 
  Exploitation of natural resources  59,521  362.93 
  Processing Industry  33,062  201.60 
Construction and building  43,018  262.30 
Trade 31,845  194.18 
Transport and communication  45,716  278.76 
Banking 75,861  462.57 
State administration  25,448  155.17 
Mean 30,852  188.12 
Source: AGENCY OF STATISTICS, 2005c. 
Note:  Exchange rate 1 €=164 KZT. 
3.2.2 Capital  endowment,  collateral, and investments: 
According to data presented in OSTRIKOVA (2005), more than 50 per cent of the 
fixed assets in the agricultural sector are machinery and equipment. After 
stagnation in investments in fixed assets, the value of assets put into operation 
increased significantly in 2003 and 2004, which reflects the overall economic 
trend in Kazakhstan. In agriculture, this development has been stimulated by 
the governmental programme for the development of rural areas 2003-2005. 
Table  3-5 shows the relative density of investments into agriculture in all 
regions.  Development of agriculture and the role of risk management in transition 
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Table 3-5:  Relative density of investments into fixed capital  
(Agricultural sector as percentage of the entire regional economy) 
 
  Area, city 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  Mean 
Eastern region 
East-Kazakhstan  0.89 0.72 1.34 1.51 4.33 1.76 
Western region 
Aktubinskaya  0.29 0.61 0.30 3.37 5.01 1.92 
Atyrayskaya  0.01 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.09 
Mangistauskaya  0.19 0.06 0.12 0.17 0.21 0.15 
West-Kazakhstan  0.09 0.16 0.13 0.27 0.20 0.17 
Northern region 
Akmolinskaya  31.30 19.85 23.64  0.31  2.90  15.60 
Kostanayskaya  11.65 13.12 16.24 12.44 14.28 13.55 
Pavlodarskaya  0.37 0.96 3.43 2.69 3.79 2.25 
North-Kazakhstan  53.15 45.48 29.85 29.76 30.64 37.78 
Central region 
Karagandinskaya  0.47 0.80 0.75 0.94 1.16 0.82 
Southern region 
Almatinskaya  3.77 5.12 4.86 3.44 4.72 4.38 
Djambulskaya  4.66 1.55 1.05 0.58 1.70 1.91 
Kyzilordinsskaya  0.58 1.29 0.18 0.60 0.92 0.71 
South-Kazakhstan  2.10 2.85 2.16 2.35 2.58 2.41 
Astana  0.39 0.52 1.07 0.77 1.05 0.76 
Almaty  0.10 0.23 0.72 0.71 0.82 0.52 
Source:  Own table based on OSTRIKOVA, 2005. 
Note:  Research regions selected for the farm survey are marked in italics. 
The main crop production regions Akmolinskaya oblast, Kostanayskaya oblast, 
and North Kazakhstan show the highest shares of agricultural investments among 
all regions. Investment numbers show no identical pattern across time. Whereas 
investment share in North Kazakhstan fell from 2001 to 2002 by about one third, 
it almost doubled in East Kazakhstan. Similar developments occurred in other 
regions and different years. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
 
48
The sources of investment in agriculture are rather diverse, the most important 
of which being own capital. Its share in financing is about 78 per cent, which is 
about 26  per  cent more than the average of all economic sectors including 
agriculture. The share of external capital lies around 22 per cent, of which the 
largest share is financed by bank credits and state budget. The share of external 
financing as well as the total amount of investments is much higher in other 
sectors of the economy. While the agricultural sector contributed to GDP by 
about 8.4 per cent in 2003, agricultural investments amounted only 1.5 per cent 
of total investments, representing an urgent need to invest. The low rate of 
external financing in agriculture can be partly explained by limited credit-access 
of agricultural firms. 
Table 3-6:  Sources of investments into fixed capital 2003 




%   in million 
KZT 
% 
Own capital of the enterprises  433786  52.6  9818  78.3 
Revenue 412402  50.0  9746  77.7 
Depreciation 21384  2.6  72  0.6 
External capital  391132  47.4  2723  21.7 
State budget  46022  5.6  1038  8.3 
Bank credits  153431  18.6  1301  10.4 
Private credits  75066  9.1  122  1.0 
Other investments  116613  14.1  262  2.0 
In total  824918  100  12541  100 
Source:  Own formation after OSTRIKOVA, 2005. 
3.2.3 Farm  restructuring
24 
Contemporary farm structure in Kazakhstan is a consequence of intense 
restructuring which was initiated by privatisation and the introduction of new 
legislation (LERMAN  et. al., 2004). Like in other transition countries, former 
collective and state farms have practically disappeared, to be replaced by limited 
liability partnerships, joint stock companies and other corporate forms. Since farm 
privatisation began, the cultivated grain area has been reduced by more than a 
third. In contrast, the number of new farm governance structures has been increasing. 
In 1991, the agricultural sector comprised 2120 state farms and 430 collective farms. Development of agriculture and the role of risk management in transition 
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Between 1992 and 1997, the sector went through several evolutionary stages, 
which can be summarized as follows: After the dissolution of former state and 
collective farms and creation of collective farm entities, a majority of theses entities 
were converted into Producer Co-operatives (PCs) with the land and property 
shares retained under the common ownership of the co-operative. In 1997, PCs 
were encouraged to reallocate shares to structure ownership more defined. The 
most common method for share concentration was the creation of one or more 
Partnerships with Limited Liability (PLL), by leading members of the PC, with 
the accompanying transfer of some or all property and land shares to the director 
of the PLL (GRAY, 2000).  
In 2002, the total number of farms, including household plots was reported to be 
116,290 compared to 57,450 five years and 16,936 ten years before (AGENCY OF 
STATISTICS, 2004b). The share of peasant farms in the total number of farms 
during the transition period rose from initially 30 per cent in 1991 to 96 per cent 
in 2002. During the same period the share of large agricultural enterprises and 
organisations decreased from 53 per cent to four per cent. Land ownership clearly 
favours large enterprises. Whereas peasant farms cultivate 36.4 per cent of total 
agricultural land, large-scale organisations do so for 63.1 per cent of the land. 
The sharply dual farm structure was a dominant feature of the Soviet model of 
agriculture with an even more dramatic concentration of land than today: 
98 per cent of Soviet household plots controlled less than two per cent of land, 
while two per cent of the largest farm enterprises controlled 98 per cent of land 
(LERMAN et al., 2004). LERMAN et al. (2004), based on World Bank surveys from 
the 1994 to 1998 period, evaluate the farm structure in Kazakhstan nowadays as 
sharply dual, where 99 per cent of agricultural land is controlled by top 10 of the 
largest agricultural enterprises. 
LERMAN et al. (2004) provide explanations for the high share of co-operatives 
among farms in CIS countries: First, the burden to transform enterprises from a 
sovkhoz/kolkhoz to a producer co-operative is lower than to transform it to an 
organisational form that digress even more from socialist farm structures (see 
also VALENTINOV and CURTISS, 2005).  
Second, Soviet-time management and administration tried to maintain old structures. 
This path-dependency
25 along with failure of labour markets can serve as 
explanation for the maintaining of organisational structures. 
                                           
24  This section is based on HEIDELBACH, 2005. 
25  For a definition of the term path-dependence and its discussion related to change in agricultural 
structures see BALMANN (1994). Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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3.2.4 Agricultural  policy 
MACOURS and SWINNEN (2005) as well as CSAKI and KRAY (2005) in evaluating 
the progress in agricultural reforms sort Kazakhstan in the same group as Russia 
and Ukraine. Especially the land privatisation process was slow and instrumental in 
keeping large farm structures in place because it was implemented through 
shares. 
WTO accession plays an important role for the future development of the 
agricultural sector. Kazakhstan’s minister of industry and trade, Vladimir Shkolnik 
expects WTO accession for 2007. He confirmed that the process would be 
synchronized with Russia’s accession to the WTO. Currently bilateral negations 
with 14 WTO members including the EU, the US, Australia and Brazil have to 
be closed. The WTO accession would require the current systematic fuel and 
diesel export bans to be abolished. As an alternative mechanism, the provision 
of direct subsidies for farmers is being considered (East Europe, 2006). 
The current agricultural policy is characterised by an increasing amount of subsidies, 
which is much criticised by international experts (CSAKI and KRAY, 2005). Key 
points of the actual governmental programme for the development of the agricultural 
sector is the active increase of competitiveness of agricultural products on the 
world market by using comparative advantages and export potential. According 
to Agricultural Minister Daniel Akhmetov, the state will support this process by 
improvement of research infrastructure and dissemination of innovative technologies 
(Agra-Europe, 2006a) 
3.3 Natural  conditions 
Based on soil, climatic and economic conditions, Kazakhstan may be subdivided 
into 5 major regions: Northern, Central, Western, Eastern and Southern. 71 per cent 
of the wheat area is situated in the northern region, 10 per cent in the Western 
part, 5 per cent in the East, and the Central and Southern parts each account for 
7  per  cent. Another subdivision can be made following the ecological zones. 
Table 3-7 describes 9 different zones and gives an overview about the amount of 
annual precipitation and the potential agricultural use. The zones reach from 
forest steppe in the North at the Russian border with the most favourable 
conditions for rainfed grain farming to the mountain meadows at the bottom of 
Tien Shan in the South and Altai in the East.  Development of agriculture and the role of risk management in transition 
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Possible agricultural use of 
territories  Mio. 
ha 
% 
Woodland (forest) steppe  320-340  Non-irrigated farming  2.1  9.3 
Steppe 270-310  Semi-non-irrigated  farming  10.2  44.7
Dry steppe  230-250 
Insufficient non-irrigated 
farming and livestock breeding 
6.5 28.5
Semi-steppe 200-230 
Livestock breeding, drove, 
rainfall deficit for cropping, 
selective irrigation farming 
0.5 2.2 
Desert 120-150 




Irrigation and dry farming, 
livestock breeding, drove 
1.4 6.1 
Foothills-desert 120-170 
Livestock breeding, drove, 
selective irrigation farming 
0.8 3.5 
Mountainous-steppe 300-400 




Drove, mowing in the bottom of 
mountain 
– – 
Total 120-750  –  22.8  100
Source: MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, 2003. 
The largest share of grain is produced under highly vulnerable conditions in the 
steppe and dry steppe zone, where the wheat production border lies. This border 
follows a 250 mm precipitation line, a so-called Isohyet (LENK, 2005). The same 
figure is found in MEINEL et al. (2003) for the Kulunda-step in Western Siberia. 
The informative value of such mean values must not be over-estimated against 
the background of the enormous variation of individual parameters. Those 
parameters which depend directly on the sun, such as radiation and vaporization, 
are subject to relative small variations. For instance, the dates for snow melting 
and spring high water are well predictable. The parameters influenced by the 
actual weather events like precipitation and extreme temperatures deviate 
considerably from mean values. For agriculture, this means a hardly estimable 
drought risk. That is the most important explanation for the strong yield 
variations. The already short vegetation time is limited even further in some 
years by autumnal early frosts and spring frost.  Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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While black soils and dark chestnut soils show useful features for crop production, 
such as crumbling structure, humus contents, and nutrient availability, temperature 
and precipitation circumstances limit the production. Wheat is one of the few 
cultures, which can be cultivated under these conditions. A decisive factor of 
ecological tolerance of wheat is its frost resistance of up to -22 degrees Centigrade. 
Since temperatures fall below this boundary in the most years in northern 
Kazakhstan, the farming of high-yielding winter wheat hardly comes into 
consideration. Most water is required during the haulm shoot, ears shift and 
blooming, i.e. in the late spring and early summer. Spring frosts lead to the extension 
of the soil, which leads to a destruction of roots and finally to the drying up of 
the younger plants. The drought during the wheat blossom often leads to emergency 
maturity. Too much moisture during the maturity stage delays it, which increases 
the risk of early frosts. 
In the continental-climatic vegetation conditions of Kazakhstan, plant production 
carries a particularly high risk burden. This manifests itself predominantly in the 
considerable inconsistency in yields. Table 3-8 gives an indication of the extent of 
these fluctuations, using regional variation coefficients for different plants.  
Table 3-8:  Coefficients of variation for different crops and regions based 
on yield data from 1974 to 2003 
Crop Region  (Oblast)  Min  Max  Median 
Akmola 0.34  0.41  0.38 
Kostanai 0.23  0.61  0.44 
North Kazakhstan  0.24  0.39  0.33 
East Kazakhstan  0.23  0.47  0.23 







South Kazakhstan  0.32  0.54  0.43 
Kostanai 0.39  1  0.52  Barley 
North Kazakhstan  0.28  0.49  0.35 
Cotton South  Kazakhstan  0.20  0.26  0.23 
Source:  Own calculations based on survey data. 
Note:  The coefficients of variation (quotient of standard deviation and arithmetic mean) 
measure the distribution of yields in the investigated period on the rayon level. Minimum, 
maximum and median values refer to variation coefficients of rayons within the same 
oblast. 
The coefficients for the investigated regions of Kazakhstan are much higher than 
those of the comparable studies from various European countries, in which their 
values for wheat, for example, vary between 0.19 and 0.28 (MEUWISSEN et al., 1999). 
Figure 3-5 gives an overview about the distribution of grain yields (wheat and 
barley mostly) in 6 selected rayons of Akmolinskaya Oblast in the period between 
1980 and 2002. It shows a strong concentration of mean grain yields between 






















Figure 3-5: Boxplot of expected values and variance of farm grain yields in 











Source:  Own figure, the bold point depicts the Akmola study farm. 
Own international comparison of coefficients of variation
26 comprising data 
from various sources (1980-2003) depicts Kazakhstan’s relative comparative 
disadvantage in rainfed crop production. For wheat as well as for sunflowers 
Kazakhstan ranks last in a list of important producer countries. In both cases, 
Kazakhstan produces the lowest yields with a standard deviation that is 
comparable to other transition countries (Russia, Ukraine) that produce the double 
mean yield. The control of yield variation looks much better from a comparative 
perspective for irrigated crops, such as cotton. Cotton yields are relatively high 
with an acceptable standard variation, which secures Kazakhstan’s third place 
in the variation coefficient ranking after the United States and Uzbekistan. 
However, irrigated cotton production in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is strongly 
connected to the Aral Sea catastrophe. Irrigation projects can damage the 
environment to a large extent. Sustainability impacts, esp. ecological ones, have 
to be carefully evaluated beforehand. 
                                           
26  Chapter 4.4.3 will discuss the effect of insurance on the variation coefficients of income. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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Table 3-9:  An international comparison of yield variations of selected crops 
   Yield (dt/ha)  
Wheat  Mean  Standard deviation  Coeff. of variation 
  United States of America  25.5  2.2  0.086 
  France  63.7  7.4  0.117 
  Germany  64.4  8.6  0.133 
  Russian Federation  17.1  2.5  0.144 
  Canada  20.8  3.1  0.150 
  Spain  23.7  5.2  0.219 
  Kazakhstan  9.1  2.8  0.303 
Sunflower seed   
  France  22.6  1.8  0.079 
  Russian Federation  10.0  1.8  0.179 
  Germany  24.9  4.5  0.181 
  Ukraine  13.3  2.9  0.218 
  Kazakhstan  6.7  3.0  0.441 
Seed cotton   
  United States of America  18.4  1.9  0.102 
  Uzbekistan  25.5  3.3  0.128 
  Kazakhstan  22.1  3.4  0.154 
  China  25.9  5.0  0.193 
  India  6.5  1.4  0.213 
  Pakistan  16.1  3.6  0.227 
Sources: FAOSTAT Database (Production, 15. 7. 2005; STATISTICAL YEARBOOK USSR 1985, 
p.  210; 1987, p.  89; 1990; p.  472; STATISTICAL  HANDBOOK 1995; STATES OF THE 
FORMER USSR, pp. 259, 587; STATISTICAL YEARBOOK CIS COUNTRIES, 1994, pp. 226, 
345, 498; STATISTICAL YEARBOOK KAZAKHSTAN, 1984, p. 89; 1987, p. 70; 1990, p. 315; 
NATIONAL STATISTICAL AGENCY, Almaty. 
Note:  Data from 1980-2003.  
To get a feeling for the frequency of drought events and their regional impact, 
i.e. the systemic risk component in crop production, revisiting Soviet statistics 
might be helpful, because production technology and conditions were fairly 
comparable due to central planning. For that purpose, RAUNER’s (1977 drought 
catalogue of the main grain growing regions of the Soviet Union was 
considered. The detailed summary of all drought events in the main grain 
regions of the former USSR, including the Volga region, the Central Tshernosem 
region, the Northern Caucasus, Western Sibiria and the Altai, and North and 
Central Kazakhstan, during the time period 1861-1975 gives an impression 
about frequency and correlation of yield losses caused by drought. A short 
survey of Rauner’s data for the time period 1950-1975 (table A-7) shows 











































or more regions, in nine years four or more regions, in six years five or more 
regions and in three years all regions were affected by drought. This effect did 
not influence grain prices during socialist times. However, this strong correlation 
among vast grain growing regions had an effect on producer prices after these 
regions transformed into market economies. 
As Table 3-9 shows, for non-irrigated crops, yield deviations seem to be extremely 
high in Kazakhstan compared to other countries. Rainfed agriculture is extremely 
dependent on the volume and distribution of rainfalls. Figure 3-6 and 3-7 show the 
correlation of monthly precipitation and grain yields for an exemplary weather 
station (Astana) and its surrounding crop area (Tselinogradski rayon). The data 
for the period 1974-2002 demonstrates a strong correlation of June rainfall and 
grain yields. The strong dependence on rainfall in a certain period of time 
prompted us to think about alternative insurance products in the form of 
parametric rainfall insurance. The results are presented in chapter 4.5.3. 
Figure 3-6: Correlation of monthly precipitation and grain yields for the 
period 1974-2002 (weather station Astana, grain yields for 











Source:  Own figure based on survey data. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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Source:  Own figure based on survey data. 
Another strongly limiting factor for wheat yields is the date of sowing. Because 
the soil humidity is quickly used up with the beginning of the vegetation period, 
the sowing date is decisive as a field experiment in Kostanaiskaya oblast 
demonstrates (KRANZ, 2000). 
Table 3-10:  Wheat yields according to sowing date, fertilisation, and pest  
  management 
  Sowing date  
10
th of May  
(-12 days) 
Sowing date  
22
nd of May 
Sowing date 
5
th of June  
(+14 days) 
Yield (t/ha) without fertilisation and 
pest management 
1.03 (-28%)  1.43  0.98 (-31%) 
Yield (t/ha) with fertilisation and 
pest management 
1.48 (-28%)  2.04  1.53 (-25%) 
Source:  Based on KRANZ (2000). 
3.4  Description of research regions 
Akmola, North Kazakhstan and Kostanai in the North, Aktobe in the West, South 
Kazakhstan and East Kazakhstan were chosen as research regions for the farm 
survey, which will be presented later on. These regions will be described to give 
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the regions Akmola, East Kazakhstan and South Kazakhstan have been considered 
for further analysis of risk management instruments to represent a spectrum of 
different natural conditions, farm sizes, organisational forms, and and specialisations. 
The three research regions will therefore be described more extensively in this 
section. 
Map 3-1 gives an overview of all investigated research regions (marked red) and 
depicts different levels of wheat yield variation on the rayon-level. 
Map 3-1:  Research regions with variation coefficients for wheat yields 
(1980-2002) 
 
Source:  Own Map.  
Note:  TSE=Tselinogradski Rayon, GLU=Glubokovskoe Rayon, TUR=Turkestanski Rayon.  
Akmola (oblast capital Kokshetau) lies north of the large steppe Sari-Arka and is 
characterised by an intensive grain production mostly carried out on large farms. 
The oblast is characterised by large plains and a hilly region about 200 km north 
of the capital Astana. The steppe character of the region manifests itself in the 
land use. As Figure 3-8 reports, the largest share of land is extensively utilised 
as pasture land for cattle, horses and sheep. The decline in pasture area can be 
explained by the strong decline in livestock numbers. In 2003, the number of 
cattle has been reduced by 34 per cent and the number of sheep and goats by 
almost 40 per cent compared to 1994. 
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Figure 3-8: Development of agricultural areas under most important crops  














Source:  Own figure based on survey data. 
East Kazakhstan is situated in the farthest east of the country, bordering on 
Russia and China. With the beginning of the transformation period, the oblast 
was formed from East Kazakhstan oblast and Semipalatinskaya oblast. The two 
parts of the new oblast are different in geological structure and consequently in 
land use. Whereas the eastern part is strongly influenced by the Altai mountain 
climate with high precipitation and good soils, the region around Semipalatinsk 
is plain steppe. As in Akmola, the number of livestock was reduced drastically, 
consequently the meadows and pasture area decreased (s. Figure  3-9). As 
everywhere in the country, the total sown area decreased until 1998 and is recovering 
since then. Oil-yielding crops play a central role in the future development of the 
regional crop production. Beside sunflowers, rapeseed is gaining importance in 
the regional crop portfolio. Development of agriculture and the role of risk management in transition 
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Figure 3-9: Development of agricultural areas under most important crops 














Source:  Own figure based on survey data. 
South Kazakhstan Oblast geographically takes up the central part in the south of 
the country. Its extension from north to south is around 550 km, from east to 
west 40 km. The oblast is characterised by plains and mountains. The altitude 
varies mainly between 150m and 300m in the plains whereas the mountains 
reach altitudes up to 4500m. 
Three main zones can be identified: First, a sandy desert with partly afforested 
lowlands; second, an afforested zone with irrigation plants; and third, a mixed 
step-mountain zone. The annual sum of temperatures above 10°C varies between 
3000 and 4600 with a much higher variation in the mountainous region. Annual 
precipitation amounts to 300-900 mm in the mountainous region, whereas the 
sum in the desert zone varies between 130 and 200 mm. Also, the vegetation 
periods are subject to large changes across the oblast. Whereas in a part of the 
mountainous zone the vegetation period is maximum 215 days long, it lasts in a 
part of the desert zone only to maximum 165 days (MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, 
1967). The soils are characterized by sandy to clayey Serosyoms (Xerosols) that 
developed from loess soils. They are weak in humus (1-2%), calciferous up to the 
soil, weakly weathered, loose and easily prone to erosion. Normally, the agricultural 
utility of these soils is small, but their advantageous physical properties make 
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In South Kazakhstan, irrigated crops like cotton, fruits, and vegetables gained 
importance during the last years, whereas the share of grain and forage crops 
decreased drastically since the beginning of transformation (Figure 3-10). Only 
in recent years, the total sown area has been stabilising.  
Figure 3-10:  Development of agricultural areas under most important crops  















Source:  Own figure based on survey data. 
Note:  For reasons of visibility, pastures and meadows were not included in the graph. The 
average pastures and meadows area between 1990 and 2003 was about 9.3 mil. ha. 
All of the selected oblasts play an important role in the national agricultural 
production. Although Akmolinskaya oblast contributes only 2.89
27 per cent to 
the GDP, its contribution to the agricultural GDP is significant with a share of 
11.3 per cent. East Kazakhstan is fairly industrialized and contributes 7.36 per cent 
to the GDP. Its contribution to agricultural GDP is around 9.66 per cent with more 
than half of it coming from livestock production. South Kazakhstan is a densely 
populated oblast, contributing 6.19 per cent to the GDP. South Kazakhstan’s 
agriculture makes up 12.43 per cent of the national agricultural GDP, though the 
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area sown is relatively small compared to the other two oblasts. The reasons for 
this lie in the production of high value-added products. 
The agricultural sector plays an important role in the regional economies. In 
terms of contribution to the regional GDP, it is the most important sector in 
Akmola, the second most important sector after industry in South Kazakhstan 
and the third most important one after industry and trade in East Kazakhstan.  
In terms of employment, agriculture is the most important sector throughout the 
country. In Akmola 47.1 per cent of the population are employed in agriculture, 
in East Kazakhstan 35.4 per cent, and in South Kazakhstan 34.9 per cent. Crop 
production is the predominant production branch in the country. It contributes 
by 70.6 per cent to agricultural gross product in Akmola, 48.2 per cent in East 
Kazakhstan, and 67 per cent in South Kazakhstan. However there are differences 
between the organisational forms, e.g. in East Kazakhstan the share of crop 
production is around 44.9  per  cent in agricultural enterprises and around 
81.1 per cent in private farms. The number of agricultural entities and their 
organisational status varies strongly from oblast to oblast. Both indicators seem 
to depend more on such factors as potential agricultural income portfolio, crops 
grown, intensity of crop and livestock production, and the regional agricultural 
authorities. Regional statistics on the oblast level (Table3-12) reveal marked 
geographical patterns in farm ownership structures, with the majority of legally 
registered peasant farms located in the southern and eastern oblasts, while the 
majority of the JSCs and PLLs are situated in the grain-growing northern 
oblasts. This can partially be deduced to the more favourable conditions for a 
variety of labour-intensive crops like cotton, fruits and vegetables and pressure 
on land due to high population density, esp. in South Kazakhstan, and the 
comparative advantage of vertically integrated structures in large-scale grain 
production. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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Table 3-11:  Selected characteristics of investigated oblasts 
Feature/Oblast  Akmola  East Kaz  South Kaz  Kazakhstan
Share of Ag in GDP  
(mean 2001-2004) (in %) 
34.5 11.5 18.4 9.1
Share of crop production  
(mean 2001-2004*) (in %) 
70.6 48.2 67.0 58.1
Share of crop production, agr. 
enterprises (mean 2001-2004)  
(in %) 
92.9 44.9 89.0 86.2
Share of crop production private 
farms (mean 2001-2004) (in %) 
99.1 81.1 99.3 91.7
Share of crop production 
household plots  
(mean 2001-2004) (in %) 
27.1 22.2 35.0 38.0
Number of agr. enterprises  
(mean 2003-2005) 
546 126 3,499 8,020
Number of private farms  
(mean 2003-2005) 
4,486 13,165 52,515 156,399
Soil quality (bonitet)  38 (26-57) 39 (9-93) 30 (20-57)  – 
Sown area (2003) (‘000 ha)  3,844 1,011 740  17,454
Population (in ‘000) (2005)  747.2 1,442.1 2,193.6  15,074.8
Percentage of rural population 
(2005) 
52.9 40.8 59.9 42.9
Percentage of population working 
in agriculture, mean (2001-2004). 
47.1 35.4 47.1 34.9
Source:    AGENCY OF STATISTICS (2005b), KAZGIDROMET (2003, 2004).  
Notes: 
* All kinds of enterprises including household plots; – missing value. 
However, one  has to distinguish between registered and operating farms 
(Table 3-13). Especially stunning are the numbers in South Kazakhstan: Only 
5,022 of 43,323 registered peasant farms and 735 of registered 3,421 agricultural 
enterprises and organisations reported cultivation of land for 2003 (REGIONAL 
STATISTICAL OFFICE SOUTH KAZAKHSTAN OBLAST, 2003). The high number of 
non-active farms could partially be explained by problems with liquidity and 
access to capital. Family farms which have access to more stable, non-agricultural 
income sources decide not to invest in agricultural production as long as their 
own capital cannot provide them with sufficient collateral for the engagement in 
risky agricultural production.  Development of agriculture and the role of risk management in transition 
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Akmola  1999  3,575 112 34  203 30 
Akmola 2005  4,647 46  26  491  1 
East Kazakhstan 1999  6,761 55  19  149  5 
East Kazakhstan 2005  14,198 26  9  95  9 
South Kazakhstan 1999  23,198 847  11  113  81 
South Kazakhstan 2005  67,121 1,933  17  1,569  14 
Sources: GRAY (2000); AGENCY OF STATISTICS (2005b). 










Akmola 2003 (registered)  4,412 59  25  448 
Akmola 2003 (active)  4,406 12  13  349 
South Kazakhstan 2003 (registered)  43,323 2,088  30  1,303 
South Kazakhstan 2003 (active)  5,022 465  6  264 
Sources: REGIONAL STATISTICAL OFFICES (2003); AGENCY OF STATISTICS (2005b). 
Note:  – Missing value. 
Figure 3-11 depicts the prevailing underinvestment in the agricultural sector for 
almost all research regions in almost all years. Specifically, it shows the 
relationship between the relative investments in agriculture as a share of total 
investments in the economy and the share of agriculture in the regional GDP. 
A  "1" would express investments in the agricultural sector according to its 
importance in the regional economy. Despite the great importance for the 
regional economies, investments in agriculture correspond in only two years 
(2000 in Akmolinskaya Oblast and 2001 in North Kazakhstan Oblast) to the 
economic sector weight. This relationship might be put into perspective by the 
high probability that many investments in smaller enterprises (East and South 
Kazakhstan) have not been accounted.  Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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Figure 3-11:  Relationship between relative investments in agriculture and  
  share of agriculture in regional GDP 
Source:  Own figure based on survey data. 
According to Table 3-14 crop production has been marked by increasing 
specialisation. The share of wheat in total area sown has steadily increased during 
the last years. On the national level, the share of wheat area in total area sown 
increased from 41 per cent in 1995 to 66.1 per cent in 2002. The same development 
can be perceived for East Kazakhstan and Akmola, where the share was around 
77 per cent in 2002. These numbers express the high portfolio risk of the farmers in 
the respective regions. The figures for South Kazakhstan show a somewhat 
different picture. The wheat share is relatively stable around 25 per cent. 
Table 3-14:  Share of wheat area in total sown area 
   1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Akmolinskaya  0.628 0.714 0.713 0.742 0.748 0.771 
Aktyubinskaya  0.421 0.611 0.548 0.632 0.712 0.736 
East  Kazakhstan  0.168 0.172 0.357 0.400 0.439 0.511 
Kostanaiskaya  0.662 0.646 0.700 0.759 0.775 0.757 
North  Kazakhstan  0.181 0.605 0.645 0.687 0.724 0.743 
South  Kazakhstan  –  0.271 0.239 0.229 0.240 0.255 
Republic of 
Kazakhstan 
0.410 0.573 0.591 0.624 0.646 0.661 
Source: AGENCY OF STATISTICS, 2003. 
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The differences between production conditions can best be shown by comparing 
yield data for wheat, the by far most important crop in Kazakhstan that is grown 
in all regions.  
Table 3-15 shows some wheat yield characteristics for all regions. The average 
wheat yield over all regions was 0.92 t/ha for the period from 1980-2002. The 
three research regions show strongly varying yield features: Crop production in 
Akmolinskaya Oblast strongly focuses on grain, though yield levels are relatively 
low (0.939 t/ha for wheat) in comparison to South Kazakhstan. This region is 
endowed with a large share of irrigated crop area (60%) and thereby reaches a 
comparatively high yield (0.128 t/ha), though soil quality is relatively low (yield 
power of 30 in average). East Kazakhstan possesses a medium yield potential 
for grain crops. The relatively high yield instability, expressed in a coefficient of 
variation (CV) of 0.43 might partly be attributed to the unification of the former 
East Kazakhstan and Semipalatinskaya Oblast, where natural conditions are more 
unfavourable. 
Table 3-15:  Mean, standard deviations, and coefficients of variation based  
on wheat yield data from 1980 to 2002 
Oblast Mean  STD  CV 
Akmolinskaya 9.39  2.94  0.31 
Aktubinskaya 6.06  3.12  0.51 
Almatinskaya 13.53 4.81 0.36 
Atyrauskaya 4.72  3.32  0.70 
East Kazakhstan  9.79  4.22  0.43 
Djambulskaya 12.02 4.29 0.36 
West Kazakhstan  7.01  4.21  0.60 
Karagandinskaya 6.42  2.88  0.45 
Kustanaiskaya 9.98  4.03  0.40 
Kysilordinskaya 9.81  3.99  0.41 
Pavlodarskaya 6.33  3.20  0.51 
North Kazakhstan  11.48  3.73  0.32 
South Kazakhstan  12.77  4.57  0.36 
Republic of Kazakhstan  9.19  2.82  0.31 
Min 4.72  2.82  0.29 
Max 13.53  4.81  0.73 
Median 9.59  3.86  0.40 
Source:  Own calculations based on survey data. 
Table 3-16 depicts selected results for the rayons, in which the three study farms 
are situated. An investigation of productivity in crop production between farms on 
the rayon-level depicts higher differences in the pre-transition period (1984-93) Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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than in the restructuring period thereafter (1994-2003). Results show a significant 
yield decline for wheat and sunflowers in Glubokoe, a weaker one in Tselinograd 
for wheat and barley and a slight increase of wheat and cotton yields in Turkestan. 
The coefficients of variation decline between the periods for wheat and barley in 
Tselinograd, sunflowers in Glubokoe and cotton in Turkestan are mainly influenced 
by the yield declines. The productivity differences are measured as coefficients 
of correlation between investigated farms. For three selected regional cultures the 
average correlation coefficients increased compared to the preceding period. 
Productivity differences between farms become particularly visible for the large 
rain farms in Tselinograd. 
Table 3-16: Productivity differences between farms before and after 
transition 























Tselinograd Wheat  11.6  9.1  0.330  0.257  0.890  0.730 
(Akmola) Barley  13.4  10.9  0.439  0.381  0.815 0.590 
Glubokoe Wheat  20.3  13.8  0.163  0.219  0.593 0.609 
(East Kaz)  Sunfl.  18.4  11.5  0.203  0.193  0.696  0.639 
Turkestan Wheat  14.3  18.2  0.365  0.382  0.822 0.952 
(South Kaz)  Cotton  19.6  20.3  0.227  0.183  0.748  0.977 
Source:  Own calculations based on survey data. 
3.5  Available and potential risk management instruments 
3.5.1  On-farm risk management instruments 
As discussed in chapter 2.2.1, the main on-farm risk management measures are 
portfolio selection and technology choice. These two instruments will be 
discussed in the following with regard to the conditions in Kazakhstan. The 
concluding paragraph will describe the current government measures to support 
on-farm risk management. 
3.5.1.1 Technological  instruments 
MEINEL (2002) investigates the geo-ecological effects of the Virgin Land’s 
Campaign in Western Siberia and derives recommendations for the future use of 
these areas. The thesis mainly aims at formulating best practise recommendations Development of agriculture and the role of risk management in transition 
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from an ecological viewpoint of erosion minimisation. Table 3-17 gives an 
overview of proposed measures, their effects and utility for the typical wheat-
fallow crop rotation. 
Table 3-17:  Recommendations for a cropping concept for the typical steppe 
Cycle Measure  Effect  Utility 
Shallow cultivation with 
disc harrow 
Last year’s stubbles 
remain 
Protection against erosion 
Low evaporation 
Fallow 
Herbicide use  
(total herbicide) 
Weed control  Low transpiration 
Herbicide use in early 
spring  
Weed control  Low weed competition 
Early seeding  Early seed emergence   Longer vegetation period 
Optimal usage of melt 
water 
Protection against erosion 
in spring 
Wheat 
Fixing the straw 
production 
Increase of stubble length  Improved snow collection 
Optimised influx of 
organic material 
Reduced evaporation 
Protection against erosion 
Source:  Own formation based on MEINEL (2002). 
However, gross margin calculations used by Meinel as examples do not allow to 
draw general conclusions for the long-term economic sustainability of different 
technologies. It is proposed to use mainly old machinery for no-till technology. 
This view cannot be supported by the author of this thesis, although the proposed 
agro-technological measures are capable of stabilising yields. 
Experience with minimum tillage technology
28 from North America shows 
promising results in terms of costs and yields and makes it a considerable option 
under the prevailing natural and economic conditions for crop production in 
Kazakhstan. It would make sense to introduce this technology as one of the on-
farm risk-management instruments in the later discussed programming model. 
                                           
28 Definition: The least amount possible of cultivation or soil disturbance done to prepare  
a suitable seedbed. The main purposes of minimum tillage are to reduce tillage energy 
consumption, to conserve moisture, and to retain plant cover to minimize erosion. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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Unfortunately, there is not sufficient data available yet to model a minimum 
technology option. The report of a joint project of the Ministry of Agriculture, 
the FAO, CIMMYT, and the Farmers’ Union on the use of soil-conserving 
technologies for a sustainable crop production in Northern Kazakhstan (MINISTRY 
OF AGRICULTURE, 2005) displays results on costs and yields for one year only, 
which is not suitable for drawing any conclusions about probability functions. 
Development and dissemination of technologies is strongly dependent on market 
availability. The establishment of trader networks of some international farm 
machinery producers will provide farmers with a broader range of technological 
solutions. As shown by the investments plans of the international farm machinery 
corporation Agco there is a huge market potential, predominantly caused by lack 
of investments in new machinery during the transition phase (INTERFAX FOOD 
AND AGRICULTURE REPORT, 2006 c). 
3.5.1.2 Diversification 
The agriculture sector in planned economies was characterised by a strong 
specialisation and hardly any diversification of enterprises. The transformation to 
market economies opened opportunities to manage risk by diversification of 
economic activities. 
CHAPLIN et al. (2005) investigated factors which support and inhibit enterprise 
diversification in Poland. Diversification-stimulating factors found are the level 
of general education and the frequency of public transport. Impediments to 
diversification are age and the desire to concentrate on farming activities. In the 
Polish case, both factors inhibit the willingness to enter other sectors. Whether 
this is the case for Kazakhstani farmers and what role mentality and risk aversion 
play is an interesting question for further research. The results of the Chaplin 
paper suggest that understanding the reasons for rural households not diversifying 
can contribute to producing more realistic and better tailored development policy. 
For an analysis of off-farm diversification in rural households in Slovenia and 
Macedonia see MÖLLERS (2006). 
MISHRA et al. (2005) examine the impact of various farm, operator, and household 
characteristics on the level of on-farm enterprise diversification in US agriculture. 
They find evidence that larger farms are more specialised. According to the 
results, there is significant evidence that insurance and diversification is positively 
correlated, indicating that farmers who buy insurance operate diversified farms. 
This result demonstrates the farmer’s ability to self-insure and supports the view 
that insurance and diversification are complements. For the investigated Kazakhstani 
farms, the results of a logit model estimation on factors influencing the demand 
for crop insurance suppose a somewhat different picture (see chapter 4.4.2.8).  Development of agriculture and the role of risk management in transition 
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SULEIMENOV et al. (2005) investigate agronomic and economic potentials of 
crop portfolio diversification in Kazakhstan. They come to the conclusion that a 
replacement of summer fallow in a typical fallow-wheat-wheat-barley crop rotation 
would be beneficial from two perspectives. First, the planting of alternative crops 
such as oats and pea reduce soil erosion significantly. Second, overall grain yields 
and profit margins increased. The authors forecast a high yield and economic 
potential for safflower, an oil crop with high drought resistance. This assessment 
was confirmed by personal communication with experts (UMBETOVNA, 2004; 
KRUSE, 2003, 2006). Their conclusions are based on investigations in western 
Kazakhstan carried out for the years 2000-2002. Further research could test the 
long-term economic potential of alternative crops under changing natural conditions 
and prices. 
Estimations of yield-stabilising effects of crop diversification show clear results. 
The analysis of coefficients of yield variation (CV) for the main cultures in the 
research rayons demonstrates a significant reduction in CVs of weighted, aggregated 
yield
29 of all cultures compared to the CVs of individual crops for a majority of 
the investigated enterprises. 
BABU and RHOE (2001) demonstrate that agricultural diversification will improve 
food security through several different avenues. First, agricultural diversification 
will divert land and labour resources from grain production to the production of 
higher value-added products, such as animal or horticultural products. Second, 
with rising urbanisation in Kazakhstan and its surrounding export markets and a 
perceived change in the demand of higher income elastic foods such as meat, fruits, 
and vegetables, agricultural diversification will assist in achieving equilibrium in 
supply and demand. Third, diversification could lead to rural industrialisation 
through post-harvest activities, such as storage, transportation, processing, and 
marketing. 
3.5.2  Financial risk management measures 
Financial risk management measures are the second component of a holistic risk 
management approach. The following sections discuss the situation of Kazakhstani 
farms regarding own capital endowment and access to credit. However, the 
focus of this chapter lies on the description and analysis of the current mandatory 
                                           
29  Aggregated CVs were estimated in three steps. First, the production share of the individual 
crops (measured in sown area) was weighed. Second, the yields of the individual crops were 
aggregated by multiplying them with the weighing factor. Third, the CV of the aggregated 
yield was estimated. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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crop insurance system as well as future options to establish a fully market-based 
voluntary insurance system. 
3.5.2.1 Own  capital 
Own capital is the limiting factor for the expansion of enterprises and the 
application of a certain technology. Therefore a key adjusting screw of the 
programming model that will be discussed later is the availability of own 
capital. Table 3-18 demonstrates that many agricultural enterprises are not 
profitable. Only in East Kazakhstan, the number of unprofitable farm enterprises 
decreased significantly during the years 2003 and 2004. 
Table 3-18:  Profitability on agricultural enterprises (2001-2004) 
   Profitable  Unprofitable 
    2001 2002 2003 2004 2001 2002 2003  2004
Republic  of  Kazakhstan  1832 1565 2103 1954 1973 1499  833  1427 
Akmolinskaya  228 213  80 228 171 185  14  208 
East  Kazakhstan  80 53  101 93 73 47 18  15 
South  Kazakhstan  420 360 530 541 531 321 265  350 
Source: AGENCY OF STATISTICS, 2005b. 
Profitability problems have a negative impact on solvency and own capital 
accumulation for self-insurance. For that reason, similar to the Russian Federation, 
the establishment of agro-holdings
30 plays an increasingly important role in 
Kazakhstan (SUNDETOV, 2004). In 2003, for example the holding "Agrozentr 
Astana" cropped approximately 320,000  ha of grain in Akmola oblast which 
corresponds to 9.4 per cent of the entire sowing area of this oblast. The enterprise 
manages further areas in North Kazakhstan. HOCKMANN et al. (2003) present 
several reasons for the establishment of agro-holdings in transition. One reason 
is the presence of a principal-agent problem in financing agricultural enterprises. 
Vertical integration in the form of an agro-holding fulfils primarily two purposes: 
                                           
30 According to UŠAČEV (2002) an agro-holding is the entirety of legal bodies, that are linked 
to each other via contractual or asset relationships. One participating enterprise takes on 
the function of the main or central company that directs the activities of the participating 
firms and makes strategic decisions. Particularly, the main company might be responsible 
for a unified investment, technology and product policy as well as for the distribution of 
the profit (EK, 2001, quoted in HOCKMANN et al., 2003). In addition the main company 
prepares the consolidated or common balance of the holding and coordinates the flow of 
financial resources and commodities. Finally the main company may have the right to 
employ and remove managers and specialists in the participating or as they are also called 
subsidiary company (ibid).  Development of agriculture and the role of risk management in transition 
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First, it permits access to information to reduce information asymmetries, e.g. 
between suppliers and processors. Second, it provides the investor with an efficient 
control over the utilisation of his financial means by delegating decision rights 
and exercising control rights. On the other hand, disadvantages may arise in the 
form of agency problems between financiers and managers of an agro-holding. 
The inability of financiers to observe the behaviour of managers creates moral 
hazard problems. Managers may divert resources from intended use and put less 
effort in running the firm than they would do if their own capital were involved.
31  
3.5.2.2 Credit 
Because of the extremely short periods for sowing and harvesting campaigns, the 
use of reliable machinery plays a particular role in Kazakhstan’s crop production. 
The inability to replace or repair existing machinery and inputs is a major 
productivity constraint. Therefore the provision of adequate credit access plays an 
important role in the agricultural restructuring process.  
Kazakhstan’s rural credit system, a carryover from the Soviet system had the 
reputation for favouring collective and ex-state farms (POMFRET, 1995). The 
operation of a rural financial system is still mostly benefiting large producers. 
2001 the Agricultural Credit Corporation (ACC) was established to provide 
subsidised credits to farms. Since then, 30 Agricultural Credit Partnerships (ACPs) 
were established across the country. The amount of rural lending is expected to 
increase. In 2003 the agricultural sector has received about 1.3 billion US$ of 
credits from commercial banks. However, most are directed to large farms and 
to operational lending. Credit for small farms and for the renewal of obsolete 
equipment is far below needs. The continued activity of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in financing the grain warehouse 
receipt programme shows the need and appropriateness of short-term credits for 
financing variable costs (EBRD, 2004) 
PETRICK and DITGES (2000) investigate risk management instruments of a case 
farm in Aktubinskaya Oblast by applying a quadratic programming model. They 
find that increased liquidity could improve the risk management of farms. 
However, the authors did not recommend government support for agriculture in 
the form of cheap credit. They rather recommended other measures to tackle risk in 
agriculture, such as developing rural transport and communication infrastructure, 
removing legal obstacles to collateralisation, easing foreign direct investment in the 
                                           
31  For a discussion on the influences of farm capital structure on risk management decisions, 
s. HEIDELBACH (2005c). Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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sector and to establish a rural advisory service. Six years after these recommendations 
were made, different measures, such as the establishment of a marketing infra-
structure, the introduction of a market information system, and an input cost 
subsidisation programme were introduced. The rural advisory service will be put 
into operation within the framework of a currently operating World Bank project. 
The objectives are the distribution of knowledge on sustainable cultivation 
practices and improving farm management. 
In a comparison of production costs for a high-input scenario typical of the 
Soviet era and a low-input scenario representative of current condition, LONGMIRE 
and MOLDASHEV (1999) estimated that a reduction of the real interest rate by 
10 per cent from improvements in the credit system would result in production 
costs savings equivalent to a yield improvement of 10 kg/ha. 
SUBBOTIN (2005) analyses access to credit for corporate farms in Russia using 
logit regression. His results indicate that more profitable farms have better access 
to credit. Contrary to the pattern in market economies, asset endowments (land 
and capital stock) have a very weak effect on the ability to borrow, reflecting the 
low collaterisability of farm assets in Russia. According to information provided 
by a representative of Zesnabank, one of the largest financiers of agricultural 
production in Kazakhstan, collateral is the most important factor in the decision 
for or against providing credit (TARADANOV, 2005). SWINNEN (2005) states that 
large corporate farms might have an advantage in receiving credit because their 
initial wealth is larger and/or because their transaction costs in credit markets are 
lower. 
3.5.2.3 Crop  insurance 
Crop insurance has a long history in the former USSR in general and in Kazakhstan, 
in particular. Agricultural insurance exists already since tsarist times. In 1918, 
all insurance companies, with an exception of the mutual ones were transferred 
into state ownership under the roof of the state insurance company Gosstrakh. In 
the framework of the intensification of the planned economy, Gosstrakh was 
disintegrated in 1930. Three years later a re-establishment of the state insurance 
company began, which ended in the 1940 law "On compulsory insurance". One 
of the characteristics of the socialist crop insurance system was a relatively 
rough estimation of insurance tariffs, i.e. there was not much differentiation 
between regions within the republics.  
After 1968 the soviet crop insurance system was reformed. An all-risk insurance 
was introduced with coverage level of up to 70 per cent of the average yield of 
the last five years. (OSTRIKOVA, 2003). After the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
in 1991, the state insurance system was cancelled. Five years later, a new mandatory Development of agriculture and the role of risk management in transition 
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crop insurance system was introduced under the supervision of the state 
insurance company "Kazagropolis". According to information provided by a 
former inspector of the state insurance system, "Kazagropolis" went bankrupt, 
because many farmers could not pay their premiums (UAISOVICH, 2003). On the 
other hand, many farmers stated, that the state insurance company did not pay 
indemnities in case of a crop loss. In 2001, "Kazagropolis" was closed down, but 
some of the negative image of the former state insurance system remained. The 
bad reputation might be an obstacle to the new crop insurance system, which is 
based on private insurance industry participation. 
Under the national agro-food programme of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the law 
"On Mandatory Crop Insurance" was adopted on March 10, 2004. It came into 
effect on April 1, 2004, and all by-laws were adopted for its implementation. 
However, due to absence of insurance companies holding license for crop 
insurance activities, implementation of the law in 2004 was impossible. Practical 
implementation started in 2005 with the beginning of the sowing campaign.  
The main objective of this law is to ensure protection of property interests of 
crop producers from consequences of adverse natural phenomena, leading to 
partial or complete loss of harvest, through insurance payments. Since the law 
was adopted, the dissemination process provoked mostly depreciative reactions on 
the side of the farmers and farmers’ organisations. Contrary to the argumentation of 
Tazhmakin (cited in PROKHOROV, 2005), chairman of a Kazakhstani insurance 
company, not only poor farmers object crop insurance. According to experiences 
gained during my extensive visits to the country, there is a broad distrust in the 
current crop insurance system. International experience shows, that large farmers 
and the insurance industry often profit most from crop insurance programmes.  
The crop insurance covers losses caused by following adverse natural phenomena 
(excerpt from a 2005 insurance contract).: 
–  Air drought – Absence of effective precipitation (above 5 mm per day) in 
vegetation period during at least 30 successive days with maximum 
temperature above 25 C˚ (in southern regions above 30 C˚). In some days, 
not longer than 25  per  cent of the period duration (7 days), maximum 
temperatures may be below the specified limits. 
–  Soil drought – In vegetation period, reserve of productive moisture in the 
soil layer 0-20 cm is 10 mm maximum during at least 30 days in a row, or 
during at least 20 days, if before drought reserve of productive moisture in 
the soil layer 0-100 cm was below 50 mm.  
–  Frosts – Decrease of air temperature (soil surface) below 0C˚ in period of 
active vegetation of crops, leading to their significant damage. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
 
74
–  Winter killing – Damage to grain crops, caused by low temperatures in 
absence of snow cover or its insufficient capacity during severe frost. 
–  Lack of heat – Lack of active and effective air temperatures, required for 
physiological development of plants (development of certain phases of 
development of various crops).  
–  Excess soil moisture – In vegetation period, soil 10-12 cm deep is visually 
characterized as sticky and fluid during at least 20 days in a row. In some 
days, not longer than 4-5 days, soil may transfer to soft plastic consistency.  
–  Hail – Particularly dangerous, when size of hailstones is 20 mm and more 
(average size of 10 largest hailstones); smaller hailstones may be considered, 
too, if they caused big damage.  
–  Shower – Rainfall 20 mm and more during less than one hour; rainfall 
during shower is counted. 
–  Storm (dust, sand) – Average speed is at least 15 m/sec and visibility is 
500 m at most. 
–  Hurricane (strong wind, squall) – Wind with average speed or gusts 15 m/sec 
and more. Maximum speed of wind that damaged plants is counted.  
–  Flood – Flooding of crop land during spring floods, rain floods, ice jams. 
–  Mudflow – Water flows, caused by floods in mountain rivers, with very high 
content of mineral particles and fragments of rocks  
The insurance company indemnifies the farmer based on standard costs per 
hectare, which were formulated by the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA). The farmer 
can choose between two standard costs types (scientifically justified technology, 
simplified technology, and three types of costs including labour, fuel, and seeds). 
50  per  cent of the payments to insurance organizations are subsidized by the 
government Fund for Financial Support of Agriculture. Licenses without time 
limit for insurance activities in the field of mandatory crop insurance have been 
issued to four insurance companies (JSC Grain Insurance Company, JSC TransOil 
Insurance Company, JSC Victoria Insurance Company, and JSC Eurasia 
Insurance Company). Active work on conclusion of contracts of mandatory crop 
insurance in 2005 has been carried out by the first two companies only. 
However two insurance companies turned out to be insufficient to provide 
complete coverage of mandatory crop insurance as Table 3-19 through Table 3-21 
show.  Development of agriculture and the role of risk management in transition 
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Table 3-19:  Crop insurance market characteristics 2005 
Source:  Own formation based on information provided by JSC "Grain Insurance Company", 
27.07.2005 and JSC "Trans Oil", 20.07.2005. 
The total insured area was 8,225,998 ha, which is 57.6 per cent of the entire crop 
area subject to mandatory insurance (14,278,000 ha), including 
–  Cereals – Insured area was 7,982,513 ha, which is 57,5 per cent of entire 
crop area under cereals (13,886,000); 
–  Oil crops – Insured area was 237,753 ha, which is 38.9 per cent of entire 
crop area under oil crops (610,900); 
–  Sugar beet – Insured area was 1969 ha, which is 10.4 per cent of entire crop 
area under sugar beet (19,000); 
–  Cotton – Insured area was 1818 ha, which is 0.9 per cent of entire crop area 
under cotton (200,700). 
There is a higher penetration of crop insurance in regions with a higher share of 
large-scale enterprises and better infrastructure, like Akmola, Kostanai, East and 
North Kazakhstan. Smaller private farms have restricted access to insurance, though 
they would need it more than large farms, since their self-insuring opportunities 










Insured area as 
share of sown 
area (2004) 
Akmolinskaya 961  1,870,060  1,946  3,606,000 0.519 
Aktubinskaya 632  243,963 386  726,300 0.336 
Almatinskaya 1,210 45,941  38 490,000  0.094 
East Kazakhstan  2,016  572,056  284  595,900  0.960 
Djambulskaya 541  46,909  87  377,300 0.124 
West Kazakhstan  521  223,930  430  666,900  0.336 
Karagandinskaya 486 203,549  419  845,400  0.241 
Kysylordinskaya 81 20,721  256  79,600  0.260 
Kostanaiskaya 3,339  2,808,782  841  3,053,700  0.920 
Pavlodarskaya 777  473,735  610  578,000 0.820 
North Kazakhstan  2,319  1,714,245  739  3,031,000  0.566 
South Kazakhstan  189  2,107  11  226,400  0.009 
Total 13,072  8,225,998  629  14,278,000  0.576 Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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chairman of "Grain Insurance Company" as of September 2003, whose main 
interest lies in insuring large-scale farms in Northern Kazakhstan (TASHMAKIN, 
2003). Private insurance companies clearly act as profit-maximisers and try to 
keep transaction costs low. 
Table 3-20:  Insured area according to crop and farm type, 2005 
Insured area (ha) 
  Grain Oil  crops Cotton 
Oblast AE*  PF**  AE PF AE PF 
Akmolinskaya  1,632,114  237,946 – – – – 
Aktubinskaya  131,588  112,375 – – – – 
Almatinskaya 15,911  11,238  10,030  5,027  –  – 
East  Kazakhstan  256,605  176,800 67,965 70,686  –  – 
Djambulskaya  23,745  16,720 4,944 1,771  –  – 
West  Kazakhstan  58,447  165,483 – – – – 
Karagandinskaya  108,433  95,116 – – – – 
Kysylordinskaya  19,578  1,083  60 – – – 
Kostanaiskaya  1,849,858  958,924 – – – – 
Pavlodarskaya  172,914  225,795 15,904 59,122  –  – 
North  Kazakhstan  1,577,748  134,453  2,044 – – – 
South Kazakhstan  89  –  200  –  1,800  18 
Total  5,847,030  2,135,483 101,147 136,606  1,800  18 
Source:     Own formation based on information provided by JSC "Grain Insurance Company", 
   27.07.2005 and JSC "Trans Oil", 20.07.2005. 
Note:  * AE=Agricultural enterprise, PF=Private farm. 
In 2005, in course of practical application of the law norms, defects were 
discovered. Accordingly, the MoA created a working group for development of 
proposals on improvement of the law on mandatory crop insurance. In a meeting 
of the MoA working group in October 2005, three main problems of the actual 
system became evident: 
–  Monitoring: Monitoring committee's authority is questioned by farmers 
and insurance companies; distances between plots are large and monitoring 
and infrastructure underdeveloped, preventing qualified monitoring being 
achieved on time.  Development of agriculture and the role of risk management in transition 
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–  Communication: Loss of information about insureds' characteristics 
(production, technology...) caused by missing collaboration between 
agricultural administration, statistical offices and insurance companies. 
Different, sometimes shady practices for transfer of premiums and 
indemnities.  
–  Insufficient provision of information to farmers and regional agricultural 
administration: Lead to confusion and resentments among farmers in 
different regions, i.e. productive farmers in Northern Kazakhstan do not want 
to subsidize highly risk-prone farms in Western Kazakhstan. 
Other weak points of the insurance programme not mentioned in the meeting are: 
–  Adverse selection and moral hazard may arise, as farmers could select the 
highest cover (scientifically justified technology), although they have used 
simplified technologies, hoping to increase the probability of insurance 
payout.
32 
–  The law does not make detailed distinction between low-risk areas and 
high-risk areas. This might expose the whole system to adverse selection, 
particularly for crops other than cereals that have a single country-wide 
premium rate. 
– A  slow processing and a high claim rejection rate. The loss adjustment is 
performed by a commission, which determines the yield loss. The first 
year processing rate was very low due to implementation difficulties. As of 
December 2005, only 60 per cent of the farmers’ claims were processed, 
although the law includes a maximum processing and indemnification 
period of 30 days after the loss occurred. If a total loss will be reported, 
this period reduces to even 10 days. Interestingly, 95.8  per  cent of the 
claims were rejected. Most of the rejected claims, are currently under 
litigation. These disputes show that the loss adjustment process needs to be 
revised in the very short run, as this will affect the reputation of the whole 
crop insurance scheme and even the reputation of the insurance industry. 
–  Another evident problem on the way to a functioning commercial crop 
insurance system is the lack of interest of potent insurance companies. 
Liquidity problems of insurers can be caused by systemic risk and credit-
rationing. Credit-rationing could be overcome by diversifying the insurer’s 
portfolio with insurance types which losses are not correlated to crop 
insurance. In Kazakhstan, the insurance market is not fully developed yet. 
There is a range of small insurers with unsatisfactory securities, such as 
"Grain Insurance Company", which was especially founded for the 
purpose of providing insurance to the agricultural sector. The company 
                                           
32  The monetary effects of this behaviour will be investigated in chapter 0. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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faces an extremely high risk when considering the portfolio of clients. 
"Grain Insurance Company" and "Trans Oil" belong to the smallest among 
the 37 insurance companies registered in Kazakhstan (as of 1 July 2005). 
Together they possess less than two per cent of the entire own capital of 
the whole national insurance industry. One might question the adequacy of 
small companies to act as a crop insurer on a national basis. 
Table 3-21:  Trends in crop insurance market development 
















Akmolinskaya 961  1,837  1.91  1,870,060  3,520,477  1.88 
Aktubinskaya 632 638  1.01  243,963  245,789 1.01 
Almatinskaya 1,210 1,997 1.65  45,941  21,149  0.46 
East Kazakhstan  2,016  5,191  2.57  572,056  370,794  0.65 
Djambulskaya 541 724  1.34  46,909 56,975  1.21 
West Kazakhstan  521  700  1.34  223,930  330,435  1.48 
Karagandinskaya 486  952  1.96  203,549  372,604  1.83 
Kysylordinskaya 81  102 1.26  20,721  26,979  1.30 
Kostanaiskaya 3,339 3,404  1.02  2,808,782  3,097,948  1.10 
Pavlodarskaya 777 791  1.02  473,735  489,024  1.03 
North Kazakhstan  2,319  2,303  0.99  1,714,245  1,917,382  1.12 
South Kazakhstan  189  369  1.95  2,107  4,662  2.21 
Total 13,072  19,008  1.45  8,225,998  10,454,218  1.27 
Source:  Own formation based on information provided by JSC "Grain Insurance Company", 
JSC "Trans Oil", and JSC "Victoria", 14.04.2006. 
In spite of many implementation difficulties, the number of insurance contracts 
and the total insured area increased in 2006 compared to 2005 in nearly all oblasts 
(Table 3-21). Nevertheless, the insurance penetration is continuing to be very low 
in southern Kazakhstan oblasts (South Kazakhstan, Almatinskaya, Djambulskaya, 
Kysylordinskaya). 
Keeping in mind the described implementation problems, the next chapter 
proceeds in discussing which implications government support of a crop insurance 
system has and which alternative non-trade distorting support mechanisms the 
government of Kazakhstan is currently using. Development of agriculture and the role of risk management in transition 
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3.5.2.4 Government  measures 
Crop insurance was historically subsidised by the state. Whether this is correct 
from the point of the state depends on the political objectives formulated by the 
respective democratic government. From an economic viewpoint, direct subsidisation 
of crop insurance might be questionable in many cases. No less questionable, 
though, is another behaviour exemplified in the demands of Russia’s Agricultural 
Minister to support Russian farmers who were affected by winter killing in 2006 
despite the existence of a crop insurance system (Agra-Europe, 2006c). Ex-post 
disaster relief contributes to the weakening of an insurance system by taking away 
ex ante insurance incentives. Public support of disaster relief and crop insurance 
at the same time annuls the idea of ex ante risk management through crop insurance. 
HARDAKER et al. (2004, p. 301) ask "Why should farmers purchase crop insurance 
against major calamities if they know that farm lobbies can usually apply the 
necessary political pressure to obtain direct assistance for them in times of need at 
no financial cost?" While lobby pressure might be predictably high after occurrence 
of natural disasters, giving in to this pressure on the part of the politicians leads 
to undermining the crop insurance system. 
Until recently the Government of Kazakhstan used to maintain relatively little 
involvement in influencing crop production. Investment in research and extension 
was minimal. Likewise, infrastructural investment, such as development of roads, 
terminal facilities, marketing system, and agribusiness promotion, remained 
insignificant (MENG et al., 2000). Starting in 2003, several actions were undertaken 
by the government to develop rural areas and particularly the agricultural sector. 
For example Kazakhstan's Food Contract Corporation launched a grain terminal 
in Ventspils, Latvia, with a capacity of 1.5 million tonnes of grain. Furthermore, 
the long-time planned grain terminal at the port of Aktau on the Caspian Sea, 
with a handling capacity of up to 500,000 tonnes a year was put into operation. 
The corporation established representations in Britain, China, Iran and Uzbekistan 
(INTERFAX FOOD AND AGRICULTURE REPORT, 2005 a). A further government 
action is the recent launching of a project on improving the competitiveness of 
agricultural commodities.  
  
 
4 Empirical analysis of risk management instruments 
This chapter presents the most important empirical findings of the dissertation. 
Specifically, the following sections highlight the research conditions, the 
selection of research regions, the questionnaire contents, and the most important 
survey findings. Thereafter, the methodology for assessing the efficiency of 
different risk management instruments and the results from model estimations 
will be presented. 
4.1 Research  design and objectives 
Different approaches have been used to work on the research topic. Besides the 
investigation of the current crop insurance system by the means of comparative 
literature analysis and the study of secondary data, the collection and analysis of 
unique own data was an integral part of the research concept. 
The research questions were approached by exploratory expert interviews and 
two workshops with scientists, representatives of insurance companies, state 
institutions and agricultural interest groups. However, conducting structured 
personal interviews on the farm-level and collecting secondary statistical data on 
cropping areas, yields, prices and regional weather data were the most important 
elements of data collection. 
The rationale for the empirical study, particularly the farm survey, is to obtain 
information about production risks that Kazakhstani farmers face, their attitude 
towards risk, and the risk management instruments they apply. Furthermore, 
factors influencing the demand for insurance products will be investigated. This 
information provides the basis for further analysis of potential risk management 
instruments for farmers in transition countries in general and under the prevailing 
production conditions in Kazakhstan in particular. No appropriate data was 
available before. In Kazakhstan and other CIS countries survey data collection 
in many cases is not affordable for socio-economic research institutes. 
The rationale for the aforementioned interviews was to gain insight in experts’ 
perceptions of functioning crop insurance in Kazakhstan. The interviews were 
conducted with 13 experts from insurance companies, chairmen of farmers’ unions 
and agricultural trading companies and scientists from the disciplines Meteorology, Empirical analysis of risk management instruments 
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Agronomy, and Agricultural Economics. They provided the basis for further 
refinements of the farm survey questionnaire. Furthermore, the interviews detected 
critical issues that had to be addressed on the workshop. 
The workshops were designed to bring together different groups of experts with 
different interest with regard to crop insurance in order to stimulate discussion 
about crop insurance in Kazakhstani agriculture. The objective of the first 
workshop was to inform the participants about the research objectives and basic 
principles of crop insurance, and on this basis to gain information for further 
empirical investigations, particularly with respect to the selection of survey regions. 
Through moderation and visualization techniques that facilitated discussions, 
workshop participants could make statements regarding the most important 
regional and supra-regional risks, preferred insurance products and their design 
features.  
The dissemination of results among stakeholders was accomplished by a second 
workshop organised by the project team and scientific publications in the country 
of research. The workshop, which took place in October 2005, in the Ministry 
of Agriculture in Astana, provided a forum for discussing results. Workshop 
participants included political decision-makers, representatives of the World Bank, 
the Kazakhstani Farmers' Union, regional administrators, insurance companies, 
researchers, farmers and journalists. 
Table A-1 provides information on the different survey components: It describes 
their objectives and informs about the respondents to the different parts of 
surveys, the number of observations, the character of the extracted data and the 
time span when the data was collected. The components constitute a crucial part 
of the research and contribute to the aforementioned research objectives by 
providing the data base. 
4.2 Research  conditions and data quality 
This chapter comprises two parts. First, it provides some observations about 
conditions for field research, which emerge from the fieldwork periods in 2003 
and 2004 and the dissemination of results among stakeholders in 2005. Second, 
it critically discusses the data quality in a transition country, such as Kazakhstan. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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4.2.1 Field  work
33 
Four points are worth making about the conditions for conducting field research 
of this kind. First, experience from the year 2003 showed that carrying out a 
random selection procedure for rayons and farms does not produce satisfying 
results. Rayons that were administratively re-organised and farms that changed 
legal form, ownership status, and crop area several times during the past years, 
might be selected. Structural interruptions such as these might lead to spurious 
findings. As a result, more importance should have been attached to additional 
recommendations of the often very helpful oblast and rayon administrative staff. 
As the 2004 experience has shown, the fieldwork tasks in the rayons can be 
organized more efficiently when taking seriously the recommendations of the 
administration.  
Second, staff and data resources in the departments of statistics and agriculture 
vary significantly across rayons, and thereby the degree of necessary support for 
researchers also fluctuates. For our purposes, we needed long time series of 
yields and sown areas for the most important agricultural crops on a farm-level 
basis. But as a result of different organizational and structural reforms and 
changes, this data is scattered among different institutions, i.e., oblast and rayon 
statistical and agricultural departments and archives. We are able to safely say 
that each rayon has its own rules. Thus, data collection resembles detailed 
detective work. Equally, the access of foreigners to the non-secret agricultural 
data is regulated and managed in different manners across oblasts and rayons. In 
the Northern Kazakhstan city of Kostanai, it was more difficult to collect data 
than in other regions, according to the head of the Regional Department of 
Statistics the result of ‘bad experiences made with foreigners’, i.e. misuse of 
confidential data.  
A further lesson learned is that the quality of accounting data varies greatly 
across farms. While smaller private farms might not have any records at all for 
the past years, larger, well-performing farms sometimes have an army of 
accountants. However, only the main accountant has an overview of the data, 
but usually is not obliged to pass on information to a third party without the 
agreement of the head of the respective enterprise. That makes it necessary to 
obtain an appointment with both persons. The last point shows the importance of 
hierarchy in Kazakhstani institutions.  
                                           
33  This chapter is based on HEIDELBACH (2005a). Empirical analysis of risk management instruments 
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The outstanding role of the head is inherent to the system and is an obstacle to 
both the functioning of the institutions itself and the efficiency of their clients. 
Finally, the efficiency of fieldwork is likewise limited by regional tele- 
communication availability and rural infrastructure. The exchange of data via 
electronic systems is often possible between state institutions, but limited between 
institutions and other entities – in our case researchers. The state of the Kazakhstani 
telecommunication network is illustrated by UN statistics. Kazakhstan placed 134 
out of 187 countries regarding internet accesses per population, 106 out of 204 
countries regarding the number of main phone lines per population and 126 out 
of 191 countries regarding mobile phone subscriptions per population (UNITED 
NATIONS, 2003a). In a UN paper assessing the overall diffusion of information 
and communication technology Kazakhstan is ranked 166 out of 180 countries 
(UNITED NATIONS, 2003b). In addition, taking into account the bad state of many 
roads and the vast territory of rayons, both a clear-cut plan and intense organization 
of the field work by experienced researchers will contribute to a successful and 
efficient data survey. 
A conclusion from this chapter could be formulated as follows: Field research is 
always a complex process involving many contextual factors, discontinuities, 
negotiations, and compromises. Comprehending cultural and historical peculiarities 
of the research area, learning how local institutions function, and being willing 
to adapt personally to new circumstances that affect planning and negation 
strategies are key qualifications for conducting successful data surveys, especially 
in transition and developing countries. 
4.2.2  A critical discussion of the data quality 
COBLE and BARNETT (1999) describe the problem of inappropriate data for risk 
analysis. Aggregated data might lead to spurious results. Table 4-1 illustrates this 
point. The table reports the ratio of weighted average of farm yield standard 
deviations to the rayon yield standard deviations for the rayon where the example 
farms are located. Rayon yield standard deviation underestimates the average 
farm yield and severely biases analysis of yield risk. 
JUST and POPE (2003) also criticise the use of aggregate data in risk analysis. 
They argue that it often distorts risk and renders empirical applications little 
more than illustrative exercises. These critics motivated the use of specific study 
farms for analysis within the framework of the risk programming model. 
 Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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Table 4-1:  Underestimation of deviations in farm yield, when aggregating  
the data 
Location (rayon)  Mean standard deviation of 
farm yield (wheat, 1994-2003) 
Mean standard deviation of farm 
yield/standard deviation of rayon 










Source:  Own estimations based on survey data. 
TOMEK and PETERSON (2001) discuss the problem of doing useful analyses by a 
lack of easy access to data on some of the relevant portfolio choices. They mention 
that when one introduces yield futures and insurance products to a portfolio 
model, research becomes more costly, as an understanding of the probability 
functions of farm-level yields is crucial. 
As described in chapter 3.2.3, the former state and collective farms were downsized 
and transformed into cooperatives, limited liability partnerships, joint stock 
companies and private family farms in the early transition period. This had a 
significant effect on production technologies and practices. To follow this data 
particularity both farm as well as aggregated yield time series (rayon, oblast, and 
national level) were tested for structural change in the respective period by 
employing a Chow-test (CHOW, 1960). In the presence of a structural break, two 
sub-periods, before and after the structural break, are regarded for yield de-trending 
(s. BOKUSHEVA et al., 2006) 
Since it was not possible to select a common procedure
34 for the whole data 
set, yield time series were de-trend according to a procedure described in 
BOKUSHEVA et al. (2006).  
The main distinctions between different procedures employed are those regarding 
the functional forms used and application of F-test to the trend parameters 
estimates. Additionally, all procedures were used with and without taking into 
                                           
34 In several cases, the data provide evidence for structural change, but trend parameters 
estimates are not significantly different from zero. Thus, it is not fully appropriate to de-
trend yields employing these estimates. On the other hand, as long as the hypothesis of 
structural break is not rejected, we have to count for a bias, if we do not apply de-trending 
to those time series.  Empirical analysis of risk management instruments 
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account annual weather effects. Introduction of a weather parameter into de-
trending procedures can be justified by the fact that in the period from 1995 to 
1998 wheat yields sank consecutively as a result of extremely adverse weather 
conditions. Thus, considering annual weather effects should allow a more correct 
assessment of time trends. However, since weather parameters cannot be introduced 
on the aggregated levels, particularly on the national and regional levels, both, 
standard de-trending procedures and de-trending with taking into account weather 
effects were used. 
Another factor with regard to data quality is trust in the collected data. In 
Kazakhstan and other CIS countries, the discrepancies between actual and reported 
crop (grain) production may be less important than in the livestock sector, as 
grain continues to be produced mainly on large collective or corporative farms, 
for which there is an established system of data collection. However, the reliability 
of data coming from the large farms is being undermined by the deficiencies in 
the grain production and marketing chain. 
Strong motivation continues to exist at all levels of the grain chain to under or 
over report. Despite the variety of conditions in grain production and marketing 
among the CIS countries, the reasons for under-reporting grain output are similar 
and reflect mainly farmers’ need for cash, aversion to (re-)paying tax and debts, 
and disappearance of grain at various levels in the marketing system – local 
elevator, rayon, oblast and higher levels of government – in countries where grain 
trade is still under partial control. In addition, lacking cash, farmers commonly pay 
for inputs and services in grain, before the grain enters the official marketing 
channels at the elevator. 
At the same time however, and despite the formal privatization of the farms, the 
tendency of underreporting production/exports in order to maximize earnings 
continues to be counterbalanced to an unknown extent by over-reporting data for 
the area sown and/or production. This happens because regional officials are under 
considerable pressure to achieve hierarchically imposed area and/or production 
targets or risk losing a position of power. As reported by the FAO (1997), in 
some countries, such as Kazakhstan in 1997, under-reporting of yields continues 
to be offset (though to an unknown extent) by over-reporting of area sown. The 
uncertainty regarding the size of the areas sown to grains adds to the difficulty 
of estimating yields, thus making it almost impossible to accurately estimate the 
final harvest. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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4.3 Data  description 
4.3.1 Sampling 
For our study purposes, i.e., a study of a large geographically dispersed population 
(farms), it was convenient to use a multi-stage sample design. This is a type of 
design where in the first stage a sample of larger units is selected (the oblasts in 
our case), then in the second stage, from each of the selected first stage units a 
sample of smaller units (rayons in our case) is chosen. The last step included a 
selection of farm enterprises and individual farms in the rayons. For these purposes, 
a Simple Random Sample (SRS) procedure was employed (POATE and DAPLYN, 
1993). A multi-stage design is particularly appropriate where a large-scale survey 
is to be conducted, and where for logistical and organizational reasons it is 
convenient for the sample to be grouped together in a more limited number of 
geographical areas, rather than being spread thinly and dispersed across the 
country (POATE and DAPLYN, 1993). 
The selection of representative oblasts was conducted using statistical data and 
expert statements from the first project workshop and by taking into account 
various criteria as noted below. Methodological principles used for the selection 
of oblasts and farms were based on the combination of typological and structural 
grouping methods (BOEV, 1995). Official information from the Agency for 
Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan served as a data base for the selection 
process. 
Specifically, the selection of research regions was based on the following indicators:  
1) gross output of the crop production sector in monetary terms; 2) share of the 
crop production sector's gross output of total agricultural output in each oblast; 
and 3) share of rural population in each oblast of total rural population of the 
country. The first indicator shows the place of the oblast in the country’s crop 
growing sector. This is the key indicator. The second indicator allows the assessment 
of the crop growing sector's importance in agriculture as a whole by oblast. This 
criterion also indicates agricultural specialisation (crop production or livestock 
industry) of an oblast. The third indicator provides an opportunity for ranging 
the oblasts based on the number of people whose material well-being is directly 
connected to the state of agriculture. In other words, the indicator highlights the 
regions of population concentration whose welfare depends mostly on agriculture. 
The integration of the three indicators mentioned above has been made in the 
following way: For each indicator, oblasts have been ranged. Then, each 
indicator (criterion) is assigned a weight. An oblast's rank in each criterion was 




35 Taking into account the factor of representativeness of different 
geographical regions with different geo-morphological and agro-climatic conditions, 
as well as the production of strategic crops such as wheat, cotton and oil crops, 
Akmola, North Kazakhstan, South Kazakhstan and East Kazakhstan, respectively, 
were chosen as possible regions for the farm survey.  
The region selection procedure was presented at the first workshop with key 
actors in September 2003. The discussion of the results of the selection results 
with workshop participants came to the conclusion to introduce two additional 
regions into the initially formed sample: Kostanai in the North and Aktobe in the 
West in order to take into account the specific production conditions in these 
regions. 
In the second stage, between two and four rayons per oblast were selected 
according to the criteria ‘natural yield potential’
36 and ‘relative importance of 
crop production’
37. Data from the regional statistical agencies served as a base 
for the selection process. Moreover, the selection process was supported by the 
directors of the regional departments of agriculture by providing valuable 
information on the local research conditions. 
4.3.2 Survey  data 
Besides the structured interviews with a sample of farmers, data on yields and 
crop areas was collected for about 200 farms in 17 rayons for up to 40 years.  
Additionally, meteorological data on temperature, precipitation, humidity and 
soil moisture is available for several rayons. The data is used to assess the statistical 
correlation between meteorological coefficients and yield and the development of 
functioning index-based insurance schemes. 
The multi-stage sample design was employed to create nationwide representativeness, 
however the stratified randomness of the agricultural producers’ sample is 
weakened by the achieved number of observations. The major reason for this 
were the inevitable budget and time constraints. Nevertheless, the data provides 
a satisfactory basis for generating valid risk management related hypotheses and 
their tests. 
                                           
35  Thanks go to Talgat Kussayinov for the design of the selection methodology. 
36  This criterion takes into account historical yields, soil quality and agro-climatic conditions. 
37  I.e. physical output of the strategically most important crops relative to other rayons in the 
same oblast. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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4.3.3  The farm survey questionnaire 
The farm survey questionnaire (see appendix B) is structured in five sections. 
The first section asks about standard personal characteristics from the respondent 
such as age and education. The questions concerned with the personality of the 
respondent fulfil two purposes: Firstly, they belong to the so-called warming-up 
phase; after the introduction of the enumerator, the respondent gets the 
opportunity to tell something about himself. Secondly, these questions serve to 
obtain an assessment of the educational background of the studied population. 
The questions in section two try to steer the respondent towards specific aspects 
of crop insurance schemes such as preferences associated with insured crops, 
contract duration, level of deductibles, and so on. Part three asks about local 
natural conditions of crop production and the characteristics of the most frequently 
experienced natural hazards. Section four evaluates respondents’ attitudes towards 
production risk and tries to assess their risk management behaviour. The main 
objective of this part is to formulate an impression about the willingness to take 
risk, risk management responses and the consequences of risk the farmers are 
most concerned about. It is important to give the respondent the full spectrum of 
answering possibilities on a five-point Likert-scale, i.e. not to restrict him to the 
three possibilities "strongly agree", "neutral" and "strongly disagree". 
Part five of the questionnaire summarises the evaluation of the survey given by 
the enumerators. This part is designed to provide the enumerator with the possibility 
of supplying a short personal assessment of the respondent. 
4.4  Analysis of survey data 
4.4.1  Results of the workshops with stakeholders and expert interviews 
In the opinion of the workshop participants, drought and early frosts represent 
the greatest production risks for all regions included in the study. Other risks such 
as pests, plant diseases and hail play a more subordinate role in causing fluctuations 
in yields. The majority of those participants questioned, however, are calling for 
a comprehensive or multi-peril crop insurance. Similarly, many favour an 
income-related insurance over a yield-related one. 
The expert interviews brought similar results. They took place with the same 
target group that attended the workshop. A principal topic of discussion was the 
development of insurance products. Instruments that guarantee flexibility seem 
to be of great importance. Examples of this are the possibility to choose the 
coverage level, a mechanism that allows weather conditions to be included in the 
development of the product, as well as a regional differentiation. The potential and Empirical analysis of risk management instruments 
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suitability of products based on weather parameters were hotly debated by the 
experts, and the issues were not resolved by the end. Separate ongoing studies show 
that such products offer realistic and efficient alternatives to conventional insurance 
schemes. 
Also in dispute is the question whether compulsory insurance in Kazakhstan 
offers advantages over a voluntary variant with different choice options. Those 
in favour of a compulsory insurance have more faith in the traditional system, in 
which the state is a central authority that also regulates the insurance market and 
guarantees the agricultural sector a basic risk protection. There is also no clear 
agreement on the question of whether insurance contracts should be long term or 
only cover the period from sowing to harvest. Less contentious is the attitude 
towards deductibles. The representatives from the insurance companies, in 
particular, value the positive effect of this instrument in reducing moral hazard. 
The average excess rate that the experts suggest should be aimed for, and which 
businesses should be able to afford, is about 30 per cent deductibles. 
Another issue that was keenly debated both during the workshop and in the 
discussions with experts is that of the monitoring mechanism. Essentially there 
are different variants of production control and damage checks. Beside remote 
sensing systems that necessitate a high level of technological expense, the insurance 
companies can send in experts. However, only a system of independent experts 
who are paid for by the state seems to be acceptable to all sides.  
Another important aspect of insurance market development associated with 
insurability is readiness of the private insurance sector to extend their services to 
agriculture. As results of structured interviews with insurance experts in Kazakhstan 
show, insurance companies are strongly distrustful to business in agriculture. 
Most of them do not possess any expertise in providing agricultural insurance. 
Those small parts of insurance companies, which do have some experts in the 
field, do not believe that risks in Kazakhstani agriculture can be privately 
insured. Additional aspects that hold them from involvement in the crop 
insurance market are high administrative and transaction costs, problems with 
monitoring and controlling moral hazard, and heavy regulation of the crop 
insurance market. Considering that both, area-yield insurance and weather-
based-index insurance possess some advantages compared to traditional insurance 
products with regard to problems of asymmetric information, they could serve as 
a facilitator for market entrance of private insurers. However, area-yield crop 
insurance, as well as weather-based-index insurance, do not solve the problem 
of risk pooling when systemic risk is present. In this case, an engagement on the 
side of either state or financial markets is inevitable for dealing with the problem.  Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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4.4.2  Farm survey results 
4.4.2.1 Key  characteristics of respondents and farms 
Interviews were conducted with 73 farmers and managers of agricultural enterprises, 
32  of which are limited companies (43.8 per cent),  26  individual  enterprises 
(35.6 per cent), 14 producer co-operatives (19.2 per cent), and 1 state enterprise 
(1.4 per cent).  The  average  agricultural  area of all interviewed enterprises is 
around 9687 ha, ranging between 4674 ha in South Kazakhstan and 25,583 ha in 
Kostanai. Wheat production is economically the most important branch in 
Kazakhstani agriculture. Consequently, the study enterprises comprise a large 
proportion of wheat producers (71.6 per cent), a smaller proportion of cotton 
farmers (17.6 per cent) and a small share (10.8 per cent) of mixed farmers who 
produce sunflowers vegetables and fruits, for instance, in addition to grain crops 
and cotton. 
The respondents were, on average, 51 years old, ranging between 33 and 70 years, 
with only seven respondents younger than 40. The educational background of 
the respondents is quite diverse: More than 69.9 per cent graduated from university, 
11 per cent visited a vocational college and 12.3 per cent a secondary school. 
Just 2.8 per cent attended only elementary or vocational school, while 1.4 per cent 
could not read and write at all. Regarding agricultural educational background, 
the majority of respondents studied agriculture: While 30 per cent have practical 
experience solely, 1.4  per  cent attended short theoretical courses in the past. 
Another 2.7  per  cent visited a vocational school, 8.2  per  cent an agricultural 
secondary school, and 57.5 per cent an agricultural university. 53.4 per cent of 
the respondents took additional training courses after schooling and higher 
education respectively, 5.1 per cent of which in food processing, 25.6 per cent in 
management and 48.7 per cent in other fields.  
The natural production conditions in the survey regions, and thereby the average 
yield levels and yield fluctuations, vary widely across farms, e.g. the average 
yield power
38 of all sample farms is 39 (of 100), ranging between 12 and 66 
(means: Akmola 42, North Kazakhstan 46, Kostanai 44, Aktobe  26, East 
Kazakhstan 47, and South Kazakhstan 28). For the selection of the research 
rayons the regional committees of land resources provided data on the average 
yield power values for the total agricultural area in each oblast (s. Table 4-2). 
The regional differences in natural conditions are reflected in different average 
                                           
38  The yield power of a soil is a function of soil type, actual state of the soil and local agro-
climatic conditions such as temperature and precipitation. The maximum yield power is 100. Empirical analysis of risk management instruments 
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grain yields and fluctuations of the grain yields over time. Correlations between 
aggregated grain yields and yield power values are not reasonable, since the 
reference areas for both values are not identical and different grain crops have 
different production elasticity with regard to yield power. 
Table 4-2 shows grain yields for all Kazakh oblasts from 1970-2001. The average 
grain yields reflect approximately the yield power values of six research regions. 
Only South Kazakhstan’s relatively high value cannot be explained by yield 
power. In this region, as well as in Kyzyl-Orda
39, irrigation of crops is an 
additional stimulating factor for yield values. 
Table 4-2:  Regional grain yield characteristics 1970-2001 (unit: 100kg/ha)* 
Source:      Survey data. 
Notes: 
*  Data from regional departments of statistics.  
 ** The value for South Kazakhstan is the average yield power of the irrigated land.  
 ***Research regions are marked in italics. 
4.4.2.2 Attitude  towards  crop insurance products 
Past experience with insurance respective to crop insurance has an important 
impact on current attitudes towards crop insurance. 31.5 per cent of interviewed 
farmers reported having experience with crop insurance in the past, mostly 
under the centrally-planned economic system of the Soviet Union. 64.4 per cent 
of the total group of respondents would like to insure crops in the near future. 
80 per cent of farmers in the three Northern oblasts (Akmola, North Kazakhstan 
                                           
39  Here, aside from wheat and barley, rice plays a major role in grain production (approximately 
71 per cent of total grain production area). Rice yields in this oblast are three to four times 
higher than yields of other grain crops. 
Region   Mean  Min  Max  Stand. dev.  Yield power**
Akmola***  9.3 3.6  17.0 3.4  39 
Aktobe  6.5 1.1  10.9 2.7  13 
Almaty  12.1 4.8  21.6 4.1  – 
Atyrau  3.5  0 9.6 2.8  – 
East Kaz  12.4 5.6  17.7 3.3  39 
Zhambyl  11.4 3.3  22.8 4.5  – 
West  Kaz  7.5 1.6  16.4 4.3  – 
Karagandy  6.8 2.9  15.0 3.1  – 
Kostanai  10.2 2.7  14.9 3.8  38 
Kzyl-Orda  33.7 14.0 43.7  7.0  – 
Pavlodar  6.0 2.6  12.2 2.5  – 
North Kaz  12.8 6.7  18.7 3.6  43 
South Kaz  13.8 4.3  21.3 4.3  35 Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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and Kostanai), 77.8 per cent in East Kazakhstan, 60 per cent in Aktobe, and only 
39.1 per cent in South Kazakhstan would, generally, like to insure their crops. 
These results reflect the production situation of the enterprises under investigation. 
In South Kazakhstan, farms are smaller, more diversified, and have at least a 
part of their land under irrigation. The respondents who did not want to insure 
had several reasons for their attitude: 47.1 per cent do not believe that insurance 
can pay off its costs, 17.6 per cent had bad experiences with insurance in the past, 
5.9 per cent made insufficient liquidity of their enterprises responsible for their 
decision. 29.4 per cent named other reasons, such as distrust in private insurance 
companies and sufficient on-farm risk management. Despite the facts that the 
crop insurance system during the 1990s did not work properly and many farms 
remained uninsured, as well as the negative experiences Kazakhstani citizens 
had with the introduction of compulsory health insurance, 37  per  cent of the 
respondents believe that crop insurance in Kazakhstan should be compulsory. The 
most frequent explanation for that answer was that all farms are exposed to risk.  
Assumptions about a correlation
40 between age and the preference for or against 
compulsory crop insurance were not proven by the data: The average age of an 
opponent of compulsory insurance was only one year less than that of an 
advocate of it. Likewise, the test for a relationship between one's risk attitude and 
willingness to procure long-term contracts
41 did not produce significant results. 
Respondents that would be willing to sign contracts spanning three to five years 
often named stability as a reason. The will for stability in this question is not 
connected to the risk attitude value that was captured by questions 4.1.3 to 4.1.5 
(s. appendix). 
The introduction of deductibles to insurance contracts plays an important role in 
counteracting moral hazard problems. For that reason, we tried to test for the 
willingness to procure such contracts. The majority of respondents had a 
positive attitude to deductibles (66.2 per cent). The individually sustainable rate 
of deductibles varied between 5 per cent and 50 per cent of the insurance sum 
(mean: 24.9, standard deviation: 9.6). 77.1 per cent perceive 20 to 30 per cent of 
the insurance sum as a sustainable deductible rate (question 2.6.1). All 
interviewed representatives of insurance companies perceived deductibles as a 
reasonable element of insurance contracts and assessed the sustainable rate of 
deductibles for farmers at about 30 per cent. 
                                           
40 The correlations between metric variables were estimated based on t-tests. Kendall’s   
Tau-tests were used to estimate correlations between ordinal variables. 
41 A vast literature on the principal-agent problem is treating long-term contracts as moral 
hazard reducing (e-g- LAMBERT, 1983). S. a. chapter 2.3.1.1. Empirical analysis of risk management instruments 
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The enterprise specialisation, as well as the importance of cash crops to enterprise 
performance, is reflected in the answers to the question which crops should be 
insured: Wheat (55 per cent), barley (18.8 per cent) and cotton (17.5 per cent) make 
up a large proportion of all crops that could potentially be insured. Regarding 
the number of perils that have to be insured, 15.4 per cent of the respondents 
would prefer all-risk insurance, 70.8 per cent would like to be insured against a 
group of most important risks, and for 13.8 per cent an insurance against just 
one predominant peril would be appropriate. 
What kind of risks have to be insured is assumed to be dependent on the considered 
crop, i.e. the extent individual crops are exposed to natural hazards and price 
risks. Results in Table 4-3 show for all considered crops a clear tendency to vote 
for income insurance (47.9  per  cent) and crop-yield insurance (43.8  per  cent) 
rather than an insurance of price risk. A possible explanation approach could be 
the interaction of risk of natural hazard and price risk. Both types of risk are 
reflected in income risk. Farmers assess price risk to be adequately covered by 
income insurance. 
Table 4-3:  Crop-specific insurance types* 
           Insurance 
                  against 
Crop   
Price risk (induced by 
price fluctuations) 
Risk of natural hazards 
(crop failure) 
Income risk 
Wheat (N=42)  .071 .381  .547 
Barley (N=17)  – .529  .471 
Cotton (N=16)  .063 .375  .563 
Note: 
* The numbers reflect the share of respondents preferring given type of crop insurance. 
Table 4-4 depicts average wheat yields and price indices (average price from after 
harvest to harvest of the following year) for all investigated regions in 
Kazakhstan. The data shows no uniform tendency across all regions. Especially 
prices in Aktobe are in the period 2001-2003 higher than in 2000. In most of the 
other regions wheat prices in 2001 and 2002 are lower than in 2000. Only in 2003 
prices in all regions are relatively higher than in 2000. The tentative calculation of 
correlation coefficients showed that farmers could not rely on the ‘natural hedge’ 
effect, i.e. there is no negative correlation between yields and prices. Distorted 
grain markets might be the most important obstacle to natural hedging. However, a 
lack of consistent price time series without structural breaks eliminates the 
estimation of efficient correlation coefficients. Therefore, alternative methods to 
evaluate price risk have been applied and will be discussed below. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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Table 4-4:  Wheat yields and relative prices 2000-2003 
      2000  2001  2002  2003* 
Kazakhstan total  Average yield (in 100 kg)  9  11.8  10.9  11.3 
  Price index Sept.-August** 100  97.0  83.9  129.1 
Akmola***  Average yield (in 100 kg)  7.6  10.8  8.7  9.9 
  Price index Sept.-August  100  90.6  79.0  133.9 
Aktobe  Average yield (in 100 kg)  7.5 7.7 5.6 9.0 
  Price index Sept.-August  100  116.8  106.5  158.1 
Kostanai  Average yield (in 100 kg)  10.6  11.8  11.8  12.2 
  Price index Sept.-August  100  103.4  92.5  126.3 
South Kazakhstan   Average yield (in 100 kg)  12.7  15.2  22.7  22.3 
  Price index Sept.-August  100  103.6  77.4  100.8 
North Kazakhstan  Average yield (in 100 kg)  8.8  13.9  10.8  10.8 
  Price index Sept.-August  100  92.4  82.7  131.3 
East Kazakhstan  Average yield (in 100 kg)  13.9  15.3  16.7  12.1 
   Price index Sept.-August  100  100.3  75.8  132.3 
Notes: 
*   For 2000-2002: Yield before processing, for 2003 only data for yields after processing  
     was available. We therefore assumed a factor of 0.9 for the yield after processing.  
    This assumption is supported by ISKAKOV and SUNDETOV (1978) and SUNDETOV (1982). 
 
**  The prices from 2001 to 2003 are expressed relative to the price in 2000. 
 
*** Major wheat growing regions are in bold. 
4.4.2.3 Price  risk 
For effective risk management, understanding the mean price level is not sufficient, 
since it is the extreme prices occurring with low probability that can bankrupt 
firms. If economists could accurately estimate commodity price behaviour and 
thereby produce reliable price forecasts, then price risk management techniques 
could better support income stabilisation instruments. Extensive efforts obtaining 
reliable forecasts of commodity prices have been proven difficult. This has led 
TOMEK and PETERSON (2001) to conclude that much of the price variability can 
be classified as risk. 
Starting from that background, we conducted a little forecasting experiment. The 
experiment’s objective is to test the confidence level of price prognoses.  
In July 2005 grain price data for six regions and five consecutive years was 
collected from the statistical office in Astana. Wheat future price distributions 
were estimated on the basis of regional historic monthly prices for the period 
after harvest in November 2000 until April 2005. Prices recorded before that 
period are to a large extent distorted by state interventions and were not taken into 
account for the forecasts. Moving average and exponential forecasting models 
were tested and evaluated using the mean absolute deviations (MAD) as a 
criterion (EPPEN et al.1998; GAYNOR and KIRKPATRICK, 1994). Empirical analysis of risk management instruments 
 
95
Table 4-5 depicts estimation results for an exponential smoothing model which 
has the best predictive power. The October 2005 prices vary across regions 
between 12683 KZT in North Kazakhstan and 16612 KZT in Aktobe. The mean 
absolute deviations between forecasted and real values as well as the standard 
deviations might be in an acceptable range for many farmers in Kazakhstan, 
who in reality possess much less price information.  
Table 4-5:  Estimated and observed prices for the 2005 harvest 
   Akmola  Aktobe  East KZ  Kostanai North KZ  South KZ
Estimated  price  (KZT)  13313 16612 15042 13292 12683 16425 
Mean  absolute  deviation  33.04 75.39 56.74 21.54 24.13 76.28 
Standard  deviation  751.8 627.95 730.11 549.96 573.68 821.18 
Observed  price  (KZT)  12440 15797 12907 12964 12120 16082 
Deviation  (est.  P/real  P) 1.070 1.052 1.165 1.025 1.046 1.021 
Source:  Own estimations.  
Note:  Forecasting period 6 months. 
In July 2006, new price data was collected in order to compare the estimated 
prices with the real ones and to determine the deviations. High deviations would 
support the Tomek and Peterson hypothesis for Kazakhstan’s wheat market. The 
deviations lie between 2.1 and 16.5 per cent. In all cases, the model overestimates 
the observed October prices. This result underpins Tomek and Peterson’s assessment 
that price forecast is an ambitious project. 
Supplementary to the price forecast analysis, a Value at Risk (VaR) analysis is a 
useful instrument to assess price risk. JORION (2001) defines VaR as the worst loss 
over a target horizon with a given level of confidence. More formally, VaR describes 
the quantile of the projected distribution of gains and losses over a predefined 
time period. If c is the selected confidence level, VaR corresponds to the 1-c 
lower tail level. For example, with a 95 per cent confidence level, VaR should be 
such that it exceeds 5 per cent of the total number of observations.  
Figure 4-1 highlights VaR for an example distribution. All values to the left of 
the solid line contribute to the share of specified loss probability. The targeted 
VaR might vary from case to case depending on the decision-makers’ objective 
function.  Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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Source: Own figure based on ODENING and MUSSHOFF (2001). 
ODENING and MUßHOFF (2001) describe and empirically apply different methods 
of VaR analysis, among which are the variance-covariance method, the Monte-
Carlo simulation and the historical simulation. For our wheat price analysis, we 
use historical simulation. This method does not require any assumptions about 
the distribution – it is non-parametric. No random generation of values has to be 
carried out, since values are directly estimated from historical data. The analysis 
was carried out using statistical wheat price data for the three research regions 
Akmola, East Kazakhstan, and South Kazakhstan. The data comprises a price 
time series from November 2000 until April 2005. Three different holding periods 
were assumed (1 month, 6 and 12 months), i.e. a farmer has the opportunity to 
sell the wheat 1, 6, or 12 months after harvest. The production costs are assumed 
to be constant over time and no costs for storage are assumed. The analysis 
solely aims at discovering the pure price of marketing wheat. 
The tables below show that VaR is significantly increasing with holding period 
and confidence level. This development is evident for all investigated markets. 
In the case of Akmola, the maximum VaR (holding period 12 months, p=0.98) 
amounts to 64.4 per cent of the average price for the analysed period. For East 
Kazakhstan, the ratio is 72.7 per cent and for South Kazakhstan 54.3 per cent. 
The differences between the regions can also be found when analysing 
coefficients of variation (CV) for the same period. The CV for Akmola amounts 
to 0.227, for East Kazakhstan 0.247, and for South Kazakhstan 0.168. 
V*  E(V) 
1-p 
value change V
VaR Empirical analysis of risk management instruments 
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Table 4-6:  VaR of wheat production revenue for different confidence  
intervalls and holding periods (in KZT/ton) – Region Akmola 
δt (months)  VaR (p=0.98)  VaR (p=0.95) VaR  (p=0.90) 
1 2082  587  390 
6 6487  6460  4459 
12 7424  7369  7289 
Source: Own calculations. 
Table 4-7:  VaR of wheat production revenue for different confidence 
intervals and holding periods (in KZT/ton) – Region East 
Kazakhstan 
δt (months)  VaR (p=0.98)  VaR (p=0.95) VaR  (p=0.90) 
1  2355 1110 1045 
6  7516 7490 5305 
12  8712 8524 8402 
Source: Own calculations 
Table 4-8:  VaR of wheat production revenue for different confidence 
intervals and holding periods (in KZT/ton) – South Kazakhstan 
δt (months)  VaR (p=0.98)  VaR (p=0.95) VaR  (p=0.90) 
1 810  810  686 
6 5781  4488  2487 
12 6683  4949  4444 
Source: Own  calculations. 
When evaluating price risk on the farm level, portfolio price risk, market power 
of the enterprise and quality aspects have to be taken into account. According to 
own data collections, prices between enterprises vary significantly and differences 
between official statistical data and on-farm data are large. This is exemplified 
by price data from East Kazakhstan. We compared own survey data and official 
wheat prices for the years 2000 to 2003 and found that the price difference 
varied between 11.1 and 35.2  per  cent over the research period. This can be 
attributed to weaknesses in the market information system. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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Table 4-9:  Comparison of on-farm and official wheat prices in  
East Kazakhstan, 2000-2003 (in KZT/ton) 
Year 
On-farm prices* Mean oblast 
prices 
Price difference  Relative price 
difference 
2000 10974 9874  1100  0.111 
2001 10406 12622 -2216 -0.176 
2002 7011 9472 -2461  -0.260 
2003 15063 11141 3922  0.352 
Source:   Own calculations. 
Note: 
*= Mean of collected prices. 
The price differences between selected enterprises (11 in East Kazakhstan) and 
the mean of the entire sample are depicted in relative terms in Figure 4-2. The 
values can be understood as a measure of homogeneity or integration between 
farms in one region. The strong fluctuations over the years do not form a 
consistent picture or give any hint on the reasons for the price differences between 
farms. One can conclude the market for wheat and sunflower in East Kazakhstan 
is not sufficiently integrated. The law of one price does not hold. 
Figure 4-2: Relative price differences between individual farm prices and 
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Grain market power is highly concentrated, as illustrated in the following example: 
Prodovolstvennaya Kontraktnaya Korporatsiya (Food Contract Corporation (FCC), 
or Prodkorporatsiya), an agricultural trading Joint Stock Company and Kazakhstan's 
main grain procurer for the state reserves, bought 2.368 million tonnes of grain 
from the 2003 harvest for the state reserves in 2003. The country exported almost 
5.816 million tonnes in 2003, a large share of which was exported by large grain 
trading companies. Kazakhstan harvested 14.8 million tonnes of grain in 2003 
(INTERFAX, 2004 b). That means that more than half of the grain harvest is 
concentrated in the hands of a relative few with strong bargaining power. Crop 
production requires upfront financing such that expenses on variable inputs are due 
in period 0, whereas returns occur in a period that is different from 0 – the period 
lies between several months and several years (permanent cultures) after the 
settlement date of production costs. In Kazakhstan, the procurement of grain and 
other crops for the state reserves is done by a two-tier system that includes spring-
summer advances for fieldwork (70 per cent) and direct fall purchases (30 per cent) 
(USDA, 2004), i.e. farms with low liquidity are highly dependent on grain buyers’ 
payments.  
Market structures might change over time. According to a statement of Daniel 
Akhmetov, former prime Minister of Kazakhstan, the country plans together with 
Russia and Ukraine a common grain market. The three countries have an annual 
export potential of 15-18 million tons of grain (Agra-Europe, 2005). Table 4-10 
shows that export increased during the last years. New markets were found, but 
due to high transportation costs the future marketing potential for lower quality 
grain is limited. Therefore, the Ministry of Agriculture plans to reduce wheat 
area significantly in exchange to other cultures, like rapeseed, soybeans, barley, 
hard wheat, and rye (AGENCY AGROFAKT, 2005). This could on the one hand, 
have a positive effect on producer prices but on the other hand, increase political 
pressure on farmers to diversify crop portfolio. In the long-run, assuming a 
further progress of reforms, Kazakhstani farmers will have to find marketing 
niches and refine their plant products. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
 
100
Table 4-10:  Production and use of grain for the period 1990-2003  
(in ‘000 tons) 
    1990 1995 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Resources         
Stock, beginning of the year  7062 11260 3104 8731 7249  11856  14073
Total production (after processing)  28488 9506 14264 11565 15897 15960 14777
Import 355 13 15 17 24  55  37
Total resources  35905 20778 17383 20313 23170  27871  28887
Use (of which)         
     As fodder  6063 1755 933 2679 3044  2986  3019
     As seed  3684 2528 1486 1349 1393  1934  2340
Processing for sales  8619 6114 1968 2617 2668  3470  3767
Loss 1258 253 129 127 409  485  503
Export 2923 3818 3818 5684 3311  4357  5835
Private consumption  37 45 219 248 221  251  256
Stock, end of the year  13122 6166 8731 7249 11856  14073  11895
Source: AGENCY OF STATISTICS, 2005a. 
BROSIG and YAHSHILIKOV  (2005) investigate the interregional integration of 
wheat markets for three main market spots in Kazakhstan. One of them is being 
located in Petropavlosk (North Kazakhstan) at the border to Russia, another located 
in Karaganda in the centre of the country and the third, Kokshetau, located between 
these two. The authors of the study find a heterogeneous picture of integration: 
Price fluctuations are closely related between the two northern locations 
(Petropavlosk and Kokshetau). They conclude there to be a multitude of market 
participants on both supply and demand side and the finding of cointegration is 
likely to reflect a competitive integrated market. Cointegration was also found 
between price time series of Kokshetau and Karaganda, though arbitrage trade 
seems to be confronted with particularly high transaction costs. For the third pair 
of locations no cointegration was found. 
However, the data used does not provide a full overview of different markets in 
the selected locations, because only one data source was used. Differences between 
traders, which might be huge according to own investigations by the author of this 
thesis, are not reflected.  
We can conclude that price risk is an important source of risk for Kazakhstan’s 
farmers, but its role is both, diminishing with increasing market integration and Empirical analysis of risk management instruments 
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strongly influenced by politics. Therefore, and for the better seperabilty of price 
and production risk effects, the analysis of risk management products focuses on 
production risk solely. 
4.4.2.4 Regional  weather  conditions and natural hazards 
As described in chapter 3.3, agriculture in Kazakhstan is strongly affected by the 
sharp continental climate with very hot summers and extreme winter frosts as 
well as large fluctuations in seasonal temperatures, in summer even in daily 
temperatures. Spring frosts are an obstacle to early sowing and early frosts in 
autumn restrict yields. A strong deficit in soil humidity in spring connected with 
atmospheric drought and dry storms (sukhovei) have a negative influence on 
crop production (SPAAR and SCHUHMANN, 2000). 
The survey respondents considered drought as the most important risk for their 
businesses, followed by hail, varmints invasion, and spring frosts. The geographical 
extension of the hazards is varying (s. appendix: Table in question 3.2). While 
drought affects always widespread areas, hail is a fairly local event. Pest invasion 
and spring frost are varying with respect to extension. 
Like the extension, also the frequency is varying across perils. Pests are the 
hazards, that farmers who named them as one of the most important group of 
hazards experience most frequently, i.e. in six of ten years. Drought and spring 
frost affect crop production every third year, hail appears every fourth year in 
average. 
The aforementioned natural hazards can locally induce crop losses up to 100 per cent 
of the expected yield, in average the losses vary between 39 per cent as an effect 
of hail and 58 per cent caused by drought.  
Only 54 per cent of the respondents apply on-farm risk management measures 
currently. Mostly agro-technical methods, like accumulating snow on crop areas 
from surrounding areas are applied against drought. In order to fight the negative 
effects of pests, insecticides are applied. For example fruit producers, who 
experience spring frost use fumes and water films to protect their plants. In the 
cases of all four perils only a minority of the respondents see additional risk 
management instruments on farm.  
For a large majority of the respondents on-farm risk management measures are 
preferred to crop insurance. Nevertheless, there is a demand for the residual risk 
that cannot be efficiently managed on farm. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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4.4.2.5  Farmers’ risk attitudes 
In part four of the questionnaire producers were asked to use a Likert-scale from 
1 to 5 to rank the importance of various sources of income variability which create 
risk. Respondents were also asked to assess the importance of various management 
responses to variability, as well as their concern about risk consequences. 
Furthermore, producers had to assess themselves in their role as decision-maker in 
risky situations (questions 4.1 and 4.5). 
For policy purposes, we often need more than just a qualitative analysis. We 
would like to know, how important is risk in agriculture and in particular how 
large is the response to a change in risk and in which direction will it take place. 
To answer the second question, in particular, to know how farmers would respond 
to the kinds of changes in risk induced by income stabilisation programmes, we 
need to be able to infer that the individual's behaviour towards this new risk 
situation will be similar to his behaviour towards earlier risky situations which 
he has faced (NEWBERRY and STIGLITZ, 1981). For that purpose, five statements 
were included in the questionnaire in order to gain insight into producers' risk 
attitudes (question 4.1). Questions 4.1.3 to 4.1.5 were used to construct a risk 
aversion
42 index (RATT)
 43, since they reflected farmers’ attitudes to production 
risk best. Values of the RATT index give an impression about how individual 
farmers assess their risk aversion relative to other farmers. Low RATT scores a 
high risk aversion. The mean coefficient for the total sample is 2.52, expressing 
that respondents are rather agreeing with risk-aversion statements. Table 4-11 
depicts the results of the risk aversion analysis differentiated by region. Risk 
aversion is slightly lower in East and South Kazakhstan, where the diversification 
of enterprises is more advanced, but t-test statistics show no significant differences 
between respondents of different regions.  
                                           
42  Definition of risk aversion: ‘Individuals who accept a lower average return to reduce the 
variability of returns are said to be risk-averse’ (HARWOOD et al., 1999).
 
43  RATT=risk attitude. The coefficient was produced by calculating the arithmetical means of 
ordinal numbers which were provided as answers to each question. In a second step the 
overall mean was calculated. Empirical analysis of risk management instruments 
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Table 4-11:  Risk aversion indices by regions 
Region Mean  St.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Northern Kaz (Akmola, Kostanai,  
North Kaz)  2.44 1.33  1  5 
Aktobe 2.53  1.04  1  3.67 
East Kaz  2.70  1.09  1  4 
South Kaz  2.57  1.57  1  5 
Kazakhstan total  2.57  1.35  1  5 
Source:  Farm survey results. 
The constructed index is not related to the coefficient of relative risk aversion
44 
introduced by ARROW (1965) and PRATT (1964), which might be validated to 
some extent by constructing a representative risky prospect, computing its 
certainty equivalent and then asking the decision-maker whether the implied 
indifference between the risky and the sure prospect seems reasonable 
(ANDERSON and HARDAKER, 2002). During the first interviews Arrow-Pratt risk-
aversion tests were conducted. However, the test needs intense explanation and 
is thereby time consuming. Only few respondents were motivated to participate 
in the test. The research team decided to cancel the tests in favour of the 
simplified, but empirically more practical measure (as described above) that 
shows relevant tendencies of risk aversion. 
In addition to the questions that aim to measure risk attitude by an index, the 
respondents were asked to assess their willingness to take risks relative to other 
farmers (question 4.6). Results show that farmers assess their behaviour as more 
risk-loving relative to others (mean: 3.44) – across different management areas 
only slight variations can be observed (see appendix). However, besides the 
level of risk aversion and the supplied form of insurance, other factors that 
influence the extent to which schemes will appeal to farmers are the availability 
of other risk management strategies, the variability of yields and prices, the 
price/yield correlations, the ad hoc support provided by governments in case of 
disasters, and farmers’ perception of risks (MEUWISSEN et al., 1999). 






= , where U’’ and U’ indicate, respectively, the second and first derivative of the 
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function and W indicated the level of wealth. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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4.4.2.6  Perception of risk sources, consequences, and management responses 
Different sources of risk were analysed according to their importance in decision-
making. The most important source of risk among respondents are crop price 
fluctuations as it is reflected in its high ranking in question 4.3 (see Table 4-12). 
94.1 per cent  considered  price fluctuations as an important to very important 
source of risk (mean: 4.58 on a five point Likert-scale). Two other particularly 
important sources of risk and uncertainty are changes in costs of variable inputs 
(4.58) and in cost of capital items (4.01). The output as well as the input price 
volatility might be related to transition forces, particularly the undergone change 
in the institutional framework. Terms of trade have been altered due to high 
contracting costs in the agricultural sector following the deterioration of input 
and output channels. The fact that crop price variability is the most important 
risk source for decision-making, but respondents would prefer income or yield 
insurance might be explained by the assessment of risk management instruments. 
The respondents might consider price insurance not as the most efficient risk 
management instrument to mitigate the negative effects of crop price variability.  
Table 4-12:  Evaluation of risk sources according to their importance in 
decision-making* 
Risk sources  Mean  Stand. deviation 
Crop price variability  4.58  0.85 
Changes in cost of inputs  4.49  0.85 
Changes in costs of capital items  4.01  1.22 
Changes in credit availability  3.79  1.42 
Changes in government commodity 
programmes 
3.76 1.25 
Changes in technology  3.64  1.33 
Changes in land rents  3.56  1.56 
Crop yield variability  3.54  1.35 
Changes in interest rates  3.41  1.49 
Note: 
* 5 point Likert-scale: 1 – Not important, 5 – Very important. 
Crop yield variability is an important source of risk in Kazakhstani crop 
production. Although, its importance regarding decision-making of the interviewed 
farmers is low compared to other considered risk sources. This might, on the 
one hand, be attributed to the limited opportunities to further minimize yield 
variability. On the other hand, yields in the production years before the survey 
were not affected by severe droughts, with the consequence that farmers perception 
of yield variability as an important risk source for their decision-making 
diminishes. Business risk has different economic consequences for agents. Farmers 
are assumed to evaluate risk consequences based on the actual performance of Empirical analysis of risk management instruments 
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their enterprise as well as their personal experiences with respect to risk of their 
businesses. The respondents were most concerned about low income (mean: 3.91; 
standard deviation: 1.16), followed by insolvency (3.21; 1.26) and equity losses 
(3.14; 1.76). The reduced possibilities of receiving a credit and the loss of 
equities were even of lesser importance for the study population. In this context, 
it is interesting to look at the results of question 2.15: The respondents defined a 
crop loss of 26.5 per cent, on average, as catastrophic for their enterprise. This 
relatively low value can be explained by the strong specialisation of farms and the 
relatively low yields. 26.5  per  cent of an average wheat yield of 1.2  tons is 
slightly more than 0.3  tons per hectare, a value that is almost negligible for 
Western European farmers.  
Question 4.4 evaluates the importance of risk management responses. The responses 
can be structured in three categories: Diversification of farming enterprises, 
geographic dispersion of production, being a low cost producer and having back-
up management/labour can be summarised as production responses (mean: 2.96 
on a five point Likert-scale). Government farm programme participation and forward 
contracting can be categorized as marketing responses to risk and were evaluated 
as slightly more important (3.04). The group of risk responses that received the 
highest scores, on average, were financial responses, i.e. crop insurance, life 
insurance, off-farm investments and employment, maintaining financial reserves 
and leverage management (3.40). Considering the full list of responses, the three 
most important ones were maintaining financial/credit reserves, being a low-cost 
producer and off-farm employment. Interpreting especially the results on risk 
management, one has to keep in mind that farm restructuring in the 1990s may 
have led to an extensive loss of knowledge due to changes in management 
structures and migration of specialists into other sectors of the economy or abroad. 
However, on-farm risk management is a matter of experience. 
4.4.2.7 Risk  management  instruments and technology adoption 
In question 4.2 of the questionnaire (see appendix B), farmers were asked to 
indicate the largest percentage of their current expected yield they would be willing 
to give up for an absolutely stable yield every year, assuming a hypothetical new 
method of growing. The question aimed at providing an idea of the premium price 
producers would be willing to pay for a crop insurance product that stabilises 
revenue. Results were analysed for wheat and cotton farmers and show a lower 
value for the former. Taking into consideration the relatively lower wheat yields 
and prices, the average willingness to pay per hectare is less for wheat ($10.49) 
than for cotton ($79.42) (see Table 4-13). However, the exact amount of money 
farmers are willing to pay for specific forms of income insurance can only be 
tested by pilot programmes (MEUWISSEN et al. 1999). Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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Table 4-13:  Average wheat and cotton producers’ willingness to pay for  



















pay for yield 
stability, $/ha
Wheat  15.00¹ 10.02² 6.98³ 69.96 10.49 
Cotton  18.14¹ 20.17²  21.70¹  437.84  79.42 
Sources:  ¹ Own survey data. 
² FAO data. 
³ Data from TACIS Marketing Project. 
4.4.2.8  Factors influencing the demand for crop insurance
45 
When designing and pricing insurance products an estimation of potential demand 
might be useful. There has been considerable work been done on crop insurance 
demand and participation decisions. Three major studies have estimated models 
of crop insurance purchase decisions using county level data (SMITH and BAQUET, 
1996; SMITH and GOODWIN, 1996; and COBLE et al., 1996). VAN ASSELDONK et al. 
(2002) as well as MISHRA and GOODWIN (2006) investigate factors influencing 
the demand for crop insurance products using farm-level and household data. 
This approach seems promising from a methodological viewpoint. Conclusively, 
this study also uses farm-level data and employs a binominal logit model to 
identify the main factors that determine demand for crop insurance. Binominal 
logit models belong to the group of discrete choice models. They are able to 
assess the importance of each independent variable with respect to the single 
outcomes of the dependent variable. The binominal logit model promises the 
greatest success regarding the data attributes. It was tested for multicollinearity. 
Backward selection has been applied. All variables that showed multicollinearity 
were removed from the model. 
The results in Table 4-14 include the description of all variables, the values of 
the logit coefficient estimates, the t-statistics plus some general statistics to verify 
the overall model. The findings are largely consistent with anticipated relationships 
and indicate that potential buyers of crop insurance are characterized by a 
specialisation in grain production and a high degree of concern about income 
losses as a consequence of risk. Grain production specialisation increases income 
variability and thereby the need for income stabilizing instruments. Diversified 
                                           
45  Based on HEIDELBACH, 2005b. Empirical analysis of risk management instruments 
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farms, e.g. in South Kazakhstan, have a lower demand for crop insurance. Potential 
buyers of crop insurance services can be found in the group of respondents that 
is concerned about income loss as a consequence of risk. 
Adoption of insurance (and technology) is to some extent grounded in human 
capital theory. The research of WELCH (1970), KHALDI (1975), NELSON (1985) 
and WOZNIAK (1989) uses education as a measure of human capital to reflect the 
ability to adopt innovation (either technology or insurance). The education level 
proved significant for the purchasing decision in Smith and Baquet’s study. This 
confirms earlier studies by JUST and CALVIN (1990) and EDELMAN et al. (1990) 
who found that participation in Multiple Peril Crop Insurance is positively 
correlated with education level. These results cannot be confirmed by the result 
found in our study. Here, personal characteristics of the study population such as 
age and education do not play a significant role for the participation decision. 
This might on the one hand be explained by the insufficient experience with crop 
insurance. On the other hand, educated farmers may see a range of other instruments 
to increase and stabilise income in their newly founded enterprises. 
Furthermore, neither concerns about insolvency as an outcome of risky business, 
nor farm size and past experiences with crop insurance are of any significance 
for the decision to participate. The relationship between the use of risk management 
instruments and risk aversion, respectively, on the demand for crop insurance 
are discussed in further detail in the following. 
SHERRICK et al. (2004) hypothesise that insurance users are expected to be more 
experienced and better educated, indicating a greater responsiveness of insurance 
use to modern, more sophisticated approaches to risk management. This assumption 
was not verified by model results. The use of on-farm risk management instruments 
by operators (RM) was considered to be a relevant factor for the decision for or 
against the purchase of crop insurance. Farmers who apply risk management 
instruments are assumed to have weaker reasons to purchase crop insurance as 
additional risk management. This relationship is confirmed by the negative 
tendency of the coefficient, although it is not significant. An interpretation in 
favour of non-significance is contrary to the discussed thought: Farmers who 
apply risk-management measures know about their efficiency and effectiveness 
in reducing risks and assess them as non-sufficient. They would like to purchase 
crop insurance in order to back up the remaining residual risk. Another possible 
interpretation could be that farmers who are already applying on-farm risk 
management instruments in the absence of insurance could be more efficient 
farmers, who also see the possible risk efficiency and long-term character of a 
functioning insurance scheme. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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The literature on risk research contains no uniform assessment about the importance 
of production risk in analysing farmer’s economic behaviour. For instance, 
HUETH and HENNESSY (2002) argue that presence of risk does not explain the 
tendency to contract, although it is an important consideration in designing 
optimal contracts once decisions to contract are made. FRASER (1992) assumes 
that producers who were more risk averse with respect to their losses would be 
more likely to participate in insurance programmes. The used risk aversion 
variable (RATT) was of significance and shows the expected tendency. 
Table 4-14:  Summary of logit model results 
Logit Model  Variable Description 
Estimate T-Ratio 
CONSTANT           -3.47*         -2.19 
AGE  Age of the respondent  
(0 = younger than 50, 1 = 50 or older) 
        0.47  0.69 
EDUgen  General educational background  
(0 = no studies and primary education,  
1 = higher education) 
        0.24  0.30 
EDUag  Level of agricultural education  
(0 = no agricultural education, 1 = 
agricultural education) 
        0.54  0.74 
EXP  Experience with crop insurance (CI) (0,1)           0.50  0.69 
RM  Use of on-farm risk management (0,1)         -0.55         -0.66 
SPEC  Specialisation: 0 = no grain, 1 = grain          1.85*  2.36 
AREA  Agricultural area (in ha)         -0.00001         -0.60 
RATT  Risk attitude (with respect to income losses)   0.65*  2.09 
    Log-likelihood:        -33.00 
    Pseudo R-squared         0.222 
    Chi-squared:          18.82 
   Significance  level:  0.016 
Source:    Own table. 
Note: 
* Statistical Significance at the 5% level. 
4.4.3  Evaluation of the farm survey 
When doing research, the evaluation of the process of doing it is an important 
factor to assess the value of the research. What lessons can be learned from 
organising data surveys? What additional insight can be gained by looking at the 
research process from the meta-level? Empirical analysis of risk management instruments 
 
109
A key conclusion derived from the data survey is that field research is always a 
complex process involving many contextual factors, discontinuities, negotiations, 
and compromises. Particularly, comprehending cultural and historical peculiarities 
of the research area, learning how local institutions function and data is aggregated, 
and being able to quickly adapt to unforeseen circumstances that affect planning 
and negotiation strategies are key qualifications for conducting successful data 
surveys, especially in transition and developing countries. 
To provide an assessment of the experiences with the survey instrument, it must 
be stated that the field work demonstrated the suitability of the questionnaire. 
An important precondition for this was the conducted pre-test, which helped to 
modify questions according to experience. The various parts with different types 
of questions worked well, including the relatively complex table in part three (see 
appendix B).  Data  verification procedures showed that most of the collected 
answers were plausible and useful. In most questions, the quality of data exceeded 
the expectations of the research team – non-responses remained within acceptable 
ranges (see appendix).  
The exception was the accounting information, which was not always provided at a 
satisfactory level as described above. Many farms in Kazakhstan were restructured 
several times in recent years, and even if they do have an accountant today, they 
might not have any data for previous years. Even with the support of the local 
administration, farms with a satisfactory accounting organisation were not always 
selected. 
The evaluation of the farm survey allows a number of tentative conclusions. First, 
more than half of the respondents had some or even much interest in responding. 
Second, the majority of respondents was qualified to answer the questions posed. 
The overall evaluation by the interviewers was positive. 
4.5  Empirical analysis of different risk management instruments 
The results generated by descriptive statistics provided an overview about crop 
production in Kazakhstan with regard to natural production conditions and the 
attitude of farmers towards risk and insurance. Further analyses will focus on the 
development of appropriate risk management instruments for farms specialised 
in crop production in the investigated regions. Particularly, this chapter investigates 
the risk efficiency of selected risk management instruments, such as technology, 
insurance and credit. First, the study farms selected for analysis will be described. 
Second, the risk programming model will be specified, before model results will be 
presented. In a further step, the results of an alternative methodology, namely the 
second-degree stochastic dominance analysis will be included in the discussion. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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A last section quantifies possible moral hazard effects, when crop insurance is 
introduced 
4.5.1 Characterisation  of  study  farms and their risk management 
Three study farms were selected for a more detailed analysis of production 
programmes and risk management instruments. This section characterises study 
farms and their environment in detail. Table 4-15 gives a short overview of farm 
characteristics, such as legal form, size, income sources, and crop yield 
characteristics.  
Table 4-15:  Characterisation of study farms 
Oblast   Akmola  East Kazakhstan  South Kazakhstan 
Legal form  Ltd.  Ltd.  Individual farm 
Year of foundation  1998  1996  2001 
Size (crop area in ha)  34,272  3,100  2,446 
Irrigated area  –  –  2,066 
Number of employees 
(mean 2000-2003)  100 63 185 
Own capital (mean 2000-
2003) in thous. KZT  349,397 28,795  4,000 
Income from     
   Crop production  85  100  100 
   Livestock production  12     
   Processing  3     
Specialisation  Wheat, Barley  Wheat, Sunflowers  Cotton, Wheat 
Average yield power  35  62  20 
Average wheat yield 
(1999-2003)  13.9 19.6  20.63 
Coefficient of variation 





Cotton and grain 
processing 
Source: Survey  data. 
Study farm Akmolinskaya oblast: 
As one of the study farm serves a large crop farm (34,000 hectares of sown area) 
in the grain belt of Northern Kazakhstan. In the years 1999-2003 about 74 per cent 
of the farm income is generated by crop production, 21 per cent by livestock 
production and 5 per cent by processing. A relatively high yield level, a strong 
weight of crop production in overall economic performance, and the ‘organisational 
history’ of the enterprise, make the model farm an interesting research object. 







































limited liability company. The manager holds more than half of the shares. 
Several years ago the farm entity was incorporated in a supra-regionally active 
holding company that comprised approximately 400,000 hectares of sown area. 
In the past, production, credit, and insurance decisions, were taken by the central 
planning unit of the holding company. Nowadays the general manager takes 
most of the important decisions. 
Figure 4-3 shows the contributions of the different economic activities to the 
overall income of the enterprise. Income from crop production is strongly 
fluctuating over the years, whereas the income generated by livestock production 
and processing is constantly increasing. The fluctuation in crop production 
income can be partly attributed to the generous storing capacities of the study 
farm, which allow sales in high-price periods. The development towards 
augmenting livestock activities resembles the overall trend of growing 
importance of livestock production and processing in Kazakhstan.  












Source: Survey  data. 
For this enterprise, not only crop, but also livestock production activities were 
included in the programming model discussed at a later stage. The following 
excursion explains the reasons for the integration of livestock activities in the 
programming model and briefly describes how the assumptions about total farm 
income affecting features and future prospects of livestock activities were derived. 
Excursion: The role of livestock production in Kazakhstan’s agriculture in 
general and its contribution to income stabilisation of the selected farm 
enterprise in Akmolinskaya oblast in particular Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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The steppe characteristics of most of the region are best suited for nomadic 
pastoralism, which has been pursued by an ever-shifting pattern of peoples in 
the history of the territory of today’s Kazakhstan. Collectivisation in the 1930s 
met with massive resistance and major losses and confiscation of livestock. 
Livestock numbers in Kazakhstan fell drastically during collectivisation: From 
7  million cattle to 1.6  million and from 22  million sheep to 1.7  million. 
Figure A-4 shows the share of crop production in total agricultural production 
from the times of the Virgin Lands Campaign until 2004. With the successive 
development of the collectivised livestock sector in the sixties, the share of 
crop production in total agricultural production fell to values below 40 per cent. 
With the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the livestock sector has been 
suffering from a strong crisis until recent years.  
After a sharp decline during the 90ies, livestock production regains importance 
in Kazakhstan and might support income stabilization. The World Bank 
stresses the importance of reviving the livestock sector in Kazakhstan and 
recommends making use of comparative advantages through capitalization 
of the vast, but under-exploited rangeland resources mainly for extensive 
cattle and sheep-raising in the South and in the North (WORLD BANK, 2004).  
After a decrease in the early transition phase, consumption of animal 
products is expected to rise further with increasing average incomes in 
Kazakhstan. Table 4-16 shows this trend for total meat consumption: While 
population increased by 1.4  per  cent in the period 2000-2004, the private 
meat consumption did by 23.6 per cent. 
Table 4-16:  Development of population and meat consumption over time 
Year  Population in  
thousands 
Meat consumption  
(in thousand tonnes) 
Meat consumption per 
capita (kg/year) 
2000 14866  660  44 
2001 14851  681  46 
2002 14867  707  48 
2003 14951  749  50 
2004 15075  816  54 
  Source:    AGENCY OF STATISTICS, 2005. 
Livestock production might represent a future income-stabilizing activity for 
the study farm in Akmolinskaya oblast and was therefore included in the 
portfolio. Therefore some assumptions about the relationship between livestock 
and crop production have to be made. A particular point of interest is the 
hedging opportunity between crop and livestock production. For this reason, Empirical analysis of risk management instruments 
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the focus of the following paragraphs lies on the interdependencies in price 
and output developments of both types of products. 
Table 4-17 depicts the average production costs for 100 kg of grain, pork and 
beef for various years. The great difference between 1995 and 1998 can 
mainly be attributed to inflation. However, the relatively low grain yields in 
the drought year 1998 contribute to high grain production costs per production 
unit. Analysis of grain production costs, which is used as an input to livestock 
production and beef and pork production costs demonstrates a positive 
correlation of both parameters. 
Table 4-17:  Average production costs 100 kg of marketable produce –  
 Agricultural enterprises Akmola 
    1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Grain  398 790 445 605 616 722 806 
Beef  3,485 9,246 9,057 9,110  11,125  11,925 9,841 
Pork  8,267 20,863 18,704 17,927 14,924 13,671 13,423 
Correlation  grain/beef  0.651       
Correlation grain/pork  0.337                   
  Source:  AGENCY OF STATISTICS, 2004a. 
Table 4-18 and Table 4-19 give an impression on the total production and 
use of grain. After a low point in 1999 – probably conditional on the poor 
harvest the year before – the share of fodder in use of total production is 
relatively stable around 20 per cent. 








  Source:    AGENCY OF STATISTICS, 2005a. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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Table 4-19:  Production and use of grain for the period 1990-2004 
‘000  tons  1990 1995 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 









28488  9506 14264 11565 15897 15960 14777 12374 
Import  355 13 15 17 24 55 37 16 
Total resources  35905  20778 17383 20313 23170 27871 28887 24285 
U s e           
  of which                 
     as fodder  6063  1755  933  2679  3044  2986  3019  3178 
     as seed  3684  2528  1486  1349  1393  1934  2340  2450 
Production for 
food  8656 6159 2187 2865 2689 3720 4032 3669 
Loss  1258 253 129 127 409 485 503 792 
Export  2923 3818 3818 5684 3311 4357 5835 2933 
Stock, end of 
the year  13122 6166 8731 7249  11856  14073  11895  10841 
  Source:    AGENCY OF STATISTICS, 2005a. 
As we learned from the tables above, fodder has – after export and processing – 
a significant share in total use of grain products. Fodder demand might 
influence the price of grain to a certain degree, but it has to be differentiated 
between grain varieties mainly used as fodder resources, such as barley and 
oats and wheat, of which prices depend to a assumingly higher degree on 
world market prices which are fairly stable over time (see Table 4-19). The 
high values for grain export in 2000 and 2003 can partially be attributed to 
grain shortages in other CIS countries, which still represent the most important 
export destinations. Based on the assumption that production and prices are 
interdependent, an analysis of the extent of this interdependency might make 
sense. The following table demonstrates negative correlation between production 
and prices of oats and slightly positive correlation between production and price 
of wheat and barley. Thus, fodder crops provide a potential for natural hedge. 
The natural hedge effect seems to be even higher for livestock products, such as 
beef and horsemeat. 
The investigation of the price relationship between crop and livestock products 
provides support to the hypothesis that prices of inputs (grain) influence the 
output prices (meat). 
A shortage in the supply of main fodder inputs might lead to higher prices Empirical analysis of risk management instruments 
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for livestock outputs as the negative correlation between barley/oats and beef/ 
horsemeat show. 
Table 4-20:  Testing for hedge effects between crop and animal products 
Correlation between 
Production and price of barley  0.106 
Production and price of oats  -0.171 
Production and price of wheat  0.069 
Production and price of beef  -0.865 
Production and price of horsemeat  -0.726 
Price of beef and price of barley  0.399 
Price of beef and price of oats  0.582 
Price of beef and price of wheat  0.303 
Price of horsemeat and price of barley  0.303 
Price of horsemeat and price of oats  0.467 
Price of horsemeat and price of wheat  0.628 
Price of beef and production of barley  -0.363 
Price of beef and production of oats  -0.687 
Price of beef and production of wheat  0.487 
Price of horsemeat and production of barley  -0.440 
Price of horsemeat and production of oats  -0.721 
Price of horsemeat and production of wheat  0.431 
  Source:    Own calculations based on FAOSTAT, data 1996-2002; prices were deflated. 
On the basis of the above data analysis, we can state following results and 
hypotheses about the relationship between income from livestock and crop 
production. Fodder costs contribute to a large part to total production costs in 
livestock production. Thus, the supply of livestock products seems to be strongly 
determined by production costs. As we learned from the data above, an increase 
in input prices as well as a shortage in production of the input resources lead 
to an increase in output prices
46. This relationship has to be integrated in the 
programming model. The following procedure is proposed: For different states 
of nature
47, different levels of livestock production costs will be formulated. In 
states with high grain (barley) yields, prices for grain (barley) as fodder as well 
as meat prices will be low. For the future strategy of the enterprise, production 
and processing of livestock products will play an increasingly important role.  
End of the Excursion. 
                                           
46  Demand was assumed to be stable over the years. However demand for more income elastic pro- 
ducts, such as meat is expected to increase, since incomes in Kazakhstan are steadily increasing. 
47  Ideally, a comprehensive set of states of nature is a mutually exclusive and exhaustive set 
of possible descriptions of the states of the world (CHAMBERS and QUIGGIN, 2000). For our 
purposes, the states of nature are defined by weather conditions. Within the framework of 
the programming model, probabilities are attributed to all states. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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Study farm East Kazakhstan oblast: 
The study farm in East Kazakhstan is situated in the rayon Glubokoe, about 70 km 
from the oblast centre Ust-Kamenogorsk (Oeskemen). The Limited Liability 
Company was founded in 1996. It has 63 full-time employees and comprises 
3100 ha, sown to a large extent with wheat and sunflowers. It has a high average 
yield power resulting in a yield comparable to the irrigated wheat yields in South 
Kazakhstan. The good soil conditions can be attributed to the location of the 
enterprise at the foothills of the Altai mountains. The farm has relatively good 
access to infrastructure important for marketing such as road access and short 
distances to the processing industry.  
Study farm South Kazakhstan oblast: 
The farm in Turkestanski rayon (South Kazakhstan) is the only private farm in the 
sample. It was founded in 2001, comprises a sown area of about 2,466 ha, 
84 per cent of which is irrigated. The main crops grown are winter wheat and 
cotton. Soil quality is low, but irrigation is the decisive factor for relatively high, 
stable yields. Plots in South Kazakhstan are smaller, the degree of mechanisation 
lower and labour cheaper than in northern Kazakhstan. Therefore the number of 
employees is relatively high compared to much larger farms in the North. 
4.5.2  Model specification and behavioural assumptions 
Expected utility provides a convenient way to represent risk preferences: Its basic 
idea is that decision-makers maximise expected utility. When income increases, 
utility increases less than proportionately for risk-averse decision-makers. Hence, 
utility is an increasing but downward bending function of income. Expected utility 
estimates can be translated into certainty equivalents (CE), where CE is the inverse 
of the utility function and represents the certain monetary value a person would 
accept to avoid a specified risk. Knowing certainty equivalent outcomes not only 
permits the ranking of risky alternatives, but also facilitates estimating risk 
premiums. CE simultaneously accounts for the probabilities of risky prospects 
and the preferences for the consequences (Anderson et al., 1977). Each production 
activity and application of risk management instrument may influence a decision-
maker’s expected utility. Examining CE is one approach to investigating the 
magnitude of this influence.  Empirical analysis of risk management instruments 
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The utility-efficient programming model (UEP) integrates the assumptions of 
expected utility theory in an objective function and constraints as follows
48: 
[]
) 1 /( 1 ) ( ) 1 ( max
r U E r CE
− − = , 
where 
CE =certainty equivalent, r = absolute risk aversion coefficient, and 
z r U ) 1 exp( 1 − − = , 
subject to 
Ax ≤ b, Cx-Iz =uf, and x ≥ = 0, 
where A is a matrix of technical coefficients for all activities, b is a vector of 
capacities, x is a row vector of adjustable variables, C is a matrix of activity net 
revenues by state, I is an n by n identity matrix, z is the annual net income in each 
state, u is a vector of ones, and f is fixed or overhead costs. The utility function U(z) 
is positive  () ) 0 ´ ( f z U , but decreasing  ( ) ) 0 ´´ ( p z U . These functions are characterised 
by decreasing absolute  z r z U z U z ra / ) ´( / ) ( ) (
´´ = − =  and constant relative risk aversion 
r z zr z r a r = = ) ( ) ( .
 
The activity net revenues for all states, C, represent the uncertainty in activity 
returns. Therefore, there is no need to assume any standard form of distribution. 
In our case, suitable values are de-trended observations from the time period 
1980-2002, treated as states with assessed probabilities. 
4.5.2.1 Risk  aversion 
Different methods to estimate risk aversion were applied. Based on a direct utility 
elicitation method (ANDERSON et al., 1977), one of the three case decision-makers 
were classified as risk-neutral. According to alternative qualitative risk aversion 
tests, one decision maker was considered to be risk-loving and one as risk-averse. 
After testing several approaches to determine risk aversion coefficients empirically, 
we came to share the opinion of HUDSON et al. (2005) that consistent measurement 
of risk attitudes is difficult to achieve. For the described base model, all three case 
decision-makers (decision-maker) were classified as slightly risk averse. The 
implications of a change in risk aversion will be tested in different scenarios. 
The relevant absolute risk aversion range for the model was derived from the 
plausible range of relative risk aversion, rr, defined as the marginal utility of 
wealth. ARROW (1965) has shown that ra = rr/w where w is wealth. LITTLE and 
MIRRLEESS (1974, cited in PATTEN et al., 1988) and HARDAKER et al. (2004) 
                                           
48  An extensive algebraic representation of the model can be found in the annex (A1). Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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suggest that rr will be a number close to 2, therefore a range of 0.5 to 4 was used 
for the test on the risk aversion elasticity of the model. The wealth of the study 
farmers has been approximated by employing own capital of the farm enterprise 
in the last recorded year as a proxy variable. Table 4-21 illustrates the described 
assumptions for the case farm in East Kazakhstan. The last column shows the 
different CE levels for identical income and wealth levels under varied risk 
aversion coefficients. 
Table 4-21:  Assumed wealth, risk aversion levels and certainty equivalents –  
 East Kazakhstan study farm 
Source: Own  estimations. 
Notes:  Rr= Relative risk aversion, Ra=Absolute risk aversion, CE=Certainty equvalent.  
4.5.2.2 Scenarios 
To test the effects of different risk management instruments on production 
programme, income and certainty equivalent, different scenarios were estimated. 
The scenarios are described in Table 4-22. In all scenarios marked with "1", all 
available technologies (I-intensive, II-medium intensive, III-extensive) are available. 
In the type "2"-scenarios, the most favourable technology, which was selected by 
the model in the type"1"-scenarios, was excluded to show the effects of inappropriate 
technology use. This type of analysis was amplified by type"3"-scenarios, 
including only the most unfavourable scenarios. In all described scenarios, all 
selected insurance products were introduced as activities. Scenario "R" serves as a 
reference scenario, in which only on-farm risk management is possible by the use 
of appropriate technology. Insurance is not available to the decision-maker. The 
scenarios were further modified by in-and excluding credit access and different 
insurance products. Additionally, sub-scenarios were estimated, including a 
variation of access to own capital and interest rates for borrowed capital. 




Hardly risk averse at all  0.5 1.68953E-05  29,932  28,770 
Somewhat risk averse 
(normal)  1 3.37906E-05  29,594  27,680 
Rather risk averse  2 6.75813E-05  29,594  25,610 
Very risk averse  3 0.000101372  29,594  23,710 
Extremely risk averse  4 0.000135163  29,594  21,970 Empirical analysis of risk management instruments 
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Table 4-22:  Description of model scenarios 
Scenario Description 
R  Reference scenario: All technologies are available, no access to insurance and 
futures, no access to credit 
RC  Reference scenario: All technologies are available, no access to insurance and 
futures, but access to credit 
1  All technologies are available, no credit access 
1C  All technologies are available, credit access 
2  The two less favourable technologies are available, no credit access 
2C  The two less favourable technologies are available, credit access 
3  Only the least favourable technology is available, no credit access 
3C  Only the least favourable technology is available, credit access 
Source: Own  formation. 
4.5.2.3 Integrating  expert knowledge  
According to VOSE (1996), risk analysis models without exception involve some 
element of subjective estimation. For a number of reasons it might be impossible 
to determine the distribution of all relevant variables: 
–  The data has never been collected in the past. 
–  Past data is no longer relevant (new technology, changes in political or 
commercial environment). 
–  The data is expensive to obtain. 
In our case the first and second reason required consultations with experts. 
Although there exists a number of short time series on crop yields from experimental 
stations, the publications available are from the 60s, 70s, and 80s. Since then, 
technological, climate and soil conditions have changed significantly and the 
actual political and economic environment is not comparable with the pre-transition 
period.  
The value of the potentially achievable gross margins is subject to uncertainty. This 
uncertainty is accounted for by deriving information about distribution functions 
from past realisations of the random variable. Basically, extensive enterprise-specific 
data sets were used. As a result of political changes and the major restructuring 
of agricultural enterprises, the available historical data might lead to unrealistic 
assumptions about distributions. In such cases, taking expert advice might be 
justified in order to derive reliable distributions (HARDAKER et al., 2004). In our 
case, we used a blend of sources, including expert judgement, farm survey results, 
and literature resources to derive information on costs, revenues and probabilities. 
Concretely, parameters like size, specialisation and own capital endowment were 
derived from farm survey results (Table 4-15), whereas the data on input and Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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output of different technology solutions stem from the analysis of regional yield 
and weather data for the period 1980-2004, and expert judgements based on 
interviews with farmers, researchers and regional agricultural administration staff 
members. The main justification of deviation from a reliance on historical data alone 
is the significant change in agro-climatic and economic production conditions. Soil 
conditions steadily worsened due to massive erosion and a lack of fertilising over 
the last decades. Economic transition caused a structural break in agricultural 
structures in general and farm management in particular. The addition of expert 
advice provides the opportunity to integrate potential technologies that are not 
widely used, but adapted to regional conditions and thereby offer the potential to 
improve economic enterprise performance. 
The use of experts supports the research process by opening up a source of 
information that is usually not available for non-experts. The cognitive abilities 
of experts including failure to assess probabilities for a long period of time 
correctly required to reduce the states of nature for which the experts had to 
assess yield levels. As HIRSHLEIFER and RILEY (1995) note, monitoring of states 
is often imperfect.  
In the case of Akmolinskaya Oblast, the expert formulated five states for each of 
the three defined technologies (IVANNIKOV, 2005). Figure 4-4 depicts the wheat 
yields for the five defined states. 
Figure 4-4: Mean wheat yields in five expert-defined states of nature for  























Source: Own  figure. 
Note:  TI=Extensive technology, TII=Medium technology, TIII=Intensive technology. Empirical analysis of risk management instruments 
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This methodology implies data aggregation and thereby a loss of information. 
However, it is necessary to maximise the explanatory power and validity of the 
programming model. For that reason the number of states was extended to 23, 
which equals the number of years used for the design of the insurance products. 
This was achieved by assigning every year to a corresponding pre-formulated 
state and was first done for the historically applied technology and then simulated 
based on the expert formulation for the two hypothetical ones. The chosen 
approach discovers the full information provided by the empirical data as following 
example shows: Whereas the yield in state 2 (S2) in Figure 4-4 is lower for all 
technologies than in state 3, the full picture in Figure 4-5 shows that in some of 
the years (1996, 1997, 1991, 1981) which were aggregated to S2, technology 1 
provides better results than in 2000 and 1983 that were aggregated to S3. 
Aggregation might lead to spurious results. 
Figure 4-5: Wheat yields for the case farm in Akmolinskaya Oblast for three 












































Source: Own  figure. 
Note:  TI=Extensive technology, TII=Medium technology, TIII=Intensive technology; the 
states in Figure 4-4 comprise following years: S1 (1984), S2 (1982, 1998, 1994, 1996, 
1997, 1991, 2000), S3 (1993, 1980), S4 (1995, 1990, 2002, 1988, 1996, 2001, 1993, 
1995, 1999, 1997, 1989), and S5 (1992). 
Figures A-1 through A-3 depict yield distributions of wheat and cotton in different 
states of nature under selected technologies for the case farm in South Kazakhstan. 
The distribution is ordered according to wheat states in the currently applied 
extensive technology (TIII). The distributions show the stabilising function of this 
crop mix: The two highest cotton yields over all technologies occur in wheat Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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states with low yields (drought). This stabilisation function can be also perceived 
in the coefficients of variation (CV) in Table 4-23: Whereas the CVs of cotton 
yields fluctuate between 0.252 and 0.3 and for wheat between 0.204 and 0.278, 
depending on the technology used, a crop mix of both in the relation 0.26 (cotton) 
to 0.56 (wheat)
49, will reduce the CV significantly. The lower CV of the whole-
farm sales income compared to CVs of the individual crop yields can be explained 
by the portfolio effect that arises when different income sources are combined. 
Except in one case, the variation coefficients of the sales revenue are lower than 
the single yield CVs, i.e. hedging with both crops is possible, even when 
assuming constant prices. 
In the latter case the CV is measured for the sales income, which is calculated by 
the yields of the single crops times a fixed price.  
Table 4-23:  Comparative statistics for different technologies – Study farm 
South Kazakhstan 
   Technology  Mean  SD  CV 
I 9.71  2.45  0.252 
II 7.69  2.10  0.274  Cotton 
III 4.97  1.49  0.300 
I 27.53  5.62  0.204 
II 20.21  4.70  0.233  Wheat 
III 10.80  3.00  0.278 
I 55,959  11,569  0.207 
II  42,952 9,781 0.228 
Sales revenue per ha  
(KZT) 
III  25,883 6,673 0.258 
Source: Own  estimations. 
Note:  TI=Extensive technology, TII=Medium technology, TIII=Intensive technology. 
4.5.2.4 Integrating  risk  management instruments 
The model captures on-farm risk management measures by introducing different 
production technologies. The technologies display possible solutions to influence 
quantity and the variability of output. To speak with HIRSHLEIFER and RILEY 
(1995), the technology is the umbrella of the farmer. He can decide whether or 
not to carry one and what kind of umbrella he will use when going outside 
(producing) and being confronted with the state of weather (under the simplest 
assumption, there are only two states (rain, no rain). The assumptions about 
                                           
49  A share of 0.16 is integrated as fallow into the crop rotation. In this case the CV is measured 
for the sales income, which is calculated by the yields of the single crops times a fixed price. Empirical analysis of risk management instruments 
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yields and yield distributions are based on a combination of long-term experimental 
data for region-specific production conditions and expert probability judgements
50 
(IVANNIKOV, 2005; KENENBAEV, 2005). Input prices are based on current market 
prices, while output prices are taken from regional statistics from 2001-2004. 
The considered technologies are characterised by ploughing cultivation and fixed 
crop rotation systems, e.g. for the model farm in Akmolinskaya oblast the fallow 
is followed by two seasons planted with spring wheat and one season planted 
with spring barley. Tables A-4 and A-5 and Figures A-10 through A-12 present a 
summary of the most distinctive features of the considered technologies for 
selected crops. The technologies show differences regarding the quantity of 
fertiliser and herbicide input, the quantity of labour and fuel input (which are 
mainly determined by the kind and frequency of soil cultivation), and the way 
soil humidity generation is accomplished. All of these technology features are 
reflected in the volume of total variable costs, which vary significantly among 
technologies. The technological differences result in intensely varying yield levels 
in different states of nature.  
Based on Fisher’s separation theorem (FISHER, 1933), which was described in 
chapter  2.2.2, the model includes different insurance and credit activities. In 
contrast to the situation in countries where market-based crop insurance programmes 
are already established since long and abundant data is available for analysis 
(compare the studies of BABCOCK et al., 2004; BOURGEON and CHAMBERS, 2003; 
MIRANDA, 1991; SCHNITKEY et al., 2003), this application requires the pre-
formulation and testing of insurance and hedging products before they can be 
introduced to the risk programming model. The formulation and testing of 
financial risk management products was carried out by BOKUSHEVA et al. (2006).  
WII products are based on three indices: A simple rainfall index, as well as two 
drought indices developed by PED (1975) and SELYANINOV (1958), two scientists 
from the former Soviet Union. BOKUSHEVA (2005) modified them by using 
monthly data
51. Since soil moisture is a parameter dependent on soil cultivation 
intensity, which could induce moral hazard problems, the Ped drought index was 
modified by replacing soil moisture data by data on cumulative precipitation in the 
period from September to May. The yearly values of the three indexes xi are 
computed by following equations: 
                                           
50  The integration of expert knowledge will be extensively discussed in section 0. 
51  Since plant resistance to drought varies during growth phases, monthly data provide a basis 
for a more precise assessment of wheat yield dependency on weather conditions in the 
individual years. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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Rainfall index  
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Modified Ped drought index  
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=+ + − +, 
where R is the cumulative precipitation and T is the average daily temperature in 
a specified period, i is a year index and each w represents a weighing factor, 
obtained from linear regressions of the right-hand side variables using farm 
yields as the dependent variable. 
Area yield insurance can be formally described following MIRANDA (1991). A 
measure ß i  is developed which measures the sensitivity of the producer’s 
individual yield to the systematic factors that affect the area yield. A theoretical 
derivation shows that area-yield insurance will be risk reducing for any producer 










* , where  
i β  is a coefficient that measures the sensitivity of the producer’s individual yield 
to the systemic factors that affect the area yield, and c β  is the critical beta 
Miranda proves that area-yield insurance is risk reducing for producer i, if 
i β > c β , i.e. if his individual beta exceeds the critical one. 













σ Δ , where  
i Δ is the variance reduction, and 
2
n σ is the variance of indemnity payments. 
Selected products were calibrated for the location of the considered enterprises 
and included in the model. Area yield insurance products are based on different 
underlyings, i.e. national, oblast and rayon yields. Premium costs and indemnities 
were estimated based on historical yield and weather data for different strike levels. Empirical analysis of risk management instruments 
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Table 4-24 gives an overview of the insurance products that were investigated in 
this thesis. The calculations are based on yields de-trended and tested for 
structural break. Yields were de-trended in order to establish an input data base 
that is not affected by technology changes. 
Table 4-24:  Insurance types used in the risk programming model 
Insurance type  Abbreviation 
1.Farm yield insurance  FYI 
2. Area yield future and insurance 
2.1 Future: Strike yield 100% of expected national yield 
2.2 Area yield insurance (National yields) 
N_Futures_100 
NYI 
2.3 Area yield insurance (Oblast yields)  OYI 
2.4 Area yield insurance (Rayon yields)  RYI 
3 Weather index based insurance 
3.1 Rainfall based index insurance  RFI 
3.2 Selyaninov (modification) index insurance  Sel 
3.3 Ped (modification) index insurance  Ped 
Note:  Strike yields vary between of 100 and 75 per cent of the expected yield. The tick size 
is 1 KZT. The price of the investigated insurance products depends on the investigated 
crop, its expected yield (location), and the strike level. 
The estimations are restricted to the areas with main cultures. Special crops like 
potatoes, fruits and vegetables are not considered for the programming model 
for three reasons: First, their share of total area is relatively small. Second, they 
are only partially marketed and serve, to a large extent, as the basic food supply 
of farm labourers. Third, it is not possible to derive statistically firm distribution 
functions from yearly changing special cultures. 
For the case farm in East Kazakhstan, insurance products similar to those in 
Akmolinskaya oblast were selected. Weather insurance products were specified 
on the basis of data from the weather station in Ust-Kamenogorsk (Oeskemen). 
In a first step, it was tested for correlation of weather data with crop yields: 
There is a positive correlation between wheat yields on the rayon and the 
enterprise-level and a slightly negative correlation between sunflower yields and 
precipitation in the vegetation period. Therefore, only for wheat weather index-
based insurance was taken into account. 
After a sharp decline during the 90s, livestock production regains importance in 
Kazakhstan. It is an income-stabilizing activity for the study farm in Akmolinskaya 
oblast and was therefore included in the portfolio (s. chapter 4.5.1). Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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4.5.3  Model results and discussion 
This section comprises the most important results of the risk programming model 
and additional estimations. Because we are investigating farm-specific cases and 
look at management options and behaviour of real decision-makers, we refer to 
personal pronouns when speaking about the decision-maker. For simplification 
reasons, we use only the male form of the pronouns. First of all, different scenarios 
are analysed to test for effects of changes in risk aversion, own capital, and credit 
availability. Then, different farm types are being investigated in order to draw farm 
type-specific conclusions. The section is wrapped up by a summary of the results. 
4.5.3.1  Income and utility effects of variation in risk aversion 
The following tables investigate the influence of risk aversion on the choice of 
risk management instruments. Therefore the risk programming model tested 
scenarios with and without access to insurance under varied risk aversion 
coefficients. Table 4-25 depicts the results for the study farm in Akmola. With no 
access to insurance or futures, the decision-maker’s only possibility is to hedge 
production risk in crop production by using another technology or to diversify 
the production portfolio by growing alternative crops. Since the programming 
model considers the two most important crops produced at the farm and technologies 
are given, the potential to manage risk by choosing another crop portfolio or another 
technology, which is better adapted to the utility function of the decision-maker, 
is limited. Therefore, the farmer keeps producing wheat and barley at the same 
level under the same technology. A scenario with access to insurance allows for 
a variation of crop portfolio, technology, insurance product and strike level. In 
this scenario, the decision-maker switches from FYI_100 to FYI_90 for wheat 
when risk neutrality is assumed with the effect that incomes in worse states of 
nature decreases, whereas it increases in more favourable states. 
Table 4-25:  Income and risk for different farm plans – Akmola  
 (in ‘000 KZT) 
Particulars Farm  Plan 
  With access to insurance  Without access to insurance 
  Risk-averse* Risk-neutral**  Risk-averse  Risk-neutral 
Gross  income  469,505 469,505 469,505 469,505 
Income in State 1  12,469  12,089  5,258  5,258 
Income in State 2  17,631  17,351  14,379  14,379 
Income in State 3  15,106  15,116  16,148  16,148 
Income in State 4  21,608  21,775  23,712  23,712 
Income in State 5  44,112  44,426  46,753  46,753 
Source:    Own estimations. 
Note: 
* rra=2, 
** rra=0.5. Empirical analysis of risk management instruments 
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In the case of East Kazakhstan (s. Table 4-26), no differences between risk-neutral 
and risk-averse behaviour could be measured in all scenarios. For this reason, 
the income distribution over all states of nature within the scenarios stays 
constant, when risk aversion is varied. However, there is an income difference 
between the scenarios with and without insurance access. As in Akmola, insurance 
participation redistributes income from better to worse states of nature, i.e. from 
states 2 and 3 to state 1. Because this farm is short of own capital and borrows 
capital from the bank an additional scenario with no access to both, credit and 
insurance was introduced. The restriction in credit access leads to a reduction in 
cultivation of crop area by 5.3 per cent. This reduces the expected gross income 
by 8.2 per cent. In contrast to the results in East Kazakhstan, the model results 
for the South Kazakhstan study farm show similar results to those in Akmola: 
The relative distribution of crop area between wheat and cotton stays constant, 
but the strike level for cotton insurance will be lifted from 90 per cent to 100 per cent 
when increasing the relative risk aversion coefficient from 0.5 (risk-neutral) to 2 
(risk-averse). 
Table 4-26:  Income and risk for different farm plans – East Kazakhstan  
 (in ‘000 KZT) 
Particulars Farm  Plan 
  With access to 
insurance 
Without access to 
insurance, but access 
to credit 
Without access to 
insurance and credit 
  Risk-av. Risk-neutr. Risk-av.  Risk-neutr. Risk-av. Risk-neutr. 
Gross income  29,932  29,932  29,932  29,932  27,474  27,474 
Income in State 1  1,388 1,388  1,166  1,166  1,071  1,071 
Income in State 2  1,025 1,025  1,308  1,308  1,201  1,201 
Income in State 3  1,570 1,570  1,871  1,871  1,717  1,717 
Source: Own  estimations. 
As a result, the average income under bad weather conditions (state 1) will be 
lifted from 744,000 KZT to 785,000 KZT. This income shift can be re-enacted 
in Figure 4-6, where in most of the years that form state 1 (years 1-13), the income 
is higher under higher risk aversion. The relatively high income in years 8 and 11 
can be explained by the method of state formulation. Like in the two other regions, 
wheat yields were used as an indicator of natural conditions, according to which 
the states of nature were formulated. However, whole-farm income might be 
reasonably high in years with low wheat yields, because income from cotton 




















































Risk-aversion variation in the scenario "without access to insurance" does not 
have any effect on activity choice and income distribution. 
Table 4-27:  Income and risk for different farm plans – South Kazakhstan  
(in ‘000 KZT) 
Particulars Farm  Plan 
  With access to insurance  Without access to insurance 
  Risk-averse Risk-neutral Risk-averse Risk-neutral 
Gross  income  20,969 20,969 20,969 20,969 
Income in State 1  785 744 519 519 
Income in State 2  880 918  1,206  1,206 
Income in State 3  1,537 1,622 1,934 1,934 
Source: Own  estimations. 
Figure 4-6: Income distribution in different states of nature for two levels of 
risk aversion (rra=0.5, rra=2), study farm South Kazakhstan, 










Source: Own  estimations. 
The relative inelasticity of utility when risk aversion is varied can be shown by 
the almost parallel utility curves in Figure 4-7. The negative exponential utility 
function gives slightly more weight to low incomes compared to high ones. 
Coefficient of 
relative risk 
aversion: Empirical analysis of risk management instruments 
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Figure 4-7: Utility elasticity of income when risk aversion is varied – 
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4.5.3.2  Effects on input use 
The results in Table 4-28 reflect the situation of the study enterprises. Both, the 
South Kazakhstan and the Akmola farm are equipped with abundant own capital. 
Logically, credit with an expected interest rate of 15 per cent, although inflation is 
moderate, is not attractive for these farms. The East Kazakhstan enterprise uses 
92 per cent of the maximally obtainable amount of credit.  
The study farm in South Kazakhstan is as so far as labour intensity is concerned 
typical for the region. In South Kazakhstan, natural conditions and low labour 
costs support the production of labour-intensive crops, such as cotton, fruits, and 
vegetables. Even wheat production is about twice as labour intensive as in 
northern Kazakhstan, due to smaller plots, a lower degree of mechanisation, and 
irrigation. 
The variation in risk aversion, however, does not have an impact on capital and 
labour use, since production portfolios are identical under both risk aversion 
assumptions. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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Akmola  Total labour use (hours)  130,868  130,868 
  Labour use per ha  3.71  3.71 
  Borrowing (‘000 KZT)  –  – 
East Kazakhstan  Total labour use (hours)  12,347  12,347 
  Labour use per ha  3.86  3.86 
  Borrowing (‘000 KZT)  2,711  2,711 
South Kazakhstan  Total labour use (hours)  61,851  61,851 
  Labour use per ha  28.90  28.90 
  Borrowing (‘000 KZT)  –  – 
Source: Own  estimations. 
4.5.3.3  Detailed analysis of study farms 
Akmola 
The insurance products contained in the portfolio can stabilise income and 
thereby increase decision-maker’s utility significantly. Compared to the reference 
scenario R, where only production technology can be chosen, scenarios with 
application of different insurance products show higher utility values. Table 4-29 
depicts that even a fair-premium insurance based on national yields reveals a 
certainty equivalent that is 2 per cent higher than in scenario R. As expected, 
farm-based products, such as farm-yield insurance and weather-based insurance 
products are dominant to area-yield insurance products. A future product based 
on national yields is surprisingly successful in stabilising income. Compared to 
insurance, a future has the advantage of not generating premium costs. Thus, 
income in bad years might be stabilised better than with insurance. An additional 
explanation is, that area-yield insurance discriminates farms with better than 
average yields compared to other farms. These results are supported by an analysis 
of gross margin coefficients of variation, which can be found in the appendix 
(see Table A-7). The table shows the full range of insurance products and strike 
levels. For wheat 4 farm-yield and 4 area-yield products with different strike 
levels (altogether 33 combinations) were analysed. For barley the overall number 
is slightly higher: 34 insurance and future products were analysed.  Empirical analysis of risk management instruments 
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All coefficients are in a normal range. The coefficients for wheat are lower than 
those for barley by 8 per cent for technology II and III and by 15 per cent for 
technology I. The number of area-yield products in the list of the ten most 
efficient insurance instruments is low. For both wheat and barley there is only 
one area-yield product among the first ten, except for technology I, where two of 
these products can be found. The same holds for the second ten instruments: 
Considering all technologies, for wheat at maximum two area-yield choices are 
represented, for barley at maximum 1. Most of the area-yield products are ranking 
last in the list. When comparing the variation coefficient means for the first ten 
with the second ten products, it becomes evident that there is no big difference, 
especially for the products designed for wheat. Hence, the potential to stabilise 
income is similar for many farm-level products. The difference between the 
schemes becomes larger when taking into account the coefficient of variation for 
the third ten, which include mostly area-yield insurance products.  
The dominance of technology I in stabilising income is evident regarding the 
differences in variation coefficients. For most of the products the variation 
coefficient can be significantly reduced by application of the intensive technology. 
 Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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Table 4-29:  Technology and insurance product choices – Study farm Akmola 
Note: 
* Achieved certainty equivalent as share of maximum achievable certainty equivalent. Technologies I (intensive), II (medium), and III (extensive)  
   reflect different input intensities. The insurance products chosen are explained in Table 4-24. Scenarios follow the pattern as outlined in  
   chapter 4.5.2.2.
                        Crop    
























(ha) Area  (ha) 
1 441,306  1.000  469,505  0.064  1C  only  FYI_100 I  FYI_100  17,636 FYI_100  8,818    8,818 
2 439,625  0.996  469,505  0.068  1C  only  WII  I  Ped_67  17,636 RFI_100  8,818     8,818 
3 439,007  0.995  469,505  0.069  1C  only  RFI  I  RFI_90  17,636 RFI_90  8,818     8,818 
4 436,478  0.989  469,505  0.076  1C 
only 







5 436,129  0.988  469,505  0.077  1C  only  FYI  I  FYI_90  17,636 FYI_75  8,818     8,818 
6 435,031  0.986  469,505  0.079  1C  only  Sel  I  Sel_67  17,636 Sel_90  8,818     8,818 
7 434,891  0.985  469,505  0.080  1C  only  Ped  I  Ped_80  17,636 Ped_67  8,818     8,818 
8 434,394  0.984  469,505  0.081  1C 








9 431,812  0.978  469,505  0.087  1C  only  AYI  I  RYI_100  17,636 OYI_75  8,818     8,818 
10 425,057  0.963  469,505  0.105  1C  only  NYI  I  NYI_100  17,636 NYI_100  8,818      8,818 




17,636 – 8,818     8,818 
12 403,282  0.870  464,066  0.151  3C  only  FYI  III      – 17,636 NYI_67  8,818 8,818 
13 387,641  0.878  441,238  0.138  2C  only  FYI  II      – 17,636 FYI_90  8,818 8,818 Empirical analysis of risk management instruments 
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The technology differences are also highlighted in Table 4-29. For an evaluation 
of the technologies with access to farm-yield insurance, three different sub-
scenarios were compared (No.  5 to No. 12 and 13). Technology III yields 
91.3 per cent of the CE and 98.8 per cent of the expected income of technology I. 
Applying technology II, 87.8 and 94 per cent respectively of technology I levels 
can be achieved. Barley is the preferable crop under more extensive 
technologies (II and III). The largest share of the barley area remains uninsured 
(17,636 ha), whereas a smaller part (8,818 ha) would have to be insured with 
national and farm yield insurance. 
However, the differences between certainty equivalents for different technologies 
are not as large as in the case of the East Kazakhstan farm. This can be partly 
explained by the technology choice which smoothes yields better than the 
extensive technology chosen by the model for the production programme of the 
EK farm. 
Table A-11 displays the insurance solutions when livestock production activities 
are introduced. The scenarios with crop production including access to different 
insurance instruments plus livestock production achieve certainty equivalents that 
are by 13.3  per  cent higher and expected incomes that are about  12.7 per cent 
higher compared to pure crop production results. Income increase and stabilisation 
can be particularly attributed to revenue generated by cattle production. However, 
the current stable place is limited und might constrain the income potential of the 
enterprise. A sensitivity analysis shows the income and income distribution effects 
of a ceteris paribus increase in the total number of stable places for cattle in 
different states of nature. In the reference scenario "R" the total livestock production 
would be switched to cattle production, if the number of cattle places would be 
doubled. This shift increases the Expected Monetary Value (EMV) of whole-farm 
production by 7.3  per  cent, caused particularly by an income increase in less 
favourable states of nature (S1-S3) as Table 4-31 shows. The same development 
can be perceived for all other scenarios. Solely "3C"shows hardly any income 
increase and redistribution between states. Scenarios R, 1C, and 2C with an 
increase in cattle places are furthermore characterised by a decrease in income in 
states 4 and 5. This can be explained by the opportunity costs of cattle production 
in states of nature that are favourable for crop production. 
 Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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Table 4-30:  Effects of cattle place extension on livestock production activities 
  Scenario 
Cow places: 1000 
Cattle places: 1000 
Horse places: 400 
R 1C  2C 3C 
Dairy cows  246  399  1,000  1,000 
Beef  cattle  1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Horses 400  400  0  0 
Cow places: 1000 
Cattle places: 2000 
Horse places: 400      
Dairy  cows 0 0 0  1,000 
Beef  cattle  2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 
Horses 0  0  398  0 
Source: Own  estimations. 
Note:  R=Reference scenario, 1C=Access to intensive technology and credit; 2C=Access to 
medium technology and credit; 3C=Access to an extensive technology and credit. 
Table 4-31:  Income-stabilisation through cattle production  
   R   1C   2C   3C 
S1 
0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.001 
S2 
0.005 0.002 0.004 0.000 
S3 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
S4 
-0.005 -0.002 -0.003 0.000 
S5 
-0.004 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 
EMV 
0.073 0.073 0.096 0.008 
Source: Own  estimations. 
Note:  Values for S1-S5 depict the increase in relative income share in the respective state, 
the EMV values show the relative increase in expected monetary value, when increasing 
the number of stable places for cattle. 
East Kazakhstan 
The model results suggest a switch in intensity for wheat: After de-trending with 
account for technology effects, the average historical wheat yield corresponds to 
the potential yield that can be achieved under technology 2. The farm model 
suggests a change to the more extensive technology 3. 
Table 4-33 shows the results for different scenarios of the risk programming 
model and orders them according to their utility-efficiency. Technology III is 
dominant in all scenarios. Results for scenarios that investigate the income 
effects of other technologies are shown in Figure A-6. As anticipated, the scenario Empirical analysis of risk management instruments 
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where crops are fully insured under farm yield insurance shows the highest utility, 
since FYI is perfectly adapted to farm conditions and losses are smoothed 
perfectly over the years. Restricting the strike level for farm-yield insurance 
products to 75 per cent as it is done in U.S. crop insurance to prevent moral 
hazard, does not significantly reduce utility. Further limitation of the insurance 
product choice further reduces utility generation as the subsequent certainty 
equivalent values show. Scenario 2 with WII only for wheat and no insurance for 
sunflowers
52 yields the lowest utility result of the compared scenarios with 
insurance products. The reference scenario R without insurance shows a significantly 
reduced utility.  
As in the case of the Akmola farm, all investigated insurance products were analysed 
according to their gross margin variation coefficients. Altogether 25 products for 
wheat and 12 for sunflowers were analysed. For wheat 11 farm-yield products 
and 14 area-yield products were tested. For sunflowers farm-yield insurance 
with four different strike levels and national and rayon-yield insurance with 
different strike levels were analysed. Table A-8 shows the test results. Variation 
coefficients for wheat are strongly fluctuating across technologies. Whereas the 
variation coefficient of farm yield insurance with a strike of 100  per  cent is 
0.167 for technology III, it increases strongly when switching to technology II 
(0.275) or I (0.250). The number of area-yield instruments for wheat is as low as 
it is in the case of the Akmola farm. Only one among the first ten is not a farm-
yield product.  
This is slightly different for sunflowers. Among the first five are three area-yield 
insurance products. This fact can be partly explained by the overall low number 
of farm-yield products, because no weather-based insurance products were 
designed for sunflowers
53. Remarkably about both crops are the measured high 
values of variation coefficients. The effects of a technology change are drastic 
for many insurance products. However, they are especially high in terms of 
variation coefficient change. 
Publications on effects of credit-rationing in Kazakhstani agriculture are not 
available to the best of the author’s knowledge. However, PETRICK’s (2004) 
contribution  inter alia investigates effects of credit-rationing on investment 
decisions of Polish farm households. His analysis led to the result that credit access 
                                           
52  This scenario depicts the case of a pilot weather index scheme for main cultures. 
53  Correlation tests between weather parameters and sunflower yields did not yield sufficient 




































is a significant factor of investment decisions of credit-rationed farmers. If these 
results can be transferred to the conditions in Kazakhstan, one can conclude that 
limited credit access might be an obstacle to adoption of new production technologies.  
The analysis of credit- and own capital rationing within the framework of the 
programming model provides some insights of the effects of both restriction 
mln KZT between the reference scenario with and without credit access. The 
effects of credit and insurance are impressively shown by scenario 1 (No. 7) 
(Table 4-29), where access to farm yield insurance products exists, but credit is 
restricted. By introduction of a credit restriction, the production area available for 
crop production under the extensive technology shrinks by 268 hectares. Figure 4-8 
depicts the effects of a change in credit availability on the expected farm income 
and the certainty equivalent, respectively. Both curves show an almost linear 
negative trend for both income measures when credit amount is reduced 
successively by 1 per cent.  
Figure 4-8: Development of expected monetary value (EMV) and certainty 












Source: Own  estimations. 
Reducing credit-access gradually from initially 8 to 0 per cent of own capital, 
reduces the expected farm income by 269,000 KZT and certainty equivalent by 
255,000 KZT in average. The sown area is reduced by 29 ha per per cent of 
credit reduction. The turning point between 7 and 8 per cent marks the point 
where no additional land is rented and land rental costs become zero. Empirical analysis of risk management instruments 
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How does the situation look like, if own capital is reduced? This situation might 
occur, if enterprise liquidity decreases as an effect of bad harvests and own capital 
has to be used to stabilize liquidity, or, if the ownership structure changes. For 
this analysis, the own capital level was gradually reduced to 50 per cent of the 
original level. This reduction results in an average decrease of 29 ha of sown 
area for every per cent of own capital reduction (s. Figure 4-9). Likewise, the 
expected farm income decreases by 315,000 KZT and the certainty equivalent 
decreases by 304,000 KZT. While income and certainty equivalent are decreasing 
in an almost linear way, the production portfolio mix does not change, i.e. the 
shares of wheat and sunflowers stay constant. 
Figure 4-9: Development of expected monetary value (EMV) and certainty 
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Source: Own  estimations. 
The convergence of both curves when own capital is reduced reflects the form 
of the utility curve. The lower the income level, the smaller is the absolute value 
of the risk premium. 
Interest rates are about 15 per cent for agricultural loans. Credits might not be 
available for agricultural enterprises due to lack of collateral or unaffordable 
interest rates. Table 4-32 highlights the effects of variation in credit availability Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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and interest rate on expected income and certainty equivalent for the case farm in 
East Kazakhstan. Comparing three interest rate levels under two different credit 
quotas (5 and 10 per cent of own capital), the table shows that real income gains 
and losses between interest rate levels are lower than gains and losses in certainty 
equivalents. Translated into reality, we can conclude that a reduction of interest 
rates, e.g. provoked by a governmental subsidisation might lead to subjectively 
experienced disproportionately high utility gains, because income gains in dry 
states of nature are higher compared to more humid states. 
Table 4-32:  Effects of variation in credit availability and interest rate on 
EMV and CE 
Credit  
(in % of own capital) 
r  
(interest rate on credit)
CE EMV 
15 28,850  29,932 
10 29,229  30,068  10 
5 29,393  30,203 
15 27,826  28,826 
10 28,122  28,900  5 
5 28,221  28,974 
Source: Own  estimations. 
The sensitivity analysis for variation in interest rates, own capital and credit 
access shows a result that can be perceived in transitional agriculture: 
Agricultural areas remain unused or underutilized, respectively due to lack of 
capital. This increases danger of erosion and desertification of unused or 
inappropriately used land. 
 Empirical analysis of risk management instruments 
 
139 
Table 4-33:  Technology and insurance product choices – Study farm East Kazakhstan 
                     Crops  












Premium Scenario  Subscenario 
Insurance 
product Area  (ha) 
Insurance 
product  Area (ha)  Area (ha) 
1 28,850  1.000  29,932 0.036  1C only  FYI  FYI_100  2,286  FYI_100 381  533 
2 28,521  0.989  29,932 0.047  1C 
only FYI_75 
and lower  FYI_67  2,286 
FYI_75 
381 533 
3 27,816  0.964  29,932 0.071  1C only  AYI  OYI_75  2,286  RYI_100 381  533 
4 27,519  0.954  29,932 0.081  1C only  NYI  NYI_67  2,286  NYI_67 381  533 
5 27,491  0.953  29,932 0.082  RC    –  2,286  –  381  533 





RFI_100 2,286  –  381  533 
7 26,766  0.928  27,474 0.026  1  only  FYI  FYI_90 2,094  FYI_100 349  489 
8 25,457  0.882  27,474 0.073  R    –  2,094  –  349  489 
Source:  Own estimations. The insurance products chosen are explained in Table 4-24. Scenarios follow the pattern as outlined in chapter 4.5.2.2.  




In South Kazakhstan, 20 insurance products were tested for wheat and 12 for cotton. 
Farm yield insurance was tested with five strike levels; the remaining seven were 
area-yield insurance products. Oblast yield insurance could not be tested because of 
missing data. Both crops are partly irrigated. Therefore, yields are less dependent on 
rainfall and an introduction of weather-based insurance is not promising. 
The results of the risk programming model (Table 4-34) show no clear differences 
between selected insurance products, when all technologies are available. The 
most input intensive technology (technology I) has a comparative advantage in 
stabilising income and was therefore chosen by the model. The certainty 
equivalent in the first best scenario (rayon-yield insurance with different strike 
levels) amounts to 18,877,000  KZT. This value is reduced by 43.6  per  cent, 
when only technology II is available. The third formulated technology has not been 
taken into account for the model estimations, because preliminary tests demonstrated 
a low potential in stabilizing incomes. Furthermore, the risk programming model 
shows that the share of cotton in the crop rotation fluctuates between 12.7 per cent 
in scenario 2C and 16.9 per cent in all sub-scenarios of 1C. This is explained by 
better income-stabilising features technology II in wheat production compared 
to cotton production. Raising credit was not considered in any of the solutions. 
As already shown for the case farm in Akmola, a combination of different insurance 
products or, as in this case, a combination of different strike levels, might 
contribute to certainty equivalent increase. For the South Kazakhstan study farm, 
this holds especially for cotton production. 
Table A-9 shows coefficients of variation (CV) for all investigates insurance 
products. For the extensive technology III, values are close to and above 1 for 
wheat and between 1.8 and 2.4 for cotton, which expresses a highly volatile gross 
margin. The analysis of variation coefficients points out that the majority of 
products represented among the first best are farm-yield products. CV-fluctuations 
among technologies are large.  
The above mentioned efficiency advantage of technology I becomes evident 
when comparing average variable costs and yields. For wheat production, 
variable costs for technology I are higher by 23 per cent compared to technology II 
and by 47 per cent compared to technology III. Simultaneously, the yield increase 
between technologies I and II amounts to 27  per  cent and between I and III 
61 per cent, respectively. The relative differences and thereby the efficiency gains 
from appropriate technology application are even higher when investigating 
cotton production. For cotton production, variable costs increase by 14 per cent 
when switching from technology II to I and by 35 per cent when doing so from Empirical analysis of risk management instruments 
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technology III to I. Simultaneously, the yield difference between technologies I 
and II amounts to 21 per cent and between I and III 49 per cent, respectively. A 
look on the distribution of variable production costs (figures A-10 through A-12) 
shows the increasing share of labour costs, when production becomes more 
extensive. All kinds of costs are subject to uncertainty: Fertilizer and fuel are 
subsidised currently. If subsidies will be lifted in the course of the WTO accession, 
these costs might rise by up to 40 per cent and will make up a much larger share 
of variable costs than today. Labour costs will rise significantly in the future, if the 
economy will grow as fast as during the last years. The wage gap between 
agricultural wages and those paid in other sectors will have to be narrowed, at 
the latest when more and more qualified workers will leave the sector and 
enterprises will run short of labour. The development of water costs will be 
subject to the changes in water resources in the southern region of Kazakhstan, 
the competition of the agricultural sector with other potential users, and the 
institutional arrangements of water user associations.  
For South Kazakhstan a price insurance, similar to CRC (Crop Revenue Coverage) 
or IP (Income Protection) could be introduced, because cotton prices are highly 
volatile and cotton farmers often take in forward contracts
54, which increase 
price risk. The production structure of southern region’s farms is less similar to 
northern Kazakhstan conditions than to the ones in Mexico, where revenue 
insurance is being promoted by the International Finance Corporation (IFC). 
 
 
                                           
54 When signing a forward contract, a farmer guarantees to supply a certain quantity of his 
output at a specified date. A lower than agreed quantity reduces the price. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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Table 4-34:  Technology (T) and insurance product choices – Study farm South Kazakhstan 
































1  19,169  18,877  1.000  0.015  1C  only RYI I RYI_90  1,393   –   –  RYI_100 340  RYI_80  22  385 
2  19,169  18,806  0.996  0.019  1C only  AYI I NYI_100 772 OYI_100 621  RYI_100 200  RYI_67  162  385 
3 19,169  18,793 0.996  0.02  1C  only  FYI I FYI_75  1,393 –  –  FYI_100  85 FYI_80  277 385 
4 10,818  10,655 0.564 0.015  2C  only  FYI II FYI_100  1,393 FYI_100  91  FYI_80  271        385 
Source:  Own estimations. Technologies I (intensive) and II (medium) reflect different input intensities. The insurance products chosen are explained 
in Table 4-24. Scenarios follow the pattern as outlined in chapter 4.5.2.2. 
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4.5.4 Utility-efficient  programming versus analysis of variance 
reduction by means of SSD and MV approach 
Alternative methods were tested to determine the efficiency of different insurance 
instruments in reducing crop production risk. The investigation of variance 
reductions in wheat production income was carried out by means of mean-variance 
(MV) and second-degree stochastic dominance (SSD) analysis (s. BREUSTEDT, 
2004). This chapter discusses a part of the results generated in the course of the 
common work with BOKUSHEVA and BREUSTEDT (s. BOKUSHEVA et al., 2006). 
The results have a special focus on two of the investigated regions, namely Akmola 
and East Kazakhstan and represent a supplement to the findings generated by 
utility-efficient programming. The results cannot be compared directly, since the 
analysis of variance reduction focuses on wheat production, while the programming 
model comprises a portfolio of production activities and the possibility to depict 
differences between production technologies. However, since wheat is an 
important crop in the production portfolio of both study farms, the variance 
reduction in wheat production has a significant impact on utility as results below 
show. 
Table 4-35 presents variance reductions by different insurance products. It 
depicts the results for the rayons Tselinograd and Glubokoe. Additionally, 
Novoishim, a part of the rayon Tselinograd has been taken into account to test for 
differences in variance reductions for a smaller sample of farms, which are located 
directly in the surrounding of a weather station. The numbers represent the variance 
reductions for strike levels 100. Table A-10 depicts the variance reductions for 
each considered strike level in more detail. Farm yield insurance which achieves 
the highest variance reductions in all three regions. Rayon-yield insurance 
generates substantial reductions in variance for Tselinograd and its sub-region 
Novoishim. However, the variance reductions are significantly larger for the 
smaller sub-region. The same is the case for the weather-index products. The 
fact that all farms of the sub-region lie within a short distance from the weather 
station that recorded the data used for the index calculation, has the effect of 
higher variance reductions by weather-based products compared to the larger 
rayon. It becomes clear that only a dense net of weather stations can guarantee a 
sufficient risk reduction when introducing weather-index insurance. 
A similar result evolves from the comparison of different area-yield products. 
Risk reductions decrease with increasing level of aggregation. This means that 
national-yield insurance performs worse than oblast-yield insurance, and oblast-
yield insurance performs worse than rayon-yield insurance. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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Results of a comparison of variance reductions in wheat production between Akmola 
and East Kazakhstan show the importance of crop insurance for the drier region 
(Akmola), which is more prone to yield fluctuations. The average variance 
reduction of all considered products is about half in East Kazakhstan compared 
to Akmola. 
The differences between values estimated by SSD and MV are relatively small 
for Tselinograd and Novoishim, but significantly larger for Glubokoe. Thus, 
SSD variance reductions of index-based insurance are lower compared to MV 
variance reduction in regions with a low degree of systemic risk. 
Table 4-35:  Average variance reductions of selected insurance products  
 according to different estimation methods 
Product  
(Strike level: 100) 
Method Tselinograd  Novoishim Glubokoe 
NYI SSD  0.218  0.242  0 
NYI MV  0.245  0.247  0.043 
OYI SSD  0.29  0.384  0.234 
OYI MV  0.365  0.384 0.36 
RYI SSD  0.427  0.531 0.27 
RYI MV  0.438  0.531  0.323 
FYI SSD  0.627 0.62  0.717 
FYI MV  0.627 0.62  0.717 
PED SSD  0.305  0.461  0.274 
PED MV  0.332  0.461 0.32 
SEL SSD  0.294  0.485 0.24 
SEL MV  0.306  0.485  0.336 
RFI SSD  0.262  0.461 0.23 
RFI MV  0.291  0.461  0.321 
Source: Own  estimations. 
This causes changes in the efficiency ranking of insurance products as depicted 
in Table 4-36 and Table 4-37. The comparison of the three criteria utility- 
(certainty equivalent), SSD-, and MV-efficiency shows ambiguous results on the 
farm-level, because utility-efficiency can hardly be compared to the other two 
criteria. Only farm-yield insurance with a strike yield of 100  per  cent of the 
expected yield (FYI_100) is unambiguously the most efficient insurance under 
all three criteria for both study farms. For the Akmola farm the same is true for 
the Ped index insurance with a strike level of 67 per cent (Ped_67), the national Empirical analysis of risk management instruments 
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yield future (NYI_fut_100), and the farm yield insurance with a strike yield of 
75 per cent of the expected yield (FYI_75). For other insurance products, the 
position in the efficiency comparison varies between 1 (OYI_75, NYI_100) and 4 
(Ped_80) ranks. 
Table 4-36:  Comparison of UEP and SSD/MV – Study farm in Akmola 
Product and 
strike level  










FYI_100  441,306  1 0.638 1 0.638 1 
Ped_67  439,625  2 0.572 2 0.572 2 
RFI_90  439,007  3 0.550 5 0.550 5 
NYI_fut_100  436,478  4 0.572 4 0.572 4 
FYI_90  436,129  5 0.549 6 0.549 6 
Sel_67  435,031  6 0.333 9 0.333 9 
Ped_80  434,891  7 0.572 3 0.572 3 
FYI_75  434,394  8 0.387 8 0.387 8 
RYI_100  431,812  9 0.532 7 0.532 7 
OYI_75  425,672  10 0.176 11 0.201 11 
NYI_100  425,057  11 0.304 10 0.304 10 
Source: Own  estimations. 
Table 4-37 shows the risk reductions derived by means of SSD and MV analysis 
for different insurance products and compares them to the UEP results for the 
East Kazakhstan study farm.  
Table 4-37:  Comparison of UEP, SSD, and MV – Study farm East  
 Kazakhstan 
Product and 
strike level  










FYI_100 28,850  1  0.734  1  0.734  1 
FYI_67 28,521 2  0  3  0  6 
OYI_75 27,816 3  0  4  0.244  3 
NYI_67 27,519 4  0  5  0.007  5 
RFI_100 27,204  5  0  6  0.180  4 
FYI_90 26,766 6  0.436  2  0.436  2 
Source: Own  estimations. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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4.5.5 Moral  hazard  effects 
"Perfect insurance is a good idea in principle, but if it blunts the feeling of 
responsibility that people have for their own actions, it might make life very 
costly for the insurance company, or at any rate for somebody" (RAY, 1998).  
Moral hazard is a major obstacle to insurability. The following analyses have 
been performed to assess the potential insurance market distortions caused by 
moral hazard. Therefore, moral hazard was captured as a reaction to insurance 
expressed in technology changes. This behavioural adaptation is plausible and 
empirically evident as discussed in chapter 2.3.1. It is assumed that a farmer takes 
in single-year contracts and the insurance company does not introduce strike 
restrictions, deductibles or contracts with an integrated indemnity memory. The 
farmer has the opportunity to react to the insurance situation with a change in 
technology. The effect of moral hazard can be described in the following way: 
Assume that a farmer can demonstrate opportunistic behaviour by switching to a 
less intensive technology than he practiced in the past. Then, the farmer’s 
indemnity gain due to moral hazard I
mh can be defined as follows:  
p


















= ,   
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) ( ) (
ext APH strike y E y E y > = ,   
where  y
strike is the strike yield estimated on the basis of the farmer’s actual 
production history and typically equals to its expected value E(y
APH); yt is the 
farmer’s yield under the less intensive technology in the production year t; 
E(y
ext) is the expected yield under this technology, respectively; and p is the 
price of the insured crop as stated in the insurance contract.
 
Figure 4-10 graphically depicts the results for sunflowers for the case farm in 
East Kazakhstan for the study period 1980-2002. The black curve depicts the net 
indemnities (indemnities-premiums) for farm yield insurance with 100 per cent 
strike and moral hazard, which is expressed in technology change from medium-
intensive to extensive. The grey curve represents regular net indemnities. In some 
of the years, the farmer can achieve gains from asymmetric information. This is 
the case in the years where the net indemnities with moral hazard are higher than 
in the situation without. In an average year, the gains from shirking would 
amount to 1640 KZT per ha. Empirical analysis of risk management instruments 
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Figure 4-10:  Net indemnity payments with and without moral hazard –  
Example switch from medium to extensive technology 
Source: Own  estimations. 
The lower the strike, the lower are the incentives to shirk. With FYI_90, FYI_80, 
FYI_75, and FYI_67 the moral hazard gains are 986, 682, 508, and 287 KZT, 
respectively. These results that are depicted graphically in Figure 4-11 support 
the argument of a limitation of strike in crop insurance schemes. For clarity 
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Figure 4-11:  Net indemnities over time for different farm yield insurance  
    strike levels with moral hazard (Example: Sunflowers in East  






























Source: Own estimations 
The results are similar for the case farm in Akmola (Figure 4-12): The long-term 
average gain of shirking is 1261 KZT per ha for wheat and 1377 KZT per ha for 
barley. A detailed analysis with consideration of states of nature shows an 
expected result: The moral hazard gains are much larger in drier states compared 
to more favourable weather conditions because the medium and the extensive 
technology result in the same yield level in drought years, but average yields, 
which determine the indemnity level are comparatively higher for the medium-
intensive technology. For wheat moral hazard gains are 7518 KZT in state 1, 
4456 KZT in state 2, and 1909 KZT in state 3. For states 4 and 5, losses were 
estimated of 962 and 1983 KZT, respectively. Empirical analysis of risk management instruments 
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Figure 4-12:  Net indemnity payments with and without moral hazard –  

































































Source: Own estimations 
Area-yield crop insurance has advantages in fighting moral hazard, but at a cost 
of providing lower variance reductions, which find their expression in lower 
certainty equivalents. Figure 4-13 compares two different types of insurance – 
farm yield insurance and area-yield insurance based on rayon-yields, both with 
pre-defined strike levels and both with a fair premium, which has the effect of 
an identical expected value. Under full coverage, the income in state 3 under 
favourable weather conditions is nearly equal for both types of insurance, the 
situation in the other two states looks different: Whereas farm-yield insurance 
provides a better income scheme in state 1, the same holds for rayon-yield 
insurance in state 2. The income distribution has an impact on the certainty 
equivalent. The difference in CEs across different insurance types could be 
interpreted as the risk premium a farmer would be willing to pay for purchasing a 
certain product. In our case, the difference in CE per ha between FYI_100 and 
RYI_100 is about 269  KZT. Conservatively interpreted, a farmer would be 
willing to pay 269 KZT more for farm-yield than for area-yield insurance. In 
practice, the positive risk reduction properties of individual farm-yield insurance 
products are outperformed by its relatively high administrative costs and the costs 
of moral hazard actions. Therefore, maximum strike is often limited to a maximum 
of 75 per cent, which at the same time has a drawback in limiting risk reduction. 
The graph gives insight in additional findings. Reductions in strike levels for farm Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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and rayon yield insurance reduce certainty equivalents alike. Farm yield insurance 
with a strike level of 67 per cent outperforms rayon yield insurance with 100 per cent 
strike. This means that the strike yield for rayon yield insurance has to be 
significantly higher than farm yield strike level in order to achieve equivalent 
CEs. 
Figure 4-13:  Performance of rayon and farm yield insurance –  
East Kazakhstan 















Source: Own  estimations. 
  
 
5 Summary of findings and conclusions 
Kazakhstan’s agricultural sector plays an important role in the country's 
economy. Not only does it function as an economic output producer, it also serves 
as a social buffer in times of transition to a market economy. The restructuring 
process had a strong impact on the economic performance of agricultural enterprises. 
As the state no longer functions as a back-up financier in times of economic 
downturn, farmers have to find their own sustainable instruments to manage 
business risks, which are significant in Kazakhstan due to the acute continental 
climate and the resulting revenue fluctuations. This chapter summarizes the 
most important findings generated throughout the research process and 
concludes with their implications for researchers and policy-makers. 
5.1  Synthesizing lessons from the empirical findings 
The results from empirical research are threefold. First, lessons from the farm 
survey results will be analysed. In a second step, the model findings will be 
discussed with regard to the practical implementation of the presented risk 
management instruments. Finally, the implications for current theory and future 
research will be presented. 
5.1.1  Lessons from farm survey results 
The investigation of production conditions, risk attitudes and risk management 
techniques was a central goal of the discussed farm survey. Analysis of the farm 
survey data allows to draw the following conclusions: 
–  A majority of farmers would like to insure their crops in the future. 
– A majority would accept deductibles in insurance contracts, whose 
sustainable rate is about 25 per cent of the insurance sum. 
– Besides  natural  hazards,  among which the predominant role in the perception 
of farmers is played by drought, changes of prices for inputs and outputs are 
the major sources of business risk. 
–  The majority of interviewed farmers vote for insurance products against 
risks caused by natural hazards or income insurance. Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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–  With respect to the constructed risk aversion index, the respondents can be 
classified as slightly risk-averse relative to other farmers. 
–  Risk-aversion and other factors influencing the decision-making process 
result in different risk-management strategies: Besides the application of 
risk-reducing technologies and cropping patterns, financial responses like 
maintaining credit reserves and off-farm employment, production responses, 
and reduction of costs are relevant risk-management instruments. 
Conclusions, however, should be drawn carefully, since the average farmer age 
is relatively high and younger successors with different educational background 
will soon take over the management of the farm enterprises. This gives ground 
for assuming that knowledge dissemination on new technologies will yield 
fruits. 
5.1.2  Lessons from model findings 
As was discovered by LIEN and HARDAKER (2001) the variation of risk aversion 
has no great influence on the choice of risk management alternatives. Only in 
some cases the income distribution between different states of nature changes 
due to a switch between different strike levels. The relative insensitive model 
behaviour after changes in risk aversion coefficients can be partly attributed to 
the fully used hedging potential. Thus, the high number of technology and 
insurance activities increases the probability of the choice of those activities that 
retain their optimality under different risk aversion coefficients.  
What can we conclude when the optimal farm plan is not changing much or at 
all if risk aversion is varied? PATTEN et al. (1988) perceive the relative inelasticity 
of the farm plan to risk aversion as a sign for the discriminative power of risk 
programming when risk aversion is limited to a plausible range. However, one 
might assume that risk aversion changes if a farmer perceives a technology as 
yield-stabilizing. This would affect the choice of insurance products. 
Scenarios with a variation of own capital and credit access show a result that is 
prevalent in the real world: Agricultural areas remain unused or underutilized, 
because farmers are risk-averse and reduce the area cultivated if capital is lacking. 
This increases danger of erosion and desertification of unused and inappropriately 
used land. 
Considering the utility-efficiency of different risk management instruments, we 
can conclude that the separate regional analysis was a reasonable procedure, 
because no general recommendations can be derived from the efficiency results. 
Therefore, conclusions regarding the utility-efficiency of the considered 
insurance instruments will be drawn regionally. Summary of findings and conclusions 
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A large number of insurance products stabilises income efficiently as can be 
derived from the utility rankings. However, weather index insurance seems to be 
more appropriate (as can also be concluded from the variation coefficients) in 
Northern Kazakhstani grain production. This can be explained by the comparatively 
insufficient precipitation this region receives and the predominant role played by 
drought compared to other risks. 
Area-yield insurance might be a reasonable alternative to weather insurance, since 
it provides a number of advantages in fighting moral hazard compared to farm 
yield insurance. Efficiency results as well as the analysis of variation coefficients 
show its applicability for East and South Kazakhstan conditions. However, the 
advantages providing better access to symmetric information should be evaluated 
against the potentially lower risk reduction. When introducing area-yield insurance, 
smaller areas (rayons) as the basis for the calculation of the underlying yield 
index are supposed to provide higher risk reductions than larger areas (oblasts). 
According to the literature research and results derived by the farm survey, the 
testing of different revenue insurance is reasonable and particularly attractive for 
cotton farmers in South Kazakhstan, where price risk plays a predominant role. 
A central conclusion can be derived for all considered study farms simultaneously. 
The choice of the production technology is the decisive factor in risk management 
(see also BOKUSHEVA anD HOCKMANN, 2006). The result can be connected to 
the evaluation of risk management responses of the farm survey. According to 
the interviewed farmers, the maintenance of capital reserves and production with 
low costs are two of the most important objectives in risk management. As 
results from the normative decision model show, these strategies are not ‘first 
best solutions’ for all considered farms. When crop production is insured, more 
intensive production technologies (with higher costs) might be more appropriate 
than low input technologies. 
5.1.3 Implications  for  current  theory and further research 
Different crops show different reactions on a change in natural conditions. This 
made it difficult to formulate states of nature with consistent yield reactions on 
natural conditions and consistent income levels, respectively. The choice of wheat 
yields as an indicator for states of nature has pros and cons. On the one hand, it 
allows a consistent formulation of states of nature over all regions, because 
wheat is an important part of the crop portfolio in most crop production regions. 
On the other hand, the income balancing effects of other crops, such as cotton and 
sunflowers, are not reflected in the states of nature formulation. Furthermore, the 
model allows for a choice of technology according to the utility preferences of Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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the decision-maker, which has a significant impact on the contribution of different 
activities to the whole-farm income. As shown by the model results in chapter 4.5.3, 
a change in technology might increase income in a less favourable state 
disproportionately compared to a more favourable state. This has the same effect 
as the described overcompensation of income by alternative crops. These findings 
provoke the question, how the method of state of nature formulation influences 
the model results. For future research, alternative methods could be applied to test 
if model validity can be further improved. One alternative method could be the 
use of different objective measures that form a state of nature, such as weather 
parameters and variables that reflect the institutional framework of agricultural 
production
55. 
The objective of this contribution was to investigate the effects of different risk 
management strategies on the utility of model decision-makers. Because some 
of the risk management tools are new, decision-makers at this point may have 
difficulties evaluating the decisions modelled here. One might expect that as 
decision-makers become more familiar with the implications of these alternatives, 
they may exhibit greater readiness to utilize new combinations. 
For further research, we can conclude that decision-making conditions and criteria 
vary across geographic regions and by farm type; thus, subsequent risk models 
should be adapted to the unique conditions of the research domain because 
standardized modelling formulations can produce spurious results. Obviously, a 
natural extension of this work is the investigation of other crops and regions. 
Future research should test the long-term economic potential of alternative crops 
under changing natural conditions and prices. Furthermore, different combinations 
of insurance with hedging products can be tested. 
Existing regionally specific recommendations for crop production in Kazakhstan 
are mostly obsolete and a significant part of practical agricultural knowledge 
was lost with outmigration of experts. There is a need for sound research in the 
fields of agronomy and plant breeding in order to develop new technologies. 
On-farm research (WAGNER et al., 2005) combined with precision farming could 
be one relatively cost-effective way to create regionally adapted recommendations 
for crop production.  
Furthermore, by means of panel data analysis, factors influencing diversification 
decisions of farmers could be investigated. 
                                           
55 Examples for these proxy variables are market infrastructure, storage facilities, input and 
output prices. Summary of findings and conclusions 
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5.2  Implications for policy design 
This chapter discusses the most important findings of the analysis of the current 
crop insurance system in Kazakhstan and evaluates additional political instruments 
to support income stabilisation in agriculture.  
5.2.1  Lessons from the analysis of the current crop insurance system 
The current crop insurance system is the result of interaction of a number of 
factors such as farmers’ demand for a sound risk management instrument, the 
government’s wish to support the supply of crop insurance, political negotiations  
of different interest groups, and path-dependence with regard to former soviet 
agricultural insurance programmes. This mix of driving forces affected the 
accuracy of insurance objectives and design and caused several deficiencies of 
the system, such as monitoring and communication problems, insufficient 
provision of information to farmers and regional administration, and institutional 
problems (moral hazard and adverse selection, slow processing and high claim 
rejection rate, and lack of interest of potent insurance companies). 
Mistakes have been made during the implementation of the new crop insurance 
scheme in Kazakhstan. Once a system with failures has been established, it takes 
time and money to improve it. This lesson can be learned from the long history 
of subsidisation in agriculture all over the world and from recent examples of 
crop insurance reforms in transition countries: In particular, at the end of 2005, 
Russia’s Minister of Agriculture Alexei Gordeyev said, his ministry would radically 
reform Russia's subsidized crop insurance system in 2006. Four months later a 
ministry official informed the media that the previous procedures for providing 
subsidies in 2006 will be maintained (INTERFAX FOOD AND AGRICULTURE REPORT, 
2006a, b).  
When having the chance to build up a new system from scratch, particular effort 
should be put in developing a sound ratemaking procedure. In this respect, the 
efforts of the World Bank to establish a dense net of weather stations and to 
promote the introduction of weather-index insurance seem particularly promising. 
As the model results show, only a sufficiently dense net can reduce risk to a 
satisfactory level. 
The hypothesis that crop insurance often supports only large-scale farmers cannot 
be rejected when investigating the data on crop insurance market development. 
One of the reasons for introducing mandatory crop insurance in Kazakhstan was 
to provide all farmers with access to insurance, regardless of their risk exposure 
or the size of their enterprises. However, insurance companies have less incentives 
to insure small, risk-prone farms. The future task of the government will be to Efficiency of selected risk management instruments in Kazakhstani crop production 
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find appropriate enforcement mechanisms to motivate insurance companies to 
provide insurance to small farms or to transform the mandatory system into a 
voluntary one. 
A further government task involves breaking up the path dependence of crop 
insurance. The bad image of the entire insurance industry could be primarily 
overcome by setting right the legal framework, the incentives, and enforcement 
mechanisms. The objective would be to create an insurance system, in which 
insurance companies can generate profits with their clients experiencing justice and 
income stabilisation that provides a sound base for the development of economic 
activities. Therefore, the identification of preconditions for the establishment 
of the institution ‘crop insurance’ by the help of indicators could be a first step 
(s. HAVRYLYSHYN and VAN ROODEN, 2000). 
5.2.2  Evaluation of alternative policy measures 
Alternatives to crop insurance comprise the whole range of risk management 
instruments as discussed above. SCHLIEPER (1997) makes an interesting suggestion 
on the integration of crop insurance in an overall risk management framework. 
Based on thoughts of NOORGARD (1976), he proposes the coupling of extension 
service and insurance and assumes that the providers of insurance and extension 
services are identical. The coupling of both services would minimize asymmetric 
information and allow for a differentiation in premiums. A direct link between 
behaviour reflected in on-farm risk management and insurance tariffs would 
create incentives to apply risk-reducing technologies. 
To strengthen the link between on-farm risk management and risk-sharing 
strategies, the government could promote research in agronomic methods to 
mitigate the effects of difficult growing conditions. Differences in agro-climatic 
environments such as soil type and fertility, moisture availability, distribution of 
weeds, and susceptibility to erosion should be better taken into consideration 
when developing new technology recommendations. Farmers will not adopt 
recommendations from the research system without the expectation that the costs 
of the recommendations will be balanced by their benefits. Therefore, researchers 
have to develop cost-effective technologies, which take into account the still 
strained financial situation of many agricultural enterprises. These recommendations 
possess the highest probability of success within the extension system.  
As empirical findings from other countries, e.g. Iran (BAKHSHOODEH and SHAJARI, 
2006) show, adoption of technology is strongly correlated with level of education 
and age. Extension classes, particularly designed for younger farmers could help 
to foster the speed of technology adoption. Summary of findings and conclusions 
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When deciding about a future strategy for the agricultural sector, the concentration 
of agricultural production in favourable areas using regional comparative 
advantages, such as natural conditions, infrastructure and skilled labour has to be 
taken account. This policy is widely known as the forming of clusters (PORTER, 
1990). 
Additionally, policy-makers might facilitate access to credit through subsidizing 
interest rates. Credit reduces transactions costs and financial constraints on purchasing 
a new technology. Alternatives to the purchasing a new technology is renting 
and leasing. It allows smaller farmers to use, and less confident farmers to test, the 
technology (AKER et al., 2005). From that point of view, it might be reasonable 
for the government of Kazakhstan to continue the state-supported leasing 
programme for agricultural machinery.  
A further project to be considered as worthwhile to be continued is the successive 
development of the grain marketing infrastructure. As described above, the 
Government of Kazakhstan invested considerable effort and financial means in grain 
marketing infrastructure within the country and abroad. Given the competitiveness of 
rainfed grain production in Northern Kazakhstan, this investment is assumed to 
pay off since global demand for grain is increasing. 
A last point to be mentioned is the stability of the state itself. One might ask how 
political uncertainty affects agricultural risk management. Political uncertainty 
might indeed hamper the positive impact of international organisations’ work on 
economic development, in that development projects will not be carried out and/or 
results of these projects will not be implemented. Furthermore, political uncertainty 
has a strong impact on foreign investments and the willingness of the international 
insurance and re-insurance industry to engage in a country. Kazakhstan’s economic 
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Table A-1:  Description of the survey components 










- To define representative 
regions relevant for the study 
- To ascertain most relevant 
natural hazards, their character 
and extension 
- To specify conditions of 
insurability  
- To investigate possibilities to 
avoid principal/agent-problem 
Deputies and members of the 
parliamentary working group 
on agricultural matters, 
representatives of insurance 
companies, scientists, staff of 
regional agricultural 
administrations and statistical 
offices. 
13  Questionnaires with experts’ responses  2003/09/01-
2003/10/01 
Workshop  - To inform political decision-
makers and involved 
institutions about main issues 
regarding introduction of a 
crop insurance system 
- To discuss critical questions 
with respect to the results of 
the experts’ interviews 
- To select the research 
regions 
Staff of regional departments 
of agriculture and statistics, 
staff of insurance and re-
insurance companies, 
members of committee on 
agrarian issues of Majilis 
(Kazakh parliament), 
researchers, representative of 
national farmers’ union, 
farmers, representatives of 
grain trading companies 
30  Voting results to the selected questions, 
discussion results summarised in tables and 
a protocol 
2003/10/02 
Farm survey  - To assess farmer’s demand 
for crop insurance 
- To specify conditions for the 
farmer’s participation in 
insurance 
- To define most relevant 
natural hazards, their character 
and extension 
Farmers and managers of 
agricultural enterprises 
73 (from 15 rayons 
in 6 oblasts) 
Questionnaires with farmers’ responses, 
accounting data on financial performance 
of the enterprises and production data 
focusing on crop production (from 1993 to 
2002/2003 in the best case, but strongly 


















- To evaluate weather impact 
on farm yields and to design 
weather-based insurance 
products 
–  12 weather stations  
in five of the six 
selected oblasts  
- Min/Max and average daily temperature, 
daily precipitation, humidity (time series 
ranging between beginning of the 20th 
century and 2003); additionally information 
on soil moisture (on the 18th of May – 
beginning of growing period) for two 










data and other 
data 
- To estimate the magnitude of 
systemic risk and to design 
regionally adjusted insurance 
products 
- To gain insight into regional 
production conditions and the 
actual performance of the 
regional economies 
–  15 rayons  
(time series from the 
1960ies-2002/2003) 
- Data on yields and crop areas on the farm 
level (former sovkhozes/kolkhozes and 
their largest successors);  
- Time series data on rayon average yields 
for the surveyed oblasts; 
- Additional time series on regional 
agricultural sectors, regional economic 








Table A-2:  Pesticide use 2004 
Crops  Cultivated area (TA), 
kha 
Treated area (TA), 
kha 
% TA of 
CA 
Yield, dt/ha  Crop share
Cereals 13,739 5,622  40.9%  11.9  78.8% 
Cotton 200  200  100.0%  20  1.1% 
Potatoes 164  50  30.5%  130  0.9% 
Fruits 55  30  54.5%  36  0.3% 
Corn 103  19  18.4%  41  0.6% 
Soybeans 28  15  53.6%  14  0.2% 
Rice 84  9  10.7%  40  0.5% 
Sugar Beets  22  5  22.7%  240  0.1% 
Sunflowers 447  0  0.0%  8.7  2.6% 
Total  17,440 5,950  34.1%      100.0% 
Source: BASF. 
Table A-3:  Share of agriculture (in per cent) in gross regional product 
Year 
Area, city 




East-Kazakhstan  10.1 11.4 11.6 20.1 12.0  10.1 
Western region 
Aktubinskaya  8.5 8.8 7.0  12.8  6.3  8.5 
Atyrayskaya  2.1 2.5 1.9 1.3 1.2  2.1 
Mangistauskaya 6.7  7.3  6.8  12.3  6.2  6.7 
West-Kazakhstan  0.8 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.3  0.8 
Northern region 
Akmolinskaya  28.2 36.2 33.7 59.5 32.9  28.2 
Kostanayskaya  22.1 26.0 23.9 42.7 23.2  22.1 
Pavlodarskaya 5.5  7.0  7.0  11.8  6.7  5.5 
North-Kazakhstan  32.2 41.6 38.7 68.9 39.0  32.2 
Central region 
Karagandinskaya  3.9 3.9 4.9 8.2 5.2  3.9 
Southern region 
Almatinskaya  28.9 25.2 27.7 42.5 27.8  28.9 
Djambulskaya  20.7 22.1 23.4 39.5 23.9  20.7 
Kyzilordinsskaya 9.0  9.2  6.3  10.6  6.2  9.0 
South-Kazakhstan  17.1 16.1 17.5 35.4 19.6  17.1 
Astana  0.2 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.2  0.2 
Almaty  0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1  0.3 
Source:  Own table based on OSTRIKOVA (2005). 
Note: Research  regions  are marked in italics. Appendix 
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Table A-4:  Characterisation of considered wheat production technologies in 
Akmolinskaya Oblast 
Characteristics  Technology I  Technology II  Technology III 
Total variable costs (KZT/ha)*  15,623  10,083  7,114 
N input (kg/ha)  200  –  – 
P input (kg/ha)  150  100  – 
Costs of plant protection (KZT/ha)  1,440  480  – 
Labour  input  (man-hours/ha)  4.95 4.37 3.50 
Fuel input (kg/ha)  119  107  88 
Snow collection 






Expected. wheat yield (t/ha), 
(strong drought, p**=.04)  
0.63 0.4 0.4 
Expected wheat yield (t/ha), 
(average drought, p=.3)  
1.08 0.6 0.5 
Expected wheat yield (t/ha), 
(weak drought, p=.09)  
1.19 0.9 0.7 
Expected wheat yield (t/ha), 
(favourable weather conditions, p=.52)  
1.45 1.01 0.85 
Expected wheat yield (t/ha), 
(very fav. weather conditions, p=.04)  
2.1 1.35 1.15 
Notes: 
* Future variable costs might increase in Kazakhstan: Leading politicians plan to pay  
   less subsidies for inputs, instead increase credit volume and reduce taxes for investments  
   in processing and high-value added products (AGRA-EUROPE, 2005);  
** p=probability. Appendix 
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Table A-5:  Description of production technologies for wheat and sunflowers 
in East Kazakhstan 
Crop Wheat  Sunflowers 































Operation  KZT kg/ha KZT kg/ha KZT kg/ha KZT kg/ha KZT kg/ha KZT kg/ha
Skim  ploughing  1,000 20 1,000 20 1,000 20 1,000 20 1,000 20 1,000 20
Ploughing  2,000 25 2,000 25 2,000 25 2,000 25 2,000 25 2,000 25
Harrowing  500 15 500 15 500 15 500 15 500 15 500 15
Seedbed  prep.  1,000 20 0 0 0 0 1,000 20 0 0 0 0
Levelling  800 20 0 0 0 0 800 20 0 0 0 0
Seedbed  prep.  1,000 20 1,000 20 0 0 1,000 20 1,000 20 0 0
Harrowing  500 15 500 15 500 15 500 15 500 15 500 15
Seedbed prep.  0 0 0  0 0 0 1,000 20 1,000  20 0 0
Sowing  1,000 20 1,000 20 1,000 20 1,000 20 1,000 20 1,000 20
Fertilising  1,000 15 500 15 0 0 1,000 15 500 15 0 0
Application of 
herbicides  1,000 15 500 15 0 0 1,000 15 500 15 0 0
Harvest  1,500 20 1,500 20 1,500 20 1,500 20 1,500 20 1,500 20
Total     205   165   115   225   185   115
Total costs  11300 6150 8500 4950 6500 3450 12300 6750 9500 5550 6500 3450
Note:  Variable costs include machinery costs (25%), salary for the agronomist (25%), and 
salary for the tractor driver (50%) 
Figure A-1:   Cotton and wheat yield effects in different states of nature in  







































































































































Figure A-2:   Cotton and wheat yield effects in different states of nature in  













Source: Own  figure. 
Figure A-3:   Cotton and wheat yield effects in different states of nature in 











































































































































































































































































Source: STATISTICAL YEARBOOK KAZAKHSTAN, various years. 
Figure A-5:   Income by states of nature, expected monetary value (EMV)  
  and certainty equivalent (CE) for different scenarios – Study  
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Table A-6:  Catalogue of drought years in the former Soviet Union  
(1950-1975) 
























4 0.667  1950  X X X X     
5  0.833  1951    X X X X  X 
2  0.333  1952  X      X   
3  0.500  1953  X      X  X 
2 0.333  1954  X  X       
4  0.667  1955  X  X  X  X 
1  0.167  1956  X        
4  0.667  1957  X  X  X   X 
1 0.167  1958       X   
5  0.833  1959  X  X  X  X  X 
0 0.000  1960         
1 0.167  1961  X        
1 0.167  1962       X   
6  1.000  1963 X X X X X  X 
1  0.167  1964  X        
2 0.333  1965       X  X 
0 0.000  1966         
5  0.833  1967    X X X X  X 
6  1.000  1968 X X X X X  X 
0 0.000  1969         
0 0.000  1970         
1 0.167  1971        X 
3  0.500  1972 X X X       
2 0.333  1973       X  X 
2 0.333  1974       X  X 
6  1.000  1975 X X X X X  X 
  
 Number  of 
drought 




years  0.42 0.46 0.31 0.35 0.54 0.50
Source:  Own formation; data based on RAUNER (1977). Appendix 
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Figure A-6:   Income by states of nature, expected monetary value (EMV)  
  and certainty equivalent (CE) for different scenarios –  











Source: Own  figure. 
Figure A-7:   Income by states of nature, expected monetary value and  
  certainty equivalent for different insurance products –  













Source: Own figure. 














































Figure A-8:   Income by normalised states of nature for different insurance  
  products (WII=Selyaninov index insurance, AYI=Rayon yield  












Source: Own figure. 
Figure A-9:   Income by states of nature, expected monetary value (EMV)  
  and certainty equivalent (CE) for different scenarios –  










Source: Own  figure. 










































Table A-7:  Ranking of investigated insurance products (IP) according  
to gross margin coefficients of variation (CV) – Akmola 
Wheat TI Wheat TII Wheat  TIII Barley TI Barley  TII  Barley  TIII 
IP CV IP CV IP CV  IP CV IP CV IP CV 
NYF_100 0.296  FYI_100  0.320  FYI_100  0.302  FYI_100  0.422  FYI_100  0.357  FYI_100  0.340 
FYI_100  0.312  NYF_100  0.327  NYF_100 0.308  RF_100  0.422  RF_100  0.357  RFI_100  0.340 
FYI_90  0.323  FYI_90  0.338  FYI_90  0.317  FYI_90  0.447  FYI_90  0.392  FYI_90  0.373 
RYI_100  0.324  Sel_100  0.338  Sel_100  0.320  RF_90  0.447  RF_90  0.392  RFI_90  0.373 
Sel_100  0.326  Sel_90  0.339  Sel_90  0.321  NYF_100  0.459  FYI_80  0.429  FYI_80  0.408 
Sel_90  0.326  Sel_67 0.339  Sel_67 0.321  FYI_80 0.473  RF_80  0.429  RF_80  0.408 
Ped_100 0.327  Sel_80  0.340  Ped_100  0.322  RF_80  0.473 NYF_100 0.440 NYF_100 0.419 
Ped_90 0.327 Sel_75  0.340 Ped_90  0.322 Ped_80  0.478  Ped_80  0.441  Ped_75  0.419 
Sel_80  0.327  Ped_100 0.341  Sel_80  0.323  Ped_75  0.478 Ped_75  0.441 Ped_80  0.419 
Sel_75  0.327  Ped_90  0.341  Sel_75  0.323  Ped_100  0.481 Ped_100  0.443 Ped_100  0.421 
Sel_67  0.328  Ped_80  0.342  Ped_80  0.324  Ped_90  0.483  Ped_90  0.444  Ped_90  0.422 
Ped_80  0.328  Ped_75  0.342  Ped_75  0.324  Ped_67  0.485  Sel_90  0.445  Sel_90  0.424 
Ped_75  0.328  Ped_67  0.342  Ped_67  0.324  FYI_75  0.485  Sel_100  0.445  Sel_100  0.424 
Ped_67  0.328  RFI_90  0.346  RFI_90  0.328  RFI_75  0.485  FYI_75  0.447  FYI_75  0.425 
RF_90  0.329  RF_100  0.346  RF_100  0.328  Sel_100  0.493  RF_75  0.447  RFI_75  0.425 
RF_100 0.329  RF_80  0.347  RF_80  0.330  Sel_90  0.493 Ped_67  0.452 Ped_67  0.431 
RYI_90 0.330  RF_75  0.347  RF_75  0.330  Sel_67  0.494 Sel_80  0.453 Sel_75  0.431 
RF_80  0.330  RYI_100 0.352  FYI_80  0.334  Sel_80  0.500 Sel_75  0.453 Sel_80  0.431 
RF_75  0.330  FYI_80  0.357  RYI_100 0.337  Sel_75  0.500 Sel_67  0.455 Sel_67  0.433 
FYI_80  0.333  RYI_90  0.358  RYI_90  0.339  FYI_67  0.502 RYI_100  0.463 RYI_100 0.441 
RF_67  0.337  RF_67  0.361  FYI_75  0.343  RF_67  0.502  FYI_67  0.471  FYI_67  0.448 
FYI_75  0.338  FYI_75  0.368  RF_67  0.347  RYI_100  0.505  RF_67  0.471  RFI_67  0.448 
RYI_80  0.338  RYI_80  0.369  RYI_80  0.348  OYI_100  0.506  OYI_100  0.474  OYI_100  0.451 
RYI_75  0.343  RYI_75  0.376  RYI_75  0.354  NYI_100  0.512  RYI_90  0.475  RYI_90  0.452 
FYI_67  0.346  FYI_67  0.383  FYI_67  0.358  RYI_90  0.512  NYI_100  0.485  NYI_100  0.462 
RYI_67 0.349  RYI_67  0.388  RYI_67  0.364  OYI_90  0.514 OYI_90  0.486 OYI_90  0.462 
NYI_100 0.365  NYI_100 0.417  NYI_100 0.395  RYI_80  0.520 RYI_80  0.486 RYI_80  0.463 
OYI_100 0.370  NYI_90 0.446 NYI_90 0.424 NYI_90  0.520 RYI_75  0.491 RYI_75  0.467 
OYI_90 0.378 OYI_100  0.448  OYI_90  0.428  OYI_80  0.522 NYI_90 0.497  NYI_90 0.473 
NYI_90 0.384  OYI_90  0.451  OYI_100 0.430  RYI_75  0.522 RYI_67  0.498 RYI_67  0.474 
OYI_80  0.388  OYI_80  0.459  OYI_80  0.435  –  0.525  OYI_80  0.498  OYI_80  0.474 
NYI_80  0.394  NYI_80  0.461  NYI_80  0.437  OYI_75  0.526  OYI_75  0.504  OYI_75  0.480 
–  0.395  NYI_75  0.470  NYI_75  0.445  RYI_67  0.526  –  0.510  NYI_80  0.486 
OYI_75  0.396  OYI_75  0.470  OYI_75  0.446  NYI_80  0.529  NYI_80  0.510  OYI_67  0.487 
NYI_75  0.399  –  0.471  –  0.448  OYI_67  0.531  OYI_67  0.511  –  0.487 
NYI_67 0.403 NYI_67 0.479 NYI_67 0.455 NYI_75 0.532  NYI_75 0.515  NYI_75 0.490 
               NYI_67 0.535  NYI_67 0.519  NYI_67 0.494 
Source: Own  calculations. Appendix 
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Table A-8:  Ranking of investigated insurance products (IP) according  
to coefficients of variation (CV) – East Kazakhstan 
Wheat TI Wheat TII Wheat  TIII Sunflow. TI  Sunflow. TII  Sunflow. TIII
IP CV IP CV IP CV IP CV IP CV IP CV 
FYI_100  0.250  FYI_100  0.275  FYI_100  0.167 NYI_90  0.413 RYI_100 0.416  NYI_90  0.264
FYI_90  0.385  FYI_90  0.389  FYI_90  0.169 RYI_90  0.415 NYI_100 0.421  –  0.268
FYI_80  0.462  FYI_80  0.445  FYI_80  0.201 NYI_100 0.416 FYI_100  0.434  NYI_80  0.268
FYI_75  0.484  FYI_75  0.460  FYI_75  0.213 –  0.417 NYI_90  0.436  RYI_80  0.269
FYI_67  0.508  OYI_100 0.472  FYI_67  0.228 NYI_80  0.417 RYI_90  0.438  RYI_90  0.272
OYI_100 0.519 Ped_100  0.475 Sel_90  0.266 RYI_80  0.419 FYI_90  0.442 NYI_100 0.278
Ped_100 0.522 FYI_67  0.476 Ped_100 0.267 FYI_67 0.431 FYI_67 0.443  FYI_67 0.298
Sel_100 0.524  Sel_100 0.476  Sel_100 0.267 RYI_100 0.439 NYF_100 0.444 FYI_75  0.316
RF_100 0.526  RF_100 0.478  Ped_90 0.268 FYI_75 0.440 FYI_75 0.445  RYI_100  0.318
RF_90  0.526  RF_90  0.479  RF_90  0.268 FYI_80 0.449 FYI_80 0.447  FYI_80 0.329
OYI_90  0.537  OYI_90  0.487  OYI_100 0.270 FYI_90  0.459 NYI_80  0.455  FYI_90  0.354
Ped_90  0.540  Ped_90  0.493  OYI_80  0.270 NYF_100 0.463 RYI_80  0.455  NYF_100 0.360
RYI_100 0.540  Sel_90  0.493  OYI_75  0.271 FYI_100  0.465 –  0.456  FYI_100  0.381
Sel_90  0.540  RYI_100  0.494  OYI_90  0.271            
OYI_80  0.546  OYI_80  0.496  OYI_67  0.272            
OYI_75 0.551  OYI_75 0.501  –  0.272         
OYI_67  0.558  OYI_67  0.508  RF_100  0.273         
NYI_67 0.565  NYI_67 0.515  NYI_67  0.273         
RYI_90 0.566  –  0.516  RYI_80  0.276         
– 0.566  RYI_80  0.516  NYI_75  0.283         
RYI_80  0.567  RYI_90  0.516  NYI_80  0.293            
NYI_75  0.571  NYI_75  0.522  RYI_90  0.296            
NYI_80  0.577  NYI_80  0.528  NYI_90  0.312            
NYI_90  0.587  NYI_90  0.540  RYI_100 0.315            
NYI_100 0.603  NYI_100 0.554  NYI_100 0.333            
NYF_100 0.712  NYF_100 0.644  NYF_100 0.426                  
Source: Own calculations. Appendix 
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Table A-9:  Ranking of investigated insurance products (IP) according  
to coefficients of variation (CV) – South Kazakhstan 
Wheat TI Wheat TII  Wheat  TIII Cotton TI Cotton TII  Cotton  TIII
IP CV IP CV IP CV IP CV IP CV IP CV 
FYI_100  0.419  FYI_100  0.493  FYI_100 1.891  FYI_100 0.389  FYI_90  0.621  FYI_80  1.784 
FYI_90  0.484  FYI_90  0.591  FYI_90  2.257  FYI_90  0.435  FYI_100 0.657  FYI_90  1.793 
OYI_100 0.543  OYI_100 0.685  FYI_80  2.672  RYI_100 0.544  FYI_80  0.783  FYI_75  1.900 
FYI_80  0.550  FYI_80  0.685  RYI_100 2.854  FYI_80  0.583  RYI_100 0.792  FYI_67  2.154 
RYI_100 0.553  RYI_100 0.691  FYI_75  2.871  FYI_75  0.650  FYI_75  0.868  NYI_90  2.243 
OYI_90 0.554  OYI_90 0.695  OYI_90 2.901  NYI_100 0.660  NYI_100 0.904  NYI_100 2.253 
OYI_80 0.569  OYI_80 0.715  OYI_80 2.908  RYI_90 0.676  RYI_90 0.943  RYI_67 2.267 
RYI_90  0.578 FYI_75  0.726 OYI_75  2.943 FYI_67 0.740  FYI_67 0.991  RYI_100 2.329 
FYI_75  0.578 RYI_90  0.727 OYI_100 2.959 RYI_75  0.751 NYI_90 1.013 RYI_75 2.338 
OYI_75  0.579 OYI_75  0.727 RYI_90  2.992 RYI_80 0.753  RYI_75 1.020  RYI_90 2.384 
OYI_67  0.593  OYI_67  0.746  OYI_67  3.004  NYI_90  0.755  RYI_67  1.024  –  2.395 
RYI_80  0.607  RYI_80  0.767  FYI_67  3.083  RYI_67  0.761  RYI_80  1.032  FYI_100 2.422 
FYI_67  0.610  FYI_67  0.770  RYI_80  3.167  –  0.805  –  1.084  RYI_80  2.440 
RYI_75  0.617  RYI_75  0.780  RYI_75  3.216             
NYI_100 0.625  NYI_100 0.791  NYI_67  3.275             
NYI_90 0.631  NYI_90 0.798  NYI_75  3.276          
RYI_67 0.632  RYI_67 0.801  NYI_80  3.285          
NYI_80 0.635  NYI_80 0.804  NYI_90  3.294          
NYI_75 0.637  NYI_75  0.806  RYI_67  3.303          
NYI_67 0.638  NYI_67 0.808  NYI_100 3.308          
–  0.643  –  0.815  –  3.314                   
Source: Own  calculations. Appendix 
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Table A-10:   Variance reductions of selected risk management instruments  
     by means of second-degree stochastic dominance (SSD) and  
     mean-variance analysis (MV) 








FarmYI100SSD 0.627  FarmYI100SSD 0.62  FarmYI100SSD  0.717 
FarmYI100MV 0.627  FarmYI100MV  0.62  FarmYI100MV 0.717 
FarmYI90SSD 0.518  RYI_100SSD 0.531  FarmYI90SSD  0.452 
FarmYI90MV 0.518  RYI_100MV  0.531  FarmYI90MV 0.452 
RYI_100MV 0.438  FarmYI90SSD 0.509  OYI_100MV  0.36 
RYI_100SSD 0.427  FarmYI90MV  0.509  Sel_100farmMV  0.336 
N_Futures100SSD 0.408  N_Futures100SSD  0.507  RYI_100MV  0.323 
N_Futures100MV 0.408  N_Futures100MV  0.507  RF_100farmMV  0.321 
FarmYI80SSD 0.393  Sel_100farmSSD 0.485  Ped_100farmMV 0.32 
FarmYI80MV 0.393  Sel_100farmMV  0.485  OYI_90MV  0.308 
RYI_90MV 0.374  Sel_90farmSSD  0.476  Sel_90farmMV  0.284 
OYI_100MV 0.365  Sel_90farmMV  0.476  Ped_100farmSSD  0.274 
RYI_90SSD 0.359  RYI_90SSD  0.474  RYI_100SSD 0.27 
RYI_80MV 0.335  RYI_90MV  0.474  RF_90farmMV  0.265 
OYI_90MV 0.334  Ped_100farmSSD  0.461  OYI_75MV 0.255 
Ped_100farmMV 0.332  Ped_100farmMV  0.461  OYI_80MV  0.254 
Ped_90farmMV 0.329  RF_100farmSSD 0.461  Sel_100farmSSD 0.24 
FarmYI75SSD 0.327  RF_100farmMV 0.461  Ped_90farmMV  0.235 
FarmYI75MV 0.327  RF_90farmSSD 0.452  OYI_100SSD  0.234 
RYI_67MV 0.321  RYI_80SSD  0.44 FarmYI80SSD  0.233 
RYI_75MV 0.321  RYI_80MV  0.44  FarmYI80MV  0.233 
Sel_100farmMV 0.306  RYI_75SSD  0.427  OYI_67MV  0.231 
Ped_100farmSSD 0.305  RYI_75MV 0.427  RF_100farmSSD  0.23 
Ped_90farmSSD 0.305  Sel_80farmMV  0.427  Sel_90farmSSD  0.23 
RF_90farmMV 0.298  Ped_90farmSSD 0.425  RYI_90MV  0.213 
Sel_100farmSSD 0.294  Ped_90farmMV  0.425  OYI_90SSD  0.2 
RF_100farmMV 0.291  RYI_67SSD  0.416  RF_90farmSSD  0.192 
OYI_100SSD 0.29  RYI_67MV  0.416  Ped_90farmSSD  0.172 
Sel_90farmMV 0.282  RF_80farmMV  0.394  FarmYI75SSD  0.162 
Ped_80farmMV 0.281  RF_90farmMV  0.394  FarmYI75MV  0.162 
OYI_90SSD 0.279  Ped_80farmSSD  0.392  OYI_80SSD 0.154 
RYI_80SSD 0.277  Ped_80farmMV  0.392  OYI_75SSD 0.153 
RYI_67SSD 0.276  OYI_90SSD  0.391  RYI_90SSD 0.139 
Ped_80farmSSD 0.272  OYI_90MV  0.391  OYI_67SSD  0.129 
RYI_75SSD 0.27  OYI_100SSD  0.384  RF_80farmMV  0.128 
RF_100farmSSD 0.262  OYI_100MV  0.384  Ped_80farmMV  0.124 
Ped_75farmMV 0.248  FarmYI80SSD  0.38  Sel_80farmMV  0.124 
Sel_90farmSSD 0.247  FarmYI80MV 0.38  FarmYI67SSD  0.09 Appendix 
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NYI_100MV 0.245  Sel_80farmSSD  0.374  FarmYI67MV 0.09 
Sel_80farmMV 0.236  Sel_75farmMV  0.365  Sel_80farmSSD  0.09 
RF_90farmSSD 0.233  Ped_75farmSSD  0.362  RF_80farmSSD 0.088 
OYI_80MV 0.229  Ped_75farmMV  0.362  Ped_80farmSSD  0.087 
FarmYI67SSD 0.224  RF_80farmSSD 0.346  RYI_80MV  0.064 
FarmYI67MV 0.22  RF_75farmMV 0.335  NYI_100MV  0.043 
NYI_100SSD 0.218  Sel_75farmSSD  0.323  N_Futures100MV  0.034 
Sel_75farmMV 0.217  FarmYI75SSD  0.322  NYI_90MV  0.03 
RF_80farmMV 0.206  FarmYI75MV  0.322  NYI_67MV  0.029 
Sel_80farmSSD 0.205  OYI_80MV  0.298  Ped_75farmMV 0.027 
Ped_75farmSSD 0.195  RF_75farmSSD  0.293  NYI_75MV  0.025 
NYI_90MV 0.173  Ped_67farmMV  0.267  NYI_80MV 0.025 
OYI_80SSD 0.168  Ped_67farmSSD  0.252  RYI_80SSD  0.024 
Sel_75farmSSD 0.166  NYI_100MV  0.247  RF_75farmMV  0.024 
RF_75farmMV 0.163  NYI_100SSD  0.242  Sel_75farmSSD 0.024 
OYI_75MV 0.16  FarmYI67SSD  0.241  Ped_67farmMV  0.017 
NYI_80MV 0.155  FarmYI67MV  0.241  RF_67farmMV  0.017 
RF_80farmSSD 0.14  OYI_80SSD  0.239  NYI_67SSD  0.014 
OYI_67MV 0.136  Sel_67farmMV  0.239  NYI_75SSD 0.013 
Sel_67farmMV 0.127  RF_67farmMV  0.221  NYI_80SSD  0.013 
NYI_90SSD 0.122  OYI_75MV  0.206  NYI_90SSD 0.012 
RF_67farmMV 0.122  NYI_90MV  0.169  RYI_75MV  0.007 
NYI_75MV 0.117  Sel_67farmSSD  0.141  N_Futures100SSD  0 
NYI_80SSD 0.106  OYI_67MV  0.139  NYI_100SSD  0 
OYI_75SSD 0.097  OYI_75SSD  0.137  RYI_67SSD  0 
NYI_75SSD 0.094  NYI_80MV  0.123  RYI_67MV  0 
Ped_67farmMV 0.092  RF_67farmSSD  0.123  RYI_75SSD  0 
OYI_67SSD 0.091  NYI_90SSD  0.116  Ped_67farmSSD  0 
RF_75farmSSD 0.077  OYI_67SSD  0.105  Ped_75farmSSD  0 
NYI_67MV 0.06  NYI_80SSD 0.097  RF_67farmSSD  0 
Sel_67farmSSD 0.053  NYI_75MV  0.081  RF_75farmSSD  0 
Ped_67farmSSD 0.05  NYI_75SSD  0.047  Sel_67farmSSD  0 
NYI_67SSD 0.026  NYI_67MV  0.026  Sel_67farmMV 0 
RF_67farmSSD 0.02  NYI_67SSD  0  Sel_75farmMV  0 
Source:  Own estimations based on BOKUSHEVA et al., 2006. 




















































Figure A-10:   Distribution of variable production costs – Cotton production,  









Source: Own  figure. 
Figure A-11:   Distribution of variable production costs – Cotton production,  










Source: Own  figure. 
Figure A-12:  Distribution of variable production costs – Cotton production,  








Source: Own  figure.Appendix 
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Table A-11:  Technology (T) and insurance product choices – Study farm Akmola including livestock production 












Premium Scenario Subscenario T Wheat  Barley   
Fallow 
(ha)         








(ha)     T
Dairy 
cows T Cattle T Horses 
1 509,396  1.000 537,790 0.055  1C  only  FYI_100  I  FYI_100  17,636 FYI_100  8,818 8,818  III 246  I 1,000  II 400 
2 507,833  0.997 537,790 0.059  1C  only  WII    I  Sel_75  17,636 RF_100  8,818 8,818  III 246  I 1,000  II 400 
3 507,180  0.996 537,790 0.060  1C  only  RF  I  RF_100 17,636 RF_100  8,818 8,818  III 246  I 1,000  II 400 
4 506,998  0.995 537,790 0.061  1C  only  FYI  I  FYI_75  17,636 FYI_100  8,818 8,818  III 246  I 1,000  II 400 
5 504,323  0.990 537,790 0.066  1C  only  NYI_futures I  NYF  17,636 NYF  8,818 8,818  III 246  I 1,000  II 400 
6 502,822  0.987 537,790 0.070  1C  only  Sel  I  Sel_100 17,636 Sel_100  8,818 8,818  III 246  I 1,000  II 400 
7 502,816  0.987 537,790 0.069  1C  only  Ped  I  Ped_67  17,636 Ped_100  8,818 8,818  III 246  I 1,000  II 400 
8 502,411  0.986 537,790 0.070  1C  FYI_75  +  lower  I  FYI_75  17,636 FYI_75  8,818 8,818  III 246  I 1,000  II 400 
9 499,756  0.981 537,790 0.076  1C  only  AYI  I  NYF  17,636 NYI_67  8,818 8,818  III 246  I 1,000  II 400 
10 490,909  0.964 537,790 0.096  1C  only  NYI  I  NYI_100  17,636 NYI_67  8,818 8,818  III 246  I 1,000  II 400 
11 484,079  0.950 537,790    R reference  I  –  17,636 –  8,818 8,818  III 246  I 1,000  II 400 
12 399,957  0.785 412,585 0.032  2C  only  FYI_100  II FYI_100  17,636 FYI_100  8,818 8,818  III 246  I 1,000  II 400 
13 392,644  0.771 402,767 0.026  3C  only  FYI_100  III FYI_100  17,636 FYI_100  8,818 8,818  III 246  I 1,000  II 400 
Note: 





Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern 
Europe,Halle/Germany and 
Agricultural University, Astana/Kazakhstan 
 
CROP INSURANCE IN KAZAKHSTAN: 
Options for Building a Sound Institution  





Farm name:__________________ Number of questionnaire_______  
Farm specialization: ___________ Enumerated by_______________  
Type of enterprise: ____________ Date_______________________  
LTD: 32(43.8%), 
Individual Farm: 26(35.6%),  
Producer Cooperative: 14(19.2%),  




Year of Foundation: Min: 1988, Max: 2003, Mean: 1998 
 









  Min: 3  Min: 12   
  Max: 77540  Max: 66   
  Mean: 9248  Mean: 39   
 
Confidentiality 
This interview is anonymous. Farm data will not be given out to anybody. In the report only 
numbers of the farms will be mentioned! Appendix 
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1. Personal  Data 
 
1.1   Name of the interview 
 partner:________________________________________ 
1.2   Age:  Min: 33, Max: 70, Mean: 51, St. Dev.: 9.17 
1.3   Telephone number: _____________________ 
1.4   Is the farm headed by a manager or is it a family farm? 
1.  ο headed by manager (or group of managers)  29 (40.3%) 
2.  ο family farm  24 (33.3%) 
3.  ο other shareholder (Please, indicate)  19 (26.4%) 
1.5 
What is the 





















Yes (1)  
39 (53.4%) 
No (0)  
34 (46.6%) 
1.8 
How many weeks of 








St. Dev.: 19.5 
1.9 
What was the subject of 
the last course you took? 
Code 
        
 
Codebox for question 1.5            Codebox for question 1.9 
No studies and cannot read or write  0  1(1.4%)   Languages 1  - 
No studies but can read or write  1  0(0.0%)  Computers 2  - 
Elementary school  2  1(1.4%)  Secretarial 3  - 
Vocational school  3  1(1.4%)  Food processing  4  2(2.7%) 
Secondary school, gymnasium  4  9(12.3%)  Accounting 5  - 
Vocational college  5  8(11.0%)  Management   6  10(13.7%)
M.Sc. studies (university)  6  51(69.9%) Other professional: _________  7  11(15.1%)
Ph.D. studies (university)  7  -  Other: ____________________  8  8(11.0%) 
Other occupation-specific higher education  8  2(2.7%)  none   34(46.6%)
 
Codebox for question 1.6 
None/only practical experience                  0  22(30.0%)
Only short courses                       1  1(1.4%) 
Agricultural vocational school  2  2(2.7%) 
Agricultural secondary school  3  6(8.2%) 
Agricultural university    4  42(57.5%)
Post-) Graduate studies  5  - Appendix 
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2.  General attitude towards crop insurance 
 
2.1  Have you ever been insured?   
ο 1. Yes 23(31.5%) ο 2. No 50(68.5%) 
 
2.4  Would you like to insure your crop in next future? 
ο 1. Yes 47(64.4%) ο 2. No 26(35.6%) 
[oh1] 
2.4.1  If No, why? 
ο  1. Insufficient liquidity (lack of funds)     1(4.3%) 
ο  2. You do not believe: Insurance can pay off its costs    8(34.8%) 
ο  3. You had bad experiences with insurance    3(13.0%) 
ο  4. other reasons ________________(please indicate)    5(21.7%) 
ο  99*   6(26.1%) 
 
2.5  What should be introduced to insurance contracts you can take one in?  
ο  1. timing of the contract fulfilment  33(45.2%) 
ο  2. sensitivity to changes in weather conditions  45(61.6%) 
ο  3. differentiation in regional design of contracts  18(24.7%) 
ο  4. a possibility to select a coverage which is reasonable for you  21(28.8%) 
ο  5. the premium sum should not exceed 19.2% (μ) of prod. cost  19(26.0%) 
ο  6. other (please indicate): e.g. insurance contracts should be based  
on productivity indexes      4(5.5%) 
 
2.6  Would you accept an insurance contract with deductibles? 
ο 1. Yes 49(66.2%) ο 2. No 25(33.8%) 
 
2.6.1  If Yes, how much deductibles can you sustain in average?  
ο  1. 40%    1(2.1%) 
ο  2. 35%    – 
ο  3. 30%    15(31.3%) 
ο  4. 25%    4 (8.3%) 
ο  5. 20%    18(37.5%) 
ο  6. 15%     1(2.1%) 
ο  7. 10%    3(6.3%) 
ο  8. other __ (please indicate)  6(12.5%) 
ο  99   1(2.1%) 
 




2.7  Which crops have to be insured in your rayon? Which kinds of risks are to 
be insured for a particular crop? *(% of total) 










1. Wheat  42(57.7%)*      3     6     23 
2. Barley  17(23.3%)          9     8 
3. Maize  1(1.4%)         1     
4. Rice             
5. Cotton  16(21.9%)     1     6     9 
6. Sugar beet             
7. Sunflower seeds  
    5(6.8%) 
       4     1 
8. Potatoes             
9. Melons             
10. Grapes 4(5.5%)         4     
11. Fruits & berries             
12. Green maize             
13. Annual ley             
14. Perennial ley 1(1.4%)         1     
15. Other ________             
 
2.8  Which prices would you prefer as reference prices in insurance contracts? 
Compare prices before evaluating this question) 










1. Prices at the commodity-
exchange  
ο 12(16.4%)  ο 14(19.2%) 
2. Prices of forward contracts   ο 4(5.5%)  ο 7(9.6%) 
3. Prices of Food Contract 
Corporation  
ο 3(4.1%)  ο 21(28.2%) 
 
4. other ___________ 
(please indicate) 
ο –  ο – 




2.10  What kind of crop insurance would you prefer? 
ο  1. all-risk insurance (rather expensive)    10(13.7%) 
ο  2. multi-peril insurance (moderate premium costs)   46(63.0%) 
ο  3. against only a particular risk (low premium costs)  9(12.3%) 
ο  99   8(11.0%) 
 
2.11  Would you be willing to sign an insurance contract spanning 3-5 years? 
ο 1. Yes 39(53.4%) ο 2. No 34 (46.6%) 
 
2.12  Please, explain ____________________________________ 
 
2.13  Do you believe that crop insurance in Kazakhstan must be compulsory? 




2.15  How do you define catastrophe for your enterprise (crop loss in percentage 
of harvest) (What percentage of crop loss is catastrophic for your enterprise?) 
             26.5% 
 
3 Weather  conditions/natural  hazards 
 
3.1  What are the most important natural hazards for your business?   
ο  1. Drought    50(68.5%) 
ο  2. Spring Frost (after plant emergence)  15(20.5%) 
ο  3. Early Frost (inducing harvest failure)  10(13.7%) 
ο  4. Wind (sukhovei)     6(8.2%) 
ο  5. Storm         3(4.1%) 
ο  6. Varmints invasion  28(38.4%) 
ο  7. Hail        32(43.8%) 
ο  8. Flood    – 
ο  9. Winter killing         5(6.8%) 
ο  10. additionally_______(please indicate)  8(11.0%) 




3.2 Please indicate for each of hazards you crossed in 3.1 (table is analysed for the four 
most important perils according to question 3.1) 
Natural hazard  Drought  Hail  Varmints  Spring frost 
3.2.1 Does it have an 
extensive character? 
(occurs at several 
sites at the same 
time) 
ο 1. Yes 48(96.0%) 
ο 2. No 1(2.0%) 
ο 99 1(2.0%) 
ο 1. Yes 15(46.9%) 
ο 2. No 15(46.9%) 
ο 99 2(6.3%) 
ο 1. Yes 15(53.6%) 
ο 2. No 8(28.6%) 
ο 99 5(17.9%) 
ο 1. Yes 3(20.0%)  
ο 2. No 12(80.0%) 
ο 99 - 
3.2.2 What extension 
does it have? What 






ο 3.Farms within a 
radius of < 50 km2) 
5(10.0%) 
ο 99 1(2.0%) 
ο 1. Oblast - 
ο 2. Rayon 
4(12.5%) 
ο 3. Farms within a 
radius of < 50 km2) 
22(68.8%) 
ο 99 2(6.3%) 
ο 1. Oblast 
7(25.0%) 
ο 2. Rayon 
5(17.9%) 
ο 3. Farms within a 
radius of < 50 km2) 
8(28.6%) 
ο 99 8(28.6%) 
ο 1. Oblast 1(6.7%)
ο 2. Rayon 
7(46.7%) 
ο 3. Farms within a 
radius of < 50 km2) 
5(33.3%) 
ο 99 2(13.3%) 
3.2.3 How often do 
you experience this 
peril during last 20 
years ? (e.g.: One 
















St. Dev.: 13.6/100 
3.2.5 Please indicate, 
how much crop 
losses can it induce 
(in per cent of 
















St. Dev.: 30.5 
3.2.6 What kind of 
risk management 
measures do you 
apply to combat 




–  Insecticides  Choosing the right 
sowing period; 
fumes and water 
film in grape and 
fruit production 
3.2.7  Do you see 
some additional 
possibilities to 
address this peril on 
farm?  
ο 1. Yes 8(16.0%)  
ο 2. No 41(82.0%) 
ο 99 1(2.0%) 
ο 1. Yes - 
ο 2. No 30(93.8%) 
ο 99 2(6.3%) 
ο 1. Yes 7(25.0%) 
ο 2. No 16(57.1%) 
ο 99 5(17.9%) 
ο 1. Yes 2(13.3%)  
ο 2. No 13(86.7%) 
ο 99 - 
If Yes,  
3.2.8  What kind of 
possibilities?  
 
3.2.10 How efficient 
are they? (indicate 
approximately in per 
cent how far crop 
losses can be 
reduced) 
 
3.2.11 Would you 
prefer crop insurance 













ο 1.Yes 2(4.0%) 
ο 2.No 47(94.0%) 












ο 1. Yes - 
ο 2. No 30(93.8%) 
ο 99 2(6.3%) 
 










ο 1. Yes -  
ο 2. No 23(82.1%) 












ο 1. Yes -  
ο 2. No 15 (100%) 
ο 99 - Appendix 
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4  Attitudes to risk 
 
The following questions deal largely with your attitudes.  
The results in brackets express percentages. 
4.1  Please circle the number which best represents your response to the 
following statements (*questions following a survey in the framework of the research project 
"An Economic Evaluation of Risk Management Strategies for Agricultural Production Firms." (see 
PATRICK et al., 1985)) 
           Strongly      Strongly 
           A g r e e    N e u t r a l     D i s a g r e e  
 
1.  "I regard myself as the kind of       1     2     3     4     5 
person who is willing to take a  42(57.5) 1(1.4)  14(19.2) 2(2.7)  11(15.1) 
few more risks than others."  99: 3(4.1) 
 
2.  "I must be willing to take a number      1     2     3     4     5 
of risks to be successful."  59(80.8) 1(1.4)  4(5.5)  –  6(8.2)   
  99: 3(4.1) 
 
3.  "I am generally cautious about        1     2     3     4     5 
accepting new ideas."  30(41.1) 6(8.2)  8(11.0)  2(2.7)  24(32.9) 
  99: 3(4.1) 
 
4.  "I am reluctant about adopting new     1     2     3     4     5 
ways of doing things until I see  35(47.9) 1(1.4)  6(8.2)  1(1.4)  27(37.0) 
them working for people around me."  99: 3(4.1)    
5.  "I am more concerned about large     1     2     3     4     5 
loss in my farm operation than  50(68.5) 1(1.4)  1(1.4)  1(1.4)  16(21.9) 
missing a substantial gain."  99: 4(5.5) 
 
Mean 1-5: 3.20, St. Dev.: 0.99 
Mean 3-5: 2.52, St. Dev.: 1.35 
 
4.2 Assume that a new method of growing cotton (C: n=14)/wheat (W: n=49) 
(main crop) is developed which results in the same yield every year at no 
additional cost. Please check the largest percentage of your current 
expected yield which you would be willing to give up to get the same 
yield every year. 
 
C: 2(14.3) W: 7(14.3)    C: 2(14.3) W: 12(24.5)    C: - W: 3(6.1) 
 0%      10% or less      50% 
          
C: - W: 2(4.1)      C: 6(42.9) W: 13(26.5)    C: - W: 2(4.1) 
  2% or less      20% or less     90% 
          
  C: 2(14.3) W: 5(10.2)    C: 2(14.3) W: 5(10.2) 
  5% or less      30% or less 
 
Mean C:15.00, St. Dev. C:10.00 
Mean W: 18.14, St. Dev.: 19.69 Appendix 
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The next set of questions deals with risk management issues. 
 
4.3  How do you rate the following sources of risk in terms of their importance 
to your farm decision-making? Please  circle the number which best 
indicates the answer. 
          Importance 
  Sources of Risk  Not Important  Very Important 
 
  1. Changes in government commodity  1 2 3 4 5  
programmes  5(6.8) 2(2.7) 28(38.4)  5(6.8) 30(41.1) 
   99:  3(4.1)  Mean: 3.76, St.Dev.:1.25 
  3. Crop yield variability  1 2 3 4 5 
     9(12.3) 2(2.7)  25(34.2)9(12.3)  24(32.9) 
     99:  4(5.5)  Mean: 3.54 St. Dev. 1.35 
4. Crop price variability  1 2 3 4 5 
         1(1.4) -  10(13.7)  5(6.8) 53(72.6) 
         99:  4(5.5)  Mean: 4.58, St. Dev.: .85 
  5. Changes in cost of inputs, such as feed,  1 2 3 4 5 
   seed, fuel, machinery repairs,  - - 16(21.9)  4(5.5)  50(68.5) 
   chemicals, custom services 99:  3(4.1)  Mean: 4.49, St. Dev.: .85 
  6. Changes in land rents  1 2 3 4 5 
         14(19.2)  1(1.4) 16(21.9)  7(6.9) 30(41.1)
     99:  5(6.9)  Mean:3.56, St. Dev.: 1.56 
7. Changes in costs of capital items  1 2 3 4 5 
  (e.g., land, machinery)  4(5.5) 2(2.7) 20(27.4)  6(8.2) 37(50.7) 
       99:  4(5.5)  Mean: 4.01, St. Dev. 1.22 
8. Changes in technology  1 2 3 4 5 
     8(11.0)  3(4.1)  21(28.8) 12(16.4) 26(35.6) 
     99:  3(4.1)  Mean:3.64, St. Dev. 1.33 
9. Changes in interest rates  1 2 3 4 5 
     13(17.8) 4(5.5)  19(26.0) 9(12.3)  25(34.2) 
     99:  3(4.1)  Mean: 3.41, St. Dev.: 1.49 
10. Changes in credit availability  1 2 3 4 5 
     8(11.0)  4(5.5) 16(21.9)  6(8.2) 34(46.6) 
     99:  5(6.8)  Mean: 3.79, St. Dev.: 1.42 
11. Other (specify),     e.g. availability of qualified staff, 




4.4  What are your management responses to risk? Consider the list below 
and indicate the importance of your various responses to risk. Please 
circle the number which best indicates your answer. 
          Importance 
  Risk Management Responses  Not Important  Very Important 
 
1. Diversification of farming enterprises  1 2 3 4 5 
     14(19.2) 4(5.5)  20(27.4) 8(11.0)  24(32.9) 
     99:  3(4.1)  Mean: 2.24, St. Dev.: 1.50 
2. Geographic dispersion of production  1 2 3 4 5 
     21(28.8)  7(9.6) 21(28.8)  5(6.8) 16(21.9) 
     99:  3(4.1)  Mean: 2.83, St. Dev.: 1.51 
3. Being a low-cost producer  1 2 3 4 5 
     4 (5.5) -  16(21.9)  9(12.3)  41(56.2) 
     99:  3(4.1)  Mean: 4.19, St. Dev.: 1.15 
4. Having back-up management/labour  1 2 3 4 5 
     31(42.5)  4(5.5) 14(19.2)  6(8.2) 15(20.5) 
     99:  3(4.1)  Mean: 2.57, St. Dev.: 1.62 
5. Government farm program participation  1 2 3 4 5 
     17(23.3) 5(6.8)  13(17.8) 9(12.3)  25(34.2) 
     99:  3(4.1)  Mean: 3.29, St. Dev.: 1.61 
6. Forward contracting the selling  1 2 3 4 5 
price of crops   24(32.9) 1(1.4)  23(31.5) 10(13.7) 12(16.4) 
       99:  3(4.1)  Mean: 2.79, St. Dev.: 1.48 
7. Multiple peril crop insurance  1 2 3 4 5 
     11(15.1) 1(1.4)  25(34.2) 11(15.1) 22(30.1) 
     99:  3(4.1)  Mean: 3.46, St. Dev.: 1.37 
8. Hail and fire insurance for crops  1 2 3 4 5 
     13(17.8) 4(5.5)  16(21.9) 14(19.2) 23(31.5) 
     99:  3(4.1)  Mean: 3.43, St. Dev.: 1.47 
9. Life insurance for partners  1 2 3 4 5 
     18(24.7) 4(5.5)  25(34.2) 8(11.0)  15(20.5) 
     99:  3(4.1)  Mean: 2.97, St. Dev.: 1.44 
10. Off-farm investments  1 2 3 4 5 
     41(56.2)  4(5.5) 11(15.1)  4(5.5) 8(11.0) 
     99:  3(4.1)  Mean: 2.03, St. Dev.: 1.45 
11. Off-farm employment  1 2 3 4 5 
     3(4.1) 1(1.4) 19(26.0)  10(13.7)  37(50.7) 
     99:  3(4.1)  Mean: 4.10, St. Dev.: 1.12 
12. Maintaining financial/credit reserves  1 2 3 4 5 
     - - 18(24.7)  10(13.7)  42(57.5) 
     99:  3(4.1)  Mean: 4.34, St. Dev.: .87 
13. Debt/leverage management  1 2 3 4 5 
     13(17.8) 1(1.4)  20(27.4) 9(12.3)  27(37.0) 
     99:  3(4.1)  Mean: 3.51, St. Dev.: 1.48 




4.5  About which consequences of risk are you most concerned? Consider the 
list below and circle the number which best indicates your answer. 
Degree of concern 
          Not Concerned         Very Concerned 
 
1. Low income    1 2 3 4 5 
     4(5.5) 1(1.4) 23(31.5)  11(15.1)  31(42.5) 
     99:  3(4.1)  Mean: 3.91, St. Dev.: 1.16 
2. Insolvency    1 2 3 4 5 
     20(27.4) 2(2.7)  14(19.2) 11(15.1) 23(31.5) 
     99:  3(4.1)  Mean: 3.21, St. Dev.: 1.62 
3. No credits    1 2 3 4 5 
     25(34.2)  7(9.6) 7(9.6) 5(6.8) 26(35.6) 
     99:  3(4.1)  Mean: 3.00, St. Dev.: 1.77 
4. Loosing job    1 2 3 4 5 
     39(53.4)  3(4.1) 6(8.2) 6(8.2) 16(21.9) 
     99:  3(4.1)  Mean: 2.39, St. Dev.: 1.71 
5. Equity losses    1 2 3 4 5 
     25(34.2) -  12(16.4) 6(8.2)  27(37.0) 
     99:  3(4.1)  Mean: 3.14, St. Dev.: 1.76 
 
4.6  How do you rate your willingness to take risks relative to other farmers? 
Please give your ratings for your willingness to take risks in farm 
production, product marketing, farm financial aspects, and in overall 
farm management. Please circle the number which best indicates your 
answer. 
 Relative willingness to take risks 
Management Area  Much Less  Much More 
 
1. Farm production  1 2 3 4 5 
     7(9.6) 1(1.4) 31(42.5)  9(12.3)  21(28.8) 
     99:  4(5.5)  Mean: 3.52, St. Dev.: 1.23 
2. Product marketing  1 2 3 4 5 
     7(9.6) 4(5.5) 33(45.2)  4(5.5) 22(30.1) 
     99:  3(4.1)  Mean: 3.43, St. Dev.: 1.27 
3. Farm finance    1 2 3 4 5 
     10(13.7)  6(8.2) 27(37.0)  7(9.6) 20(27.4) 
     99:  3(4.1)  Mean: 3.30, St. Dev.: 1.36 
4. Overall farm management  1 2 3 4 5 
     6(8.2) 3(4.1) 31(42.5)  7(9.6)   22(30.1) 




4.7  Please assess the maximum possible and the average yield of the most 
important crops in your rayon and for your enterprise (unit 100 kg/ha). 
 
Rayon Farm  Crop 
Maximum (μ) Mean  (μ) Maximum  (μ) Mean  (μ) 
Wheat  18.06 13.06 20.23 12.09 
Barley  19.50 13.50 20.60 12.30 
Sunflowers  16.20 13.17 14.33 10.22 
Thank you very much for your co-operation 
 
5  Questions for the enumerator 
 
5.1  What was the degree of co-operation and interest of the interviewed 
person? 
 
1.  didn’t want to co-operate  ο  – 
2.  had only little interest  ο  11(15.1%) 
3.  were more or less indifferent  ο  10(13.7%) 
4.  had some interest  ο  27(37.0%) 
5.  was very interested  ο  21(28.8%) 
 
99: 4 (5.5%), Mean: 3.84, St. Dev.: 1.04 
 
5.2  How well-versed was the person to answer the questions? 
 
1.  not well-versed    ο  13(17.8%) 
2.  little well-versed    ο  21(28.8%) 
3.  relatively well-versed    ο  21(28.8%) 
4.  very well-versed    ο  14(19.2%) 
 
99: 4(5.5%), Mean: 2.52, St. Dev.: 1.02 
 
5.3  With regard to your experience as enumerator, this enumeration worked… 
 
1.  quite bad      ο  3(4.1%) 
2.  worse than normal   ο  6(8.2%) 
3.  normal       ο  30(41.1%) 
4.  better than normal   ο  11(15.1%) 
5.  very good      ο  19(26.0%) 
 
99: 4(5.5%), Mean: 3.54, St. Dev.: 1.20 
 
Comments by the enumerator: Studies on the Agricultural and Food Sector in Central and Eastern Europe 




Vol. 1  The importance of institutions for the transition in Central and 
Eastern Europe with emphasis on agricultural and food industry 
ed. by Klaus Frohberg and Witold-Roger Poganietz 
1998, 137 pages, ISBN 3-8175-0258-3 
 
Vol. 2  The significance of politics and institutions for the design and 
formation of agricultural Policies 
ed. by Klaus Frohberg and Peter Weingarten 
1999, 254 pages, ISBN 3-8175-0289-3 
 
Vol. 3  Food processing and distribution in transition countries.  
Problems and perspectives 
ed. by Monika Hartmann and Jürgen Wandel 
1999, 349 pages, ISBN 3-8175-0293-1 
 
Vol. 4  Die private Nachfrage nach Nahrungsmitteln im Transformations-
prozeß Tschechiens und Polens 
Stephan Brosig (PhD) 
2000, 171 Seiten, ISBN 3-8175-0319-9 
 
Vol. 5  Integrating Estonia into the EU: Quantitative analysis of the 
agricultural and food sector 
Achim Fock (PhD) 
2000, 286 pages, ISBN 3-8175-0320-2 
 
Vol. 6  Competitiveness of agricultural enterprises and farm activities in 
transition countries 
ed. by Peter Tillack and Frauke Pirscher 
2000, 216 pages, ISBN 3-8175-0322-9 
 
Vol. 7  Конкурентоспособность сельскохозяйственных предприятий и 
фермерской деятельности в странах переходного периода 
под редакцией Петера Тиллака и Фрауке Пиршер 
2000, 253 страницы, ISBN 3-8175-0324-5 
 
Vol. 8  Perspectives on agriculture in transition: Analytical issues, modelling 
approaches, and case study results 
ed. by Witold-Roger Poganietz, Alberto Zezza, Klaus Frohberg and 
Kostas G. Stamoulis 
2000, 433 pages, ISBN 3-8175-0323-7 Vol. 9  Land ownership, land markets and their influence on the efficiency of 
agricultural production in Central and Eastern Europe 
ed. by Peter Tillack and Eberhard Schulze 
2000, 485 pages, ISBN 3-8175-0325-3 
 
Vol. 10  Landwirtschaft und Industrie in Russland – Der Transformations-
prozeß in der Ernährungsindustrie 
Jürgen Wandel (PhD) 
2000, 361 Seiten, ISBN 3-8175-0334-2 
 
Vol. 11  Food consumption in Russia. An econometric analysis based on 
household data 
Karin Elsner (PhD) 
2001, 256 pages, ISBN 3-8175-0335-0 
 
Vol. 12  Alexander Wasiljewitsch Tschajanow – Die Tragödie eines großen 
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